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Introduction1
Blind Spots of Knowledge  
in Shakespeare and His World
Subha Mukherji
Blind Spots: A Concept and Its Typology
WHEN, IN KING LEAR, the old man refuses to leave Gloucester despite his bidding, because Gloucester “cannot see [his] way,” the 
blind Gloucester replies, bitterly reflecting on his earlier failure to recog-
nize his sons morally: 
I have no way, and therefore want no eyes.
I stumbled when I saw. Full oft ’tis seen,
Our means secure us and our mere defects 
Prove our commodities ...
(F, 4.1.18–21).2
What do we see when we cannot see, or see defectively? How do our blind 
spots prove our commodities? By extension, what happens when seeing and 
knowing are prised apart? What is the epistemic purchase of unseeing? In the 
same play, Lear questions the familiar sensory hierarchy of Aristotelian episte-
mology, where “sight best helps us to know things,” a privileging also familiar 
from the Platonic tradition where knowing is a kind of seeing.3 Learning the 
cost of his emotional and ethical misrecognitions with each passing moment, 
he ironically severs the function of seeing from that of knowing oneself, and 
even from being known and knowing the other: “Doth any here know me? 
This is not Lear: / [...] Where are his eyes? / [...] Who is it that can tell me 
who I am?” (1.4.246–50). As John Berger writes, “it is seeing which estab-
lishes our place in the surrounding world,” but “the relation between what we 
see and what we know is never settled.”4 He posits seeing as a more complex, 
more active, more mobile activity than a purely optical function, “a question 
of mechanically reacting to stimuli”: “It can only be thought of in this way 
if one isolates the small part of the process which concerns the eye’s retina.”5
Yet even the internal processes of the retina are more dynamic and less 
“settled” than—literally—meets the eye, which sees more than it sees “through 
means secure.” The assumed relation in social discourse between ocular vision 
as vehicle and perception as tenor is unsettlingly reversible. So the optical 
metaphor remains functional, and has an unexpected synergy with the social, 
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psychological, and interpretative acts of seeing to which Berger has trained 
us to be attentive. The “blind spot” is a part of the retina—the optic disc or 
nerve-head—which lacks photoreceptor cells. Hence, no vision is detectable 
at this spot in the visual field. But, by a curious process of readjustment, the 
brain “reads” the blind spot by interpolating it with information from the sur-
rounding field, including the other eye: so the blind spot itself is not visible 
to the eye to which it belongs. But, because of its invisibility in the “normal” 
sense, it induces an optically inventive way of seeing, activating tools of per-
ception not ordinarily in use. It is, thus, analogous at once to a particular point 
in a larger picture that, for different possible reasons, we fail to see and to a 
mental act of seeing that makes up for what is off-scene by seeing indirectly, 
inferentially and imaginatively. But there is a further twist in the paradoxical 
reach of the blind spot as metaphor: in a digital photo of the retina, it looks 
dazzling. Thus, it is at once blind in that it cannot see, or be visible to vision, 
and blindingly bright in its dense, nerve-packed opacity when imaged.
It was not till 1660 that the French physicist Edmé Mariotte— 
sensationally—discovered and documented the blind spot, as noted by 
Supriya Chaudhuri in this volume. Yet the perceptual implications of the 
scotoma in any given monocular field of vision were understood, and in 
productive use, in the cultural imaginary of the late sixteenth and early sev-
enteenth centuries: a contrapuntal strand in the dominant ocularcentrism 
of its texture. Shakespeare, for one, seems to have “known” the blind spot 
of the eye and the mind well before it floated within the ken of science. 
The viewing relations and optical agencies implicated by its “blindness” 
inform and structure his explorations of the forms, processes, and inter-
subjectivity of knowing, our possible engagements with it, and the business 
of representation—making visible and thereby knowable. The love-juice 
with which Puck streaks the lovers’ eyes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
from which the dream of the night arbitrarily ensues, engendering at once 
“hateful fantasies” and unlikely “[enthralments]” (2.1.258; 3.1.116), makes 
the Platonic optics of love run helter-skelter—a playful send-up of what 
George Hakewill (and Stuart Clark, after him) call “the vanity of the eye”: 
the assumptions of the rationalism and primacy of sight.6 But the imperfec-
tions of the eye had particular applications in drama, not least because of the 
ontology of the early modern theatre which relied on activating modes of 
seeing what could not be shown: routinely asking the audience to see with 
“parted eye.”7 Shakespeare picked up on the theatrical potential of this con-
dition as well as its demands, enjoining his viewers to see Dover cliff while 
looking at flat ground, or the vasty fields of France within the wooden O 
of the stage. But he also tuned into the affective, ethical, perceptual, and 
mimetic scope of blindness, blind-spotting, and indeed blind-spot-spotting, 
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pushing the implications of seeing what is not visible, and not seeing what 
is, by deploying his medium. Shakespeare’s works are our focus, but not 
our horizon. This volume, likewise, is an indicative probe rather than an 
exhaustive exploration. We hope that it will thematize an internally comple-
mentary process, between text and hermeneutics, and make it available for a 
wider range of works in the early modern period.
In common parlance, a blind spot is an obstructed view, or an instance 
of partial or partisan perception, or even a localized lack of understanding, 
its meaning sliding from the physical to the cognitive to the epistemologi-
cal. Integral to Shakespeare’s recreation of human reality, both individual and 
relational, this function determines the first kind of blind spot in his works, 
which repeatedly stage moments of unmastered and unmasterable knowl-
edge, whether it is because characters cannot or will not “know” it. This can 
take the form of a perceptual failure or denial within the fiction that can exact 
a devastating cost, as when Emilia in Shakespeare’s Othello—and perhaps 
Gertrude in Hamlet, especially the Folio text—resist knowledges about their 
own agency and their husband’s designs that are accessible, but emotion-
ally unaffordable.8 Obscured by the psyche, they surface like spectres at key 
moments of re-cognition—as when Emilia mutters, on learning of Iago’s vil-
lainy, “I thought so then; I’ll kill myself for grief ” (Othello 5.2.192). As Berger 
says, “to look is an act of choice”; so is not to look.9 Or think of The Winter’s 
Tale when Leontes—with doomful shades of Oedipus—not only declares 
the oracle void of truth, but perversely refuses to see the corrosive damage 
his jealous fury is wreaking on his loved ones, and interprets Mamillius’s 
reactive sickness in the light of the only knowledge in his sight: “Conceiving 
the dishonour of his mother! / He straight declin’d, drooped, took it 
deeply, / [...] / And downright languish’d” (The Winter’s Tale 2.3.13–17). 
Looking the obvious in the face, Leontes fails to see it. His vision is so skewed 
by his “too much [belief ]” in his “own suspicion” (3.2.151) that he forgets 
the sanity of seeing at its simplest, most lucid level as he declares its irrel-
evance in proving his wife’s assumed guilt: 
...     Camillo’s flight,
Added to their familiarity,
(Which was as gross as ever touch’d conjecture,
That lack’d sight only, nought for approbation
But only seeing ...
(2.1.174–78).
Cognitive blind spots can show us how precariously close suspicion is to 
conviction, and how hopelessly entangled knowledge is with the force of 
belief, for better or for worse.10
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But let us take a more layered example—an instance of a blind spot 
of knowledge which slides from mimetic content to representational con-
cern, operating not only at the threshold between the self and the other, 
but also between the text and the reader. Significantly, it is a scene of view-
ing. As the raped Lucrece laments at length before disclosing her plight to 
her husband in the narrative poem, The Rape of Lucrece, she comes to face 
a tapestry (or panel-painting ) depicting the siege of Troy. In a crowded 
canvas, her eyes fasten on one detail, “a face where all distress is stelled” 
(line 1444): this is “despairing Hecuba” (line 1447), a passive sufferer with 
whom she can identify. “[Throwing] her eyes about the painting round,” 
she extends her lament to “who she finds forlorn” (1499–1500), all other 
figures and themes being (as it were) invisible to her eyes. But then she 
pauses on “the perjured Sinon” (line 1522)—in her mind, the cause of 
Hecuba’s grief, having been the direct instrument of the siege of Troy. 
Indignant that he should have “so fair a form,” “with a mind so ill,” her 
outrage mounts to destructive rage as she identifies him with her rapist 
Tarquin who had a similarly deceptive exterior: 
Here, all enraged, such passion her assails,
That patience is quite beaten from her breast;
She tears the senseless Sinon with her nails,
Comparing him to that unhappy guest
Whose deed hath made herself herself detest.
(lines 1562–66)
In her fit of passion, she fails to see that the painted Sinon is “senseless” 
and ends up destroying the artwork. Soon enough, she herself registers the 
hysteria, indeed almost ridiculousness, of her naïve response as a quieter 
maturity dawns: “At last she smilingly with this gives o’er: / ‘Fool, fool,’ 
quoth she, ‘his wounds will not be sore’” (lines 1567–68). In a poem much 
engaged with the affect and ethics of response, especially to pain, Lucrece’s 
empathy may seem to qualify her to give the voiceless Hecuba’s grief a 
tongue, unlike Marcus’s rhetorical, aestheticizing, over-eloquent attempt 
to speak for the raped, tongueless Lavinia in the other work Shakespeare 
wrote about rape and representation around the same time as the poem: 
Titus Andronicus. Marcus’s dissonant address feels, even if it is not, emo-
tionally detached from its subject, while Lucrece is not only both reader 
and writer, but subject as well as object. Yet Lucrece’s extreme identifica-
tion makes her blind to the fundamental difference between art and life, 
if only for an extended moment. So here is a blind spot that confronts us, 
through textual inscription, with our own relation to works of art. Do we 
need to unsee the affective reality and subjecthood of characters within a 
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fiction, to be sophisticated consumers of art? What are the limits of empa-
thy in aesthetic response? Can identification—infeeling—be the blind spot 
which, instead of helping, closes the critical distance that empathy actively 
needs as material for reaching across, as space for bridging ? Dipping 
back, for a moment, from reflexive art into inset life, we might consider 
how Titus forgets basic distinctions in his ludicrously disproportionate 
railing against Marcus for killing a fly: “How if that fly had a father and 
mother?” (Titus Andronicus 3.2.60). Pace the blind spot of certain strands 
of ecocritical readings of a seamless continuum between human and ani-
mal life in such moments, the theatre audience invariably laugh and share 
Marcus’s incomprehension—“Alas, my lord, I have but kill’d a fly”—even 
while they register the extremity of grief that makes Titus overidentify with 
any infinitely suffering thing (Titus 3.2.59). The tradition of archly witty 
exercises in the disproportion between a literary genre and its small sub-
jects (and tropes) was established enough to provide a playfully parodic 
context to the fly-killing scene—from Lucian’s encomium “In Praise of a 
Fly,” to Spenser’s “Muiopotmos, or the Fate of the Butterflie,” and Donne’s 
“The Flea.”11 The faintly ironic frames or overtones of these moments in 
Shakespeare refract our vision. A character’s encounter with a fly, no less 
than another’s with the painting of an epic war, raises questions about the 
blind spots of aesthetic encounter. What excesses of its own does tragedy 
tend not to acknowledge, which outsiders to the high tragic culture—
a Moorish Aaron, say, “[prying ] ... through the crevice of a wall” at the 
Roman Titus’s hand being swapped for his sons’ heads—would laugh at 
till their “eyes were rainy like to his” (Titus 5.1.114, 117)? In the 1590s, 
Shakespeare’s “crannied [holes]” tend to figure apertures through which 
one genre refracts into another, making us see in a different key. So the 
comic Bottom “as” the tragic Pyramus pleads to his “lovely wall”: “Show me 
thy chink, to blink through with mine eyne” (Dream 5.1.156; 174).
Another instance of a blind spot presenting itself as an encoun-
ter in the text that invites a recalibrated encounter with the text is the 
double report of Brutus’s wife Portia’s death in Julius Caesar. Anyone 
who was taught by the late Tony Nuttall will have been faced with this 
puzzling re-occurrence in the Folio and asked to make sense of it. Is it 
another textual error or corruption? A repetition that someone—maybe 
Shakespeare—forgot to take out during some sort of process of revi-
sion? There are potential indications in the relevant section—not least in 
the variety of speech headings for Cassi/Cas/Cass, and the unique stage 
direction of “Boy” to replace Messala—of incomplete revision and inter-
polations at two stages of composition.12 Here is the anomaly. Cassius and 
Brutus have uneasily made up after an angry altercation, but, when Brutus 
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intimates a hinterland of heart-struck sorrow—“O Cassius, I am sick of 
many griefs”—Cassius cannot resist a last jab: “Of your philosophy you 
make no use, / If you give place to accidental evils” (4.1.145–46). This 
prompts Brutus to reply, slightly defensively, “No man bears sorrow better. 
Portia is dead” (4.1.147), and leads him to disclose the terrible manner 
of her suicide. Cassius is suitably mortified, as this is a far stronger justi-
fication of Brutus’s disturbed state of mind than his own poor excuse of 
a “rash humour” his mother gave him (4.1.120) for his own ill temper. 
The impact of the revelation seems about to be helpfully defused by the 
entrance of Lucius, and then of Messala and Titinius, allowing Brutus to 
stop Cassius from harping on the unbearable subject: “No more, I pray 
you” (4.1.166). But Messala leads up, through probing questions, to the 
subject of Portia’s death. Trying and failing to throw him off track, Brutus 
realizes he has to engage and pretends he has not heard anything: “Now, 
as you are a Roman, tell me true.” Messala comes right back at him on his 
terms: “Then like a Roman bear the truth I tell, / For certain, she is dead, 
and by strange manner” (4.1.186, 4.1.187–88). Brutus “reacts” with what, 
to Cassius, is at once duplicity and an astonishing display of fortitude: 
Why, farewell, Portia: we must die, Messala.
With meditating that she must die once
I have the patience to endure it now.
(4.1.190–92)
Messala observes, with hushed admiration, “Even so great men great losses 
should endure” (4.1.193). Cassius, more knowingly, remarks:
I have as much of this in art as you,
But yet my nature could not bear it so.
(4.1.194–95)
Are we to assume, because it lacks immediate coherence, that the double 
announcement must be an oversight? Or should we read the duplication as a 
dramatic shape, inducing us into a way of seeing what cannot be owned within 
the parameters of the Rome that these characters inhabit: the parallel pro-
cesses of a keenly felt challenge to Brutus’s Roman identity; the inseparability 
of this identity from the ethic of Stoicism—the “philosophy” Cassius alludes 
to; the distance between Brutus’s private, emotional self and his public, polit-
ical persona; and the high Stoic manner as the stuff of performance, and the 
affective repressions and evasions it demands? If we had the second report 
alone, we might have found Brutus’s response almost inhuman—exemplify-
ing the static model of Stoicism as a freedom from emotional disturbance.13 
If we had the first alone, we would only have seen his fragility. Together, they 
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show us the dynamic arc from a bleak, all too human bereavement to a formal, 
willed control of emotions. This is also an insight into the half-lit cognitive 
crevices and bypaths of the intense relationship between Brutus and Cassius. 
Nuttall suggests that this textual crux—which has divided editors—invites 
us to step out of the “customary canons of art” by probing the tautness of 
the moment in terms of the emotional life of the characters, to read nature 
into art.14 This feels right. And such redirection of attention is, typically, a 
function of our encounters with blind spots in artworks.
The implication of recasting seeing distinguishes a range of 
Shakespearean blind spots, often combining with other properties. The 
recalibration that is so central to the optical functions of the blind spot 
models a hermeneutic encounter where the conventional processing of 
information is disrupted and diverted. When inscribed in the action, this 
has the potential to be tragic: think of situations where characters misread 
from circumstantial evidence, supplementing what is invisible or obscure 
by bending their gaze, reading inferentially from a semiotic neighbor-
hood. Typically, this variety of oblique reading operates in an evidentiary 
dramatic structure. When Diana in All’s Well that Ends Well enargei-
cally presents a ring to incriminate Bertram—“O, behold this ring”—the 
Countess is convinced that she is his wife and, further, that he has mur-
dered his wife: “That ring’s a thousand proofs” (All’s Well 5.3.191, 199). 
Yet, as the plot unravels, it turns out to prove, rather, the manipulative 
potency of visual tokens presented as synecdochic parts of an invisible sce-
nario. We also see the ironic susceptibility of a defendant to a counter-use 
of over-freighted signs, as Bertram stakes his honesty on the same object: 
If you shall prove
This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy
Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence ...
(5.3.124–26)
In the event, the ring does prove he had meant to sleep with Diana, but 
not with any intention to marry her, and that he had in fact slept with his 
lawfully wedded wife—showing how evidential inference from sensible con-
tiguous signs can be a slippery index to both deed and thought.15 Emotional 
situations dominated by sexual jealousy tend to focus such processes with 
particular imaginative force, for, in the grip of passionate suspicion, we make 
the world we see, though we take our cues from the visible world around us: 
Othello “wear[s]” his eyes to watch his wife but images what is not through 
his mind (3.3.198). Cymbeline offers a paradigmatic example in Posthumus’s 
disastrous mis-seeing of Iachimo’s vividly visual evocation of “corpo-
ral [signs]” of his supposed enjoyment of Imogen’s body, backed up with 
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visible material tokens from the alleged scene of “incontinency” (Cymbeline 
2.4.119, 127). But the foregrounded and dilatory jouissance of Iachimo’s nar-
rative recreation, both when he convinces Posthumus and when he recounts 
the bedroom scene again by way of confession, manifests Shakespeare’s 
acute alertness to the potential non-congruence of enargeia with evidence: 
an equation derived from the Latin rhetorical tradition and, more spe-
cifically, its translation of enargeia as evidentia.16 Their assumed identity is 
undercut as rhetorical temptation is shown to outstrip legal necessity. So, in 
the Shakespearean theatre, enargeia becomes the blind spot of the judicial 
imagination, with rhetoric at once shaping, and helping us deconstruct, the 
temptations and errors of the mind’s eye.
Yet, in an almost chiastic move, precisely such cognitive diversions 
can take a productive form when the text demands a reorientation of our 
position as the knowing subject to the object of knowledge. In Troilus and 
Cressida, faced with a Cressida he cannot recognize by his unitary code 
of human nature—“This is, and is not, Cressid”—Troilus muses on “the 
spacious breadth of this division” which “admits no orifex for a point as 
subtle / As Ariachne’s broken woof to enter” (5.2.146; 150–52). There 
is an obvious wobble in the text here, which the Riverside editors call 
“Shakespeare’s error for the name of Arachne, who, according to Ovid ... 
was turned into a spider by Pallas.”17 But the designation of “error” may 
be a blind spot refusing to see around this fracture in the text, this vis-
ible obscurity, to find the luminousness of Shakespeare’s conflation. For 
if he is half-remembering Arachne’s spiderweb in talking of Ariadne’s 
thread, given to Theseus to help him out of the Cretan maze, that would 
be a glimpse of how the tremor of a single image can capture the closeness 
between the sinister labyrinth that traps and the clue that guides.
If Shakespeare’s own errors are acts of mingled memory opening up 
a corridor of knowingness that “correct” rendering—or seeing straight—
would have left closed, his characters’ mistaking eyes seem, often, to similarly 
defer the closure of a text. Sometimes this can take the opposite form to see-
ing “double” (Dream 4.1.190): collapsing persons and identities that should 
be distinct. Even as he correctly sees Polixenes’s features in his son, Florizel, 
who presents Perdita as his wife, Leontes fails to recognize his long-lost 
daughter. The truancy here is deeper and darker than mere sensory failure. 
When Florizel says that his father, Polixenes, would “grant precious things 
as trifles” at his old friend Leontes’s bidding, Leontes immediately replies 
that in that case he would “beg [his] precious mistress / Which he counts 
but as a trifle.” If this is a joke, its uneasiness is sealed by Paulina’s reprimand: 
“Sir, my liege, / Your eye hath too much youth in’t,” reminding Leontes of 
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Hermione’s superior mature beauty even at the time of her death. Leontes 
replies hastily: “I thought of her / Even as these looks I made” (The Winter’s 
Tale 5.1.222–27). This moment was bound to call up, in Shakespeare’s 
theatre, the incestuous passion of the father for the daughter in the 
Shakespeare’s source text, Greene’s hugely popular prose romance Pandosto 
(1588).18 Indeed, it anticipates that other glimpse of kink through a literary 
prehistory—Ovid’s Pygmalion and his sex-doll—at the moment when 
Leontes moves to kiss the supposed statue of Hermione and Paulina restrains 
him, saying that the paint is still wet. Miscognition in the plot, here, acts as a 
productive distortion of the intertextual lens, generating new interpretative 
possibilities. The mischief written into such errant seeing could be seen to 
work at the expense of the characters’ sense of self, but as aesthetic capital, 
if played with suitable authenticity on stage. Somewhat similarly to Troilus 
and Cressida, blind spots of knowledge at moments such as these could 
enact the ironic variance between the mimetic reality of the characters’ 
emotional lives and their helplessly pre-scripted status in literary history. Yet, 
at the same time, blind spots have a way of teetering on the verge between 
almost alienated subjecthood and subjective emotional lives. For Leontes’s 
encounter with the grown-up Perdita is not just a hint of incestuous attrac-
tion drifting in from the genetic past of the text, but also a deep longing for 
her to be Hermione in the living moment, just as that later moment of a 
near-kiss embodies a heartrending desire for the return of love. These oddly 
disruptive moments of temporal telescoping are little puncta in “the opti-
cal unconscious”—to borrow Rosalind Krauss’s term—opening not only 
into corridors of intertextual and psychosexual memory, but also into well-
springs of affective fantasies that are unutterable except through indirection 
because they are so extreme in their improbability.19 They fray the surface of 
the text to make us see both beneath, and beyond, what can be shown.
Blind spots such as these are also, potentially, a generic threshold. 
The glimpse of the buried knowledge of the father–daughter story in The 
Winter’s Tale is also the pivot on which genres turn: it contains in a single 
event the translation of Pandosto’s suicidally tragic passion into a tragi-
comedy of restoration, as if allowing desire to transit from repression to 
wish-fulfilment. “What you know, you know,” says Iago, in an ultimate 
defiance of evidential epistemology and propelling an unbearable tragedy 
to its unyielding end in Othello (5.2.303). But the words his line echoes 
most closely are from Dromio of Ephesus, in the early comedy The Comedy 
of Errors: “I know what I know” (3.1.11). Are cognitive blind spots—
faced or fashioned—generically Janus-faced? Or do they face us with 
the contrivance of generic structures by pushing the bounds of one genre 
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towards another? To reclaim a responsible relation with its living mate-
rial, for example, comedy forges a language that works against the grain of 
its own conventional underpinnings: witness Hermione’s anguished but 
sharp question to Leontes when he first erupts with jealous fury: “What 
is this? Sport?” (The Winter’s Tale 2.1.58); or Beatrice’s seemingly dispro-
portionate and generically out-of-place demand of Benedick, in Much 
Ado About Nothing, after his friend emotionally kills hers: “Kill Claudio” 
(Much Ado 4.1.289). In the final moments of the Folio tragedy of Lear, 
on the other hand, Lear’s blind spot and ours come together as opposed 
generic affects brush against each other. With the dead Cordelia in his 
arms, Lear glides from recognition—“Thou’lt come no more” (5.3.281)—
to possible misrecognition, dying on these words: “Do you see this? Look 
on her, look, her lips, / Look there, look there” (5.3.284–85). The range of 
ways in which directors, actors, editors, and indeed readers want to inter-
pret, and have rendered, these lines mirrors the blind spots in our own 
imagined vision of tragic ending, tragic magnitude, and tragic knowledge.
The agency of the theatre vis-à-vis textually open and indetermi-
nate moments brings us to the blind spot of embodiment. Shakespeare’s 
“open silences,” to borrow Philip Maguire’s phrase, become an operative 
counterpart to what cannot be shown.20 What cannot be heard, no less 
than the invisible, directs our attention to the ways in which performance 
can forestall closure. On occasions, like the errors in or of the text, these 
mark portals into textual prehistories and reach for information in the 
“backward and abysm of time.”21 In North’s Plutarch (1579), Shakespeare’s 
source text for Coriolanus, Tacita is the Roman goddess of silence: 
“[Numa] taught the Romans to reverence one of them above all the rest, 
who was called Tacita, as ye would say Lady Silence.”22 As with the affective 
translation of Ovid and Greene in The Winter’s Tale, so here, the narra-
tive source is made to speak its silence on stage. On the triumphant return 
of Coriolanus to Rome in Act II, his greeting to his wife Virgilia turns 
the spotlight on her eloquently speechless presence: “My gracious silence, 
hail!” (2.1.175). Prefiguration helps cast silence as an island of sacrosanct 
intimacy and tenderness in a clamorous scene; it also makes Virgilia’s 
inwardness shimmer—intimating its reality but not giving away its sub-
stance. The blind spot of the play text, in examples such as this, intimates a 
model of memory and marks a type of literary interrelation between past 
and present.
The other kind of non-verbal gap—the one explored by Maguire—
consists of features that determine the meanings of speechless moments 
by drawing on the emotional environment around them. The mutilated 
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Lavinia in Titus, speechless from Act 2 scene 4 onwards, in a different con-
text is the most vivid presence on stage; the theatre has to decide how to 
mediate, or make known, her inner state through action. But, if this is a 
moment that can draw both horizontally and vertically (so to speak) from 
the affective neighborhood in the play as well as from its Ovidian past, 
the silent Isabella facing the duke’s uneasy speech at the end of Measure 
for Measure presents a gap in the fabric of the action which can only take 
shape in performance, out of the extratextual resources of the play itself: 
I have seen as many interpretations as there are Isabellas on stage. The 
play text, here, acts as the retinal nerve sheet, where moments of silence 
are openings for actors and director to fill in, just as the eye—helped by 
the brain—fills in the cavity where the optic nerve enters with informa-
tion from the adjoining field. These blind spots, then, create an interface 
at which choices need to be made. Barthes talks of the distance between 
crude knowledge and subtle life as one that is “corrected” by literature, just 
as the brain corrects the visual void of the blind spot.23 Yet the model is 
less stable than “correction” when it comes to performance. Such choices 
in the theatre need to negotiate the mobile boundary between knowledge 
as lived experience within the fiction and what the text knows, and, in 
turn, between both of these and what—and how much—the text would 
have the reader or viewer know. These imbrications create an ecology of 
knowledges that is never entirely predictable or fixable.
Irreducibility takes several forms. The Other is a foreign country, 
as so many plays show: witness Othello or The Winter’s Tale, or, in a more 
metaphysical key, Troilus. But sometimes, so is the self. The inevitable par-
tiality of self-knowledge is a trigger for the undoing of Lear, who “hath 
ever but slenderly known himself ” (1.1.292–93); this in turn makes him 
blind to the difference between rhetoric and intention, between the effu-
sive Regan or Goneril and the reticent Cordelia. But the unknowability 
of the self can take stranger forms. Early on in Troilus, Cressida uses the 
construct of an unknowable interior as a defence against the threatening 
ability of a world of men to exhaust her, and her identity, through their 
desire: “Then though my heart’s content firm love doth bear, / Nothing 
of that shall from mine eyes appear” (1.2.254–55). But in a painful twist, 
when she does perhaps, finally and desperately, want to make herself known 
in a letter to Troilus, her intentional self is rendered unknowable as the 
play stops her mouth; Troilus shreds and scatters the letter, unread, declar-
ing, “Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart” (5.3.108). 
The inexpressible becomes hopelessly entangled with the unknowable in a 
failed act of communication.
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There are cultural contexts in which such irony has particular res-
onance in the period’s literature. Despair at the inability to make one’s 
heart legible becomes the tragedy of the actively repentant conscience 
in the providentialist play A Warning or Fair Women.24 When Anne 
Sanders, who stooped to folly and sought concealment of her guilt ear-
lier, yearns to make her inward state visible and knowable to the world, 
the optative mode of her expression inscribes transparency as a fantasy: 
“... were my breast transparent, / That what is figured there, might be 
perceiv’d / Now should you see the very image of poore / And totter’d 
ruines, and a slain conscience ...” (Warning 2654–57). In Troilus, a play 
where reading—of others and of texts—is endless and endlessly relativ-
ized, the abortion of Cressida’s attempt to make and make known her 
own meaning has a wider philosophical dimension. Part of the play’s 
way of being true to this is to translate the author’s (real or feigned) 
cognitive aversion in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde—“Men seyn, I not, 
that she yaf him hir herte” (1050)25—to the text’s own reticence, which 
takes over a character’s reticence, at once denying her agency in the lived 
situation and, possibly, preserving the mystery and indeterminacy of 
her selfhood at the aesthetic level. Even though Cressida cannot speak 
back and control or correct possible responses to her, Troilus’s epistemo-
logically arrogant verdict mediating the unread letter to the audience is 
bound to be placed in the context of this hyper-mediated play’s by-now-
irreversible ironizing of mediation. She remains the blind spot in the 
visual field of the dramatic action that the audience view, but the play 
itself has turned this field into a treacherous repository of corrective or 
supplementary information by this time. Blind spots such as these make 
unknowability unmissable, just as they often represent the limits of rep-
resentation—as in scenes of sex and/or murder, whether in Othello or in 
Macbeth. Consider the optically framed discovery scene in Heywood’s 
A Woman Killed with Kindness, where the defining sight is only evoked 
by its undemonstrability, as we see the probative husband enter his 
inner sanctum with a prayer to heaven to “keep [his] eyes,” to find his 
wife and her lover in bed and rush out crying , “O, O.”26 The unseen 
bedchamber is foregrounded as ocular proof, while the “dark lantern” 
with which he enters is an evocative object as well as a trope for mak-
ing invisibility glow. The defiant obscurity of the inaudible and invisible 
textual moments we address incites and lures interpretation by their very 
conspicuousness. Could we, then, talk of translucency as an emergent 
representational idiom in these knowing texts, locating opacity between 
construction and happening?
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How, then, are we to know when not to fill in the gaps? What are the 
limits of translation? Performance can forestall closure, yes; but individual 
performative events—narrative or theatrical—can also push particular 
meanings towards preservation. What do the cognitive witholdings of 
texts and authors tell us about the event of knowledge, or of the motives 
of knowing informing the hermeneutic act? The ending of Ivan Turgenev’s 
narrative adaptation of Shakespeare’s Lear, “King Lear of the Steppes,” 
brilliantly plays with the possibilities and mirrors our own desires back 
to us, along with our disowning of them.27 But the reader’s expectation of 
Turgenev’s narrative is also overlaid by recognition—rooted in a knowl-
edge of the Lear story, its unmistakable referent—just as the Folio play 
of Lear itself plays with the audience’s knowledge of the sentimental 
providentialism of the old play, The True Chronicle History of King Leir 
(1594). At the end of the tender, quasi-pastoral reunion scene between 
Lear and Cordelia, Lear pleads with his daughter: “Pray you now, forget 
and forgive” (4.6.77). This is the same Lear as the one who comes out with 
the dead Cordelia’s body in his arms and declares that he has killed the 
slave that was “a-hanging” her (F, 5.3.248)—a far cry from the tediously 
pious Leir. In Turgenev, Harlov—the Lear character—is on top of his 
own house, which he had unwisely given away to his daughters, destroy-
ing it brick by brick and about to collapse with it, when Yvlempia—a 
complex “Cordelia”—tries to turn the wheel: “Forgive us. Forgive me” 
(162). In a reworking of the prison scene in Lear, she tenderly urges him 
to come down and live with her “as in Christ’s own bosom” and pleads 
in a “caressing” voice, “forget the past. [...] Now forgive us” (163). But, 
inexorably, he topples down with the house, his heavy frame crushed by 
the beam of the roof. As he lies hallucinating, his eyes fix on Yvlempia and 
“he [utters], barely audibly: ‘Well, daughter ... It’s you I won’t for ...’.” His 
fracture is revealed by his autopsy, but the intended final words remains 
a mystery. The first-person narrator, a young boy at the time, is haunted 
by it: “What did he want to say to her as he died? I asked myself the 
whole way back home on my horse: ‘It’s you I won’t for-get ...’ or ‘It’s you 
I won’t for-give ...’? [...] I decided in the end that he’d wanted to forgive” 
(266–67). In this wishful rewriting, what stares back at us is the episte-
mological spuriousness of the closure we want, as well as a human need 
for it that is both experiential and aesthetic. The strand of primal venge-
fulness that is sporadically visible in Shakespeare’s Lear forms the texture 
of the weave in Turgenev’s conception of Harlov; the familiar, canonized, 
and more readily acknowledged dimensions of love, reunion, and forgive-
ness in the father–daughter plot of King Lear are evoked to be relocated, 
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with wistful gentleness, in fantasy. But while the knowledge we choose (or 
“decide” on) is fictive, the knowledge the narrative holds back, like Harlov’s 
feelings—and perhaps unlike Iago’s constructed interior—is “the signature 
of its plenitude.” Like Barthes’s “classic text,” it remains pensive: “replete 
with meaning ... it still seems to keep in reserve one last meaning, which it 
does not express, but whose place it keeps free and signifying. [...] Just as 
the pensiveness of a face signals that this head is full of language held back 
... like the visage, the text becomes expressive ... blessed with interiority.”28 
And we, on our blind-spotting tour, are left musing on the relation between 
the inexpressible and the unexpressed.
Blind-Spot-Spotting: An Adventure
Blind spots in Shakespeare, as we have seen, not only straddle mimesis 
and poiesis, but bring them into dialogue. Focusing on a range of differ-
ent moments, and levels, of apparent obscurity, this book puts methods, 
motives, and the ends of knowing in the spotlight—rather than simply 
the condition of knowledge—and shows how this provocation emerges 
organically from the matrix of Shakespeare’s works. It is alert both to 
inscribed acts of blind-sighting within the texts and to the text or action 
blind-sighting the reader or spectator—and what insights such blindness 
might offer. Obscurity has a hallowed genealogy in literary traditions, both 
creative and critical. Narratives hold on to their secrets, luring interpret-
ers to navigate the precarious waters between what Frank Kermode calls 
the “the latent” and “the manifest” in his provocative essay on hermeneu-
tics: his “interpretation of interpretation.”29 This is a zone that our volume 
seeks to probe, even if charting it might be a contradiction in terms. The 
aim is not so much to resolve, or dissolve, the mystery—though unveiling 
may sometimes be a by-product—as to grasp the process by which literary 
works invite and induce unsuspected ways of perceiving that go beyond 
mere seeing. To an extent, this is about finding ways of accessing inaccessi-
bility as a productive textual artifact that trains us to be receptive to more 
than the primary sense, and opens us up to knowledges that lurk beneath 
the verisimilar surface, resisting reducibility.
Philip Weinstein, in Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction, offers 
a brilliant explication of modernism as a reaction against, and undoing of, 
the epistemic project of realism in post-Enlightenment fiction.30 Focusing 
on Proust, Kafka, and Faulkner as his indicative examples, Weinstein shows 
these artists embracing unknowing as a route into a different kind of know-
ing from the one premised on realist narrative’s denials: its denial of its own 
emplotments, its disowning of its own manipulation of the unknowable, 
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and its fabrication of the fantasy of a fit between the knowing subject and 
the knowable object, whether the latter is the self or the other or the world. 
Modernist fiction’s refusal of such fantasies, Weinstein argues, “releases 
narrative from the failed project of knowing”; its engagements must be under-
stood not as knowing but as acknowledgment, eschewing epistemological 
control and commodification (p. 5). Weinstein identifies this liberation as 
a response to realism inspired by two centuries of Enlightenment and its 
project of knowing, though he gestures back towards Bacon’s observational 
procedures and Descartes’s formulation of the knowing subject as he glances 
en passant at the prehistories of the Enlightenment narrative (p. 3). Yet 
Bacon, the oft-cited progenitor of the long Enlightenment, understood the 
limits of knowing: in the context of the knowledge of God, or of excellence, 
he can only speak of “no knowledge, but wonder, which is nothing else but 
contemplation broken off, or losing itself.”31
Many of the textual moves Weinstein locates in modernist prose fic-
tion are noticeable in the early modern period, perhaps most notably in 
Shakespeare. As Stephen Orgel brilliantly intuited, there is “a poetics of 
incomprehensibility” written into Shakespeare’s drama which we owe it 
to the works not to reduce “to our own brand of common sense.”32 Yet, in 
the almost three decades since then, criticism has still mostly focused on 
trying to make sense of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, rather than 
feeling its way through their non-sense. This book attempts to rectify that 
blind spot of criticism. What settled hermeneutic positions might such 
recalcitrance be reacting to? Or are such resistances more embedded in 
early modern approaches to knowledge, but elude existing paradigms? The 
formal translations here are distinct, but the probing of unknowing, intima-
tions, obstructed knowledge, or indirection, as conditions of a reoriented 
and recalibrated attention, is an integral part of Shakespeare’s dramatic tech-
nique and his vision of how we represent and relate to the world around us. 
Theseus, the rationalist, mocks “apprehension” and champions “cool reason’s 
comprehension.” But, as Hippolyta intuits, the shared perceptual errors—
pertinently, the result of a “hateful imperfection of [the] eye”—that might 
seem to do anything but bring clear knowledge, “grows to something of great 
constancy / But, howsoever, strange and admirable” (4.1.63; 5.1.26–27). 
The double adversative—“but, howsoever”—captures precisely the para-
dox of distorted vision as a productive artifact. When Posthumus asks, at a 
critical moment in the final scene of Cymbeline, “How come these staggers 
upon me?” (5.2.233; my italics), the sense is one of cognitive tottering and 
bewilderment, given the context of multiple revelations of misrecognitions—
which Belarius names “error” (5.5.260)—and “recognitions” dizzyingly 
piled on one another; from this excess of “matter” (5.5.243), a distilled 
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knowledge is gleaned when Posthumus and Imogen embrace in reunion and 
reify and embody the tree image encoded in the riddle on the tablet Posthumus 
discovered on his bosom on waking from his dream of Jupiter: “Hang there 
like fruit, my soul, / Till the tree die” (5.5.263–24). As the soothsayer pro-
ceeds, shortly after this moment, to offer his “construction” of the tablet 
(5.5.434–45), his explication feels redundant, for its truth—at least for the 
audience—has already been absorbed visibly into felt experience. Posthumus’s 
distinction between “collection” and “construction” at this point (432, 433) is 
significant, as they gesture towards two modes of knowing, in a play that keeps 
positing the affective language of the theatre audaciously against interpreta-
tion and explication, as a less definable but more vivid and capacious cognitive 
alternative. It is a mode of knowing that works through staggers, a feeling of 
déjà vu, or a sense of disorientation, through barely grasped but nonetheless felt 
traces: a dreamlike haunting which is, notwithstanding, “like” “the action of 
[one’s] life” (5.4.149). In a different key, what are the implications of the games 
of knowledge that Edgar plays with his blind father, or (in a comic context) 
Lancelot Gobbo with his, and Malcolm with Macduff, setting up false trials of 
their own? These perplexities in the plot do not fit established epistemic narra-
tives; we do not quite know how to make sense of them. When Polonius talked 
about how we, in our reach for wisdom, “with windlasses and assays of bias / 
By indirections find directions out,” his immediate context is strategic— 
imagined as “a bait of falsehood that takes the carp of truth” (2.1.62–63; 60). 
This pompous old man’s own pleonastic circuitousness as he expounds on the 
acuity of round-about routes to knowing raises a smile. But the image has a 
wider resonance for Shakespeare’s own textual strategies, as he characteristi-
cally subjects them to gentle mockery. A windlass is a winch—usually in a 
ship—which hauls an object or a weight up through cranking, but it is the 
context suggested by the OED which is perhaps more relevant here—its origi-
nal reference to a maneuver of interruption in a game of hunting. “Assays of 
bias” are circular moves, curving rather than direct, by which, in a game of 
bowls, the player brings the ball round through bias rather than trying to aim 
directly at the Jack.
The essays in this volume are all, in one sense or another, blind- 
spot-spotters. They make us look hard at the things that go bump in the text 
or in systems of knowledge: small things that do not fit, are not what they 
seem, which throw us, but lead us to worlds elsewhere—to what Bottom 
calls “deep things”—if we know how to outstare them. Such are the seem-
ingly nonsensical linguistic knots in Twelfth Night that Adam Zucker 
points us to: once we are jolted to look differently, they bristle with sense. 
The “baffles” of this play are apparently obstructive mechanical levers, 
like Polonius’s “assays,” making us gaze intensely where our eyes would 
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normally glaze over. Like the device that acts as a “problem-solving [barrier]” 
in the making of rockets, these inscribed linguistic obscurities are shown by 
Adam to be an inset figure and analogue for the hermeneutic challenges pro-
duced by the distance of time and cultural context in our encounters with 
the play(s); they push us to forge new reading strategies in response to the 
unsettling of assumed knowledges and temporal alienation.
Gil Harris’s essay links up with Adam’s in zooming in on things 
that seem foreign, literally and epistemologically, and then making won-
der seem familiar by showing how they act as a contact zone between 
worlds divided by time and space. His focus is Shakespeare’s “nuts,” and 
his hinterland the blind spots in Shakespeare’s own understanding of these 
threshold spaces. In the process, he provocatively gestures at new, twenty-
first-century approaches to Shakespeare, informed by critical positions 
that accommodate global and multicultural translations. Located in the 
“edible contact zone,” the nutty protagonist of Gil’s narrative identifies 
somatic agency as the blind spot of ethnography and cultural criticism.
Cutting right to the heart of the physiological metaphor, Supriya 
Chaudhuri’s essay offers a perfect example of how blind spots in the text 
induce a diversion of normal routes of seeing. Through a phenomeno-
logically layered argument, she demonstrates how Othello’s inferential and 
understood knowledge, derived through mis-seeing what is not there to be 
seen, is taken by him to be “ocular proof.” The optical process of supple-
mentation from off-scene (or obscene) information is, here, shown to find a 
catastrophic analogue in a character’s incapacity to see what makes him see.33 
This may prompt the further question of the relative agencies and motives of 
such circumstantial information-gathering, for, in this analogy, the manipu-
lative Iago is the operative counterpart of the brain’s act of automatic visual 
compensation, with no human choice involved. What does the crafty epis-
temic agent in a play do to what Supriya illuminates as the impotency of the 
audience as knowing subjects? At the heart of her discussion is the overvalu-
ation of a single material sign that the play empties out through its own art of 
losing—that site of blindness where the forensic process is fated to flounder, 
but which the theatre can see and show by turning signs into phantasms.34 
Through a glance at Jonson’s Volpone, she leaves us reflecting on comic under-
valuation of such objects as a response to tragic overinvestment.
But the essays are not only united by their interest in the productive 
paradox of obfuscated or hindered knowledge. They are also engaged with 
the epistemic and hermeneutic purchase of unknowability. Aveek Sen’s essay 
brings together two kinds of blind spot: the willed obscurity of disowned 
knowledges and the indeterminate openness of performative embodiment. 
It is the former that his reading of Othello through the lens of Henry James 
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sets out to minutely trace, provocatively suggesting that Shakespeare must 
have known his James.35 But, in the process, it ponders the implications of 
form in speculating about Emilia as a “probable and possible woman incar-
nated in the theatre,” pointing us to the “Emilia-shaped hole” in the texture 
of the “small beer” scene. This gives us a way of seeing many similar blind 
spots in the play: for instance, in the Desdemona-shaped hole in Emilia’s 
Folio-unique speech on men at the end of the “willow scene” (4.3.86–103). 
Imogen Stubbs’s Desdemona hugged and bonded with Zoe Wanamaker’s 
Emilia through this speech in Trevor Nunn’s 1989 production; in Janet 
Suzman’s landmark 1987 production, Joanna Weinberg as Desdemona 
lightly, almost absently, touched Dorothy Goulde/Emilia’s cheek and went 
off alone in her own direction; other Desdemonas have filled the gap by 
widening it, inscribing a failure of solidarity and solace. Theatrical inter-
pretation can play with such indeterminacies and inflect the genre of a 
play. But the play itself can play a game of knowledges against performative 
intent, defying it with a live, intractable core. Like Cressida who remains 
the unknown quantity in her play, the residue of the unknowable is shown, 
ironically, to preserve Emilia’s tragic potential in the midst of her generic 
degradation through handkerchiefs and whispers—not so much what she 
un-knew as what we can never know about what she “thought ... then.”
A generic theme runs through several of our essays, whether explicitly 
or subliminally, and suggests further connections. A single play—Othello—
undergoes a journey through genres, from Cinthio’s comic novella through 
Shakespeare’s wrenchingly painful play to Volpone’s comedic slamming of 
the drama of knowledge, across Supriya and Aveek’s essays; by the time it 
reaches Henry James in Aveek’s study, its genre is too post-lapsarian to fit 
into a known typology, whether narrative or dramatic. Stephen Spiess dis-
cusses Shakespearean “comic” violence as a site of misrecognition—both in 
the sense that it is a response to epistemic instability and insecurity, and in 
its propensity to beget misreadings. Reading The Comedy of Errors against 
the grain of established critical hermeneutics leads to a (mis)reading of such 
errors which at once reveals their implicit investments and unlocks knowl-
edges that they veil. Putting pressure on violence as a marker at once of 
obfuscation and authenticity across the divide between subjection and sub-
jecthood, this essay invites us to revisit the generic implications of Adam’s, 
where linguistic “blind spots” produce hilarious but intimate asymmetries 
that test the limits of comedy. It also enters into implicit dialogue with 
Supriya’s by positing a reading strategy that turns the phantasmic under-
freighting of frivolous violence into a legible but embodied sign. In showing 
how error and errancy come together in the play’s beatings and blows, it 
asks whether comedy itself has become a potential blind spot of criticism, 
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generating a resolute, homogenizing unreading that obscures the distinct 
ethical and emotional knowledges offered by the very “meaninglessness” of 
humorous aggression in the plural ecologies of early modern theatres and 
streets. Tanya Pollard, meanwhile, highlights the generic stakes of knowl-
edge and its gaps, showing how the mis-cognition and mis-re-cognition of 
kin and kind, gene and genre, in The Winter’s Tale bring the blind spots 
of life and literature into dialogue, and further face us with the implica-
tions of the blind spots of generic reception. After all, as Zachary Lesser 
points out in his response, “mongrel tragicomedy”—like collaborative 
writing—slipped through the hole in John Heminges and Henry Condell’s 
retinal map of Shakespeare’s plays: Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories and 
Tragedies.36 As Tanya provocatively suggests, “bastards baffle recognition” 
when it comes to literary kind, standing in for unacknowledgable genetic 
mixtures—like Adam’s baffles, they are noncompliant elements in a generic 
field that induce radical affective cognition by obstructing received modes 
of knowing. The blind-spotting of genre inevitably questions the cul-
tural work of reception, whether in the theatre or in criticism and textual 
scholarship. It also brings up evolving questions about what the cognitive 
mechanism of data tools can tell us about generic textures and our assump-
tions about genre, as text analysis of Shakespeare through Docuscope at 
Carnegie Mellon has done.37
Blind spots in works of art have a way of bringing into play a variety of 
critical approaches, as our essays show us: the conception of this book partly 
intuits that. But one would not necessarily have guessed what methodology 
may have to do with the work we want art to do for us, and how we deal with 
and wield both available and inaccessible knowledges in our individual and 
communal lives; let alone when we put the human need to know in the hands 
of a machine. Michael Witmore and Jonathan Hope’s dialogue on machine 
learning and Shakespeare is a revealing point of departure as we test methods of 
interrogating literary texts, what they tell us and what they withhold, and what 
their blind spots tell us about ours. When we put our humanistic questions 
about, say, attribution, to a neural network—that is, an algorithm trained to 
home in on patterns—we are entrusting the process of recognition to a system 
which delivers accuracy but defies explanation or representation. Machines, 
after all, pick up syntagmatic structures easily, but have little yield on language 
that has paradigmatic flexibility or polysemic density. For Mike, the refusal of 
that transparency is the black box that hides the antecedents of the results in 
our encounter with its meaning-making. But, in the very process, it becomes, 
for him, a mimetic mirror for a particular epistemic desire and its operative 
conditions—our desire to apprehend the invisible blind spot “where a liter-
ary and linguistic self hides.” But Jonathan turns this very inscrutability into 
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an invitation to reexamine the blind spots that are embedded in Shakespearean 
(or poetic) language itself; for him, this impasse does not invalidate but redi-
rects the human reader. His provocation is to posit mechanical mistranslation 
as the productive blind spot which enables us to see deep patterns of language 
functioning and the quantitative basis of what we, as literary scholars, are 
trained to think of as the qualitative essence or distinction of an author or style: 
polysemy, for instance. Using Google Translate’s machine learning algorithm as 
an example, Jonathan argues that while the model itself defies direct visualiza-
tion, it almost literally diverts our eye to the neighborhood of a word, selected 
according to its vector or string of properties: like the surrounding information 
to which the brain directs the eye to fill in the lacuna of the punctum caecum. 
This makes me recall a little experiment that Mike did for me with a vector 
space model, mapping early modern words of investigation and inquiry along 
an axis associated with gender. To my surprise, “discover” seemed to co-occur 
with words aligned with femininity. On looking harder, we saw that it was in 
fact the passive form, “discovered,” that was feminine, and looking in the lexi-
cal neighborhood revealed that “discoveries” was in fact comfortably clustered 
in the extreme “male” corner with “discerning,” “experimental,” and “dem-
onstration.” In the light of Mike’s digital experiment, then, I can understand 
Jonathan’s point about the detection of directionalities: “assays of bias” push us 
to the thresholds of the linguistic system and show us a kind of cultural calibra-
tion occurring around charged terms.
And so a dialogue becomes a conversation, one which Zack joins in, 
crossing over from a different conversation. For he asks what human mis-
translations of some of the most oft-quoted lines from Shakespeare tell us 
about the blind spots of quotation itself as an act of cultural remembrance. 
Zack combines statistical analysis and human interpretation to put pres-
sure on the persistent but identical misquotation of a line from Hamlet’s 
soliloquy, by editors, scholars, actors, and random users of the Yahoo 
Answers website. His findings redirect our attention to a discernible desire 
for Shakespeare to sound “Shakespearean”: that idea of authorial distinc-
tion that Mike and Jonathan explore in the context of the mistranslation of 
machines in attribution studies. It is significant that Zack, like them, alights 
on “To be or not to be”—perhaps the most “Shakespearean” soliloquy in 
the cultural imaginary. “Conscience doth make cowards of us all”—through 
the tiny replacement of “does” with “doth,” along with the capitalization of 
“c” in “Conscience” and the excision of “Thus” to begin with this word—
faces us with a collective, unconscious, and historically ongoing but evolving 
longing for Shakespeare to be marked by elevation, archaism, formality, 
piety, and proverbial wisdom—suitable for commonplacing. A common 
misquotation of Gertrude is shown to be driven by similar investments, but 
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miscorrection (or overcorrection) becomes in turn the further blind spot 
of reception and memory, whether in critical or editorial practice or in the 
history of reading or spectating—making us rethink the relation between 
error and misremembering. In the spirit of this volume, a personal anecdote 
may not be out of place. My Italian friends Nubar and Pallina were travelling 
in Scotland when they met a couple of Scotsmen with whom they got talk-
ing about political theory. These new acquaintances kept asking them eager 
questions about “Gromsky’s” influence on them. Initially befuddled, Nubar 
eventually saw beyond what had seemed a mere mistake. These idealistic and 
somewhat awe-struck leftist young men clearly wanted Gramsci (whom they 
had distantly heard of ) to be a Trotsky (whom they “knew”); the mishear-
ing/misremembering/mistranslating came out of an inarticulate fantasy of 
a unified—and therefore easily grasped—Great Marxist Tradition, revolu-
tionary and seamless through times and cultures.38 How would Stephen and 
Adam extend their thoughts on mistaking, after such knowledge?
Such questions arising, and leaving a space for yet unspoken answers, 
brings me to the shape of this book.
“The forms of things unknown”39
Tracing the unknowable back into modes of knowing so far unexplored 
or merely intuited, then, is the main conceptual aim of this book—pitch-
ing into a critical terrain which has seen stirrings of interest in alternative 
epistemes.40 But it is not its only aim. We also have a methodological and 
pedagogic mission, which makes the volume structurally and intellectually 
innovative. While the essays are thematically connected, the volume is struc-
tured as an internal dialogue. Each essay is followed by either one substan-
tial response from another contributor or two shorter responses from two 
contributors. The impulse behind such a novel format is an urge to capture a 
vital part of intellectual life within present-day academia. So many conversa-
tions we have at seminars and conferences, or indeed more informally over 
coffee, simply dissolve and scatter. This is an attempt to find a home within 
academic publishing for such dialogical thinking and “talking.” Some of the 
essays in this volume come out of a seminar which made us feel the urgency 
to channel such conversations into a less evanescent form, without losing 
the openness of address and response.41 Through its unusual and experi-
mental format, this book seeks to stake out a place, and find a voice, for 
a particular kind of dialogic and processive intellectual energy, rather than 
letting it dissipate; to encourage cross-fertilization while thoughts are fresh 
and explorative; and to translate a sense of intellectual “community” into 
print. It is also designed to write fun and play back into scholarship. Finally, 
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it aims to catch the alertness induced and kept alive by interruption and 
questioning—a synecdochic exercise in dwelling in a state of critical vulner-
ability, anticipation, and readiness. In that spirit, it is structured to invite 
stoppages and deviations. Although it is woven out of a shared process of 
thinking and cross-thinking, it is happy to be a “broken woof.”
The only book in the field of Shakespeare studies—and, to the best 
of my knowledge, early modern criticism—that has attempted to break the 
mould in a comparable, though distinct, way is Anthony Dawson and Paul 
Yachnin’s The Culture of Playgoing in Shakespeare’s England. Shaped provoca-
tively as a “collaborative debate,” they foreground “creative disagreement” as 
a way of reading that does justice to the heterogeneity of the Shakespearean 
theatre.42 Our book shares their anti-totalizing impulse and their sense of co-
thinking as a dynamic process; but our conversation is more heteroglossic, 
and we allow the responses to flow naturally into various forms: demurrals, 
questioning, expansion, diversion, and extraction. The result is not so much 
unification as an opening up through crossovers. The dialogic form seems not 
just pedagogically relevant but methodologically inevitable: textual blind-
spotting, no less than blind spots, operates in that Barthesian interspace where 
the subtle mess of life constantly challenges the “purported clarities” of organ-
ized knowledge.43 The centrality of encounter in the textual experience of 
conspicuous obscurities could not but be built into the structure of a book 
about blind spots. The constraint of space means that we cannot bring the 
dialogue round full circle, except perhaps in one inset dialogue (that between 
Mike and Jonathan, who respond to each other as their topics are specifically 
interrelated and integral to their ongoing collaborative work). But, in juxta-
posing each “speaking out” with a response (or two), we want at least to give 
form to a mode of critical activity, and to present the initiation of an ongoing 
to and fro of ideas that shapes some of our liveliest critical thoughts. In the 
spirit of unfinished exchange, we have deliberately retained a certain informal-
ity of presentation. The aim is not only to suggest a new, collaborative model 
of scholarly conversation and revive the lamentably lost ancient traditions of 
dialogic pedagogy, but also to encourage younger scholars (and indeed more 
advanced scholars at a formative and evolving stage of their ideas) to articulate 
thoughts in progress, in conversation with their peers, and not wait till they 
feel knowledge has been controlled and chiselled into hermetic, sealed-off 
articles which are too distant from process for others to easily or actively enter. 
In tune with how the play texts discussed “know,” the form of the volume 
tries to be mimetic of an apprehension that preserves the distinction between 
encounter and knowledge, acknowledgment and mastery.
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NOTES
1 I am grateful to Tania Demetriou for her incisive comments on the first 
draft of this essay. Thanks also to George Oppitz-Trotman for reading and com-
menting on the final draft.
2 Shakespeare, King Lear: A Parallel Text Edition, ed. Weis. All references to 
the play are to this edition.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics. Α, 980a. Cp. Plato, Republic, VII, 532a.
4 Berger, Ways of Seeing, 7.
5 Berger, Ways of Seeing, 8.
6 Hakewill, The Vanitie of the Eye. See Supriya Chaudhuri's essay in this 
volume for an illuminating discussion of the complexities of the visual culture 
of this period, via Hakewill, Clark and Merleau-Ponty. On the precariousness 
of the visual hegemony in early modern Europe, and the visual crisis that was 
its other side, see Clark, Vanities of the Eye. For a fresh study on the optics 
and poetics of early modern England, see Partner, Poetry and Vision in Early 
Modern England. On the relation between poetic ingenuity and visual anom-
aly and anamorphism in the seventeenth century, see Gilman, The Curious 
Perspective.
7 A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 4.1.189. All references to Shakespeare’s plays 
and poems are to the Riverside Shakespeare unless otherwise specified.
8 On the relative transparency and piety of Gertred in Q1, and the rela-
tive inscrutability of Folio and Q2’s Gertrude, see Kehler, “The First Quarto of 
Hamlet: Reforming Widow Gertred.”
9 Berger, Ways of Seeing, 8.
10 I use the term “cognitive” in a less specialized sense than its technical con-
notation in cognitive science. But cognitive criticism is a potentially fertile area 
for the study of blind spots in literary thinking, practice, and criticism. There has 
been much recent, innovative work on cognition and early modern literature. For 
the cognitive turn in Shakespeare studies specifically, see Mary Thomas Crane, 
Shakespeare’s Brain, to which most subsequent work is indebted. For more recent 
studies, see, for instance, Raphael Lyne, Shakespeare, Rhetoric and Cognition; 
N. Parvini, Shakespeare and Cognition; and Laurie Johnson et al., Embodied 
Cognition and Shakespeare’s Theatre.
11 “The Fly,” in Lucian, The Works of Lucian, 82–83; Spenser, The Shorter 
Poems, 289–304; Donne, The Major Works, 89. Thanks to Tania Demetriou for 
introducing me to the Lucian poem in private conversation.
12 Julius Caesar, 4.3.140–93. On stage direction and speech headings in this 
scene, see Daniell, ed., Julius Caesar, 289, n. 155.1, and “Introduction,” 137–43, 
esp. 137. See also Stirling, “Julius Caesar in Revision.”
13 For a provocative and sensitive, if somewhat schematic, thesis of the static 
and dynamic models of Stoicism, see A.D. Nuttall, “The Stoic in Love,” in Nuttall, 
The Stoic in Love, 56–67.
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14 Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 111–13 (112). See also Nuttall, Shakespeare the 
Thinker, 184–85, where he reads the double announcement more explicitly as a 
critique of Stoicism: “As Brutus is redeemed, Stoicism is damned” (185). For a 
congruent position, see the introduction to the Arden Shakespeare edition of the 
play, ed. Daniell, 139–47.
15 For an extended discussion of the difficulties of proving marital inten-
tion, and of sex itself transiting from a deed to an over-freighted sign in All’s Well 
and in Shakespeare’s England, see Mukherji, “‘Lawfull deede.’” For a discussion 
of the evidentiary overvaluation and generic negotiation of sensible tokens, see 
Mukherji, “Of Rings, and Things, and Fine Array.”
16 See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.3.61; see also Eden, Poetic and Legal 
Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition, esp. 69–75, 86–89, 92–94.
17 The Riverside Shakespeare, 520.
18 See Aveek Sen’s reponse to Tanya Pollard’s essay in this volume, unerringly 
tapping into this hinterland of unspeakable loves and half-remembered texts.
19 Krauss, The Optical Unconscious.
20 McGuire, Speechless Dialect.
21 This is Prospero’s phrase in The Tempest, 1.2.50. On Shakespeare’s transla-
tion of silence from his sources, see Demetriou, “Out of Silence Yet I Picked a 
Welcome”; her argument is admiringly discussed by Tony Nuttall in his discus-
sion of Henry VI and Richard II in Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker, 30–31 and 
136–37.
22 North, Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, vol. 1, 176.
23 Barthes, Leçon, 18: “La science est grossière, la vie est subtile, et c’est pour 
corriger cette distance que la littérature nous importe.” Trans. by Richard Howard 
in Barthes, A Barthes Reader, 457–78 (463).
24 Anon., A Warning for Fair Women.
25 Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, V. 1050.
26 Heywood, A Woman Killed with Kindness, scene xiii, line 41.
27 Turgenev, First Love and Other Stories, 203–73.
28 Barthes, “Le texte pensif,” S/Z, 204–5 (my translation).
29 Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, esp. chapter 1, “Carnal and Spiritual 
Senses,” 1–21 (2).
30 Weinstein, Unknowing.
31 Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 3, 266–67
32 Orgel, “The Poetics of Incomprehensibility,” 437.
33 See Hutson, “Law, Probability and Character in Shakespeare,” for sugges-
tive points of contact with this argument. See also her Circumstantial Shakespeare.
34 For a reading of the increasing evanescence of material objects in 
Shakespeare and Jonson, with provocative points of contact with this essay, see 
Dawson and Yachnin, The Culture of Playgoing in Shakespeare’s England, esp. 
chapter 6, “Props, Pleasure and Idolatry,” 131–58.
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35 For a congruent reading of resisted knowledges in Shakespeare’s and James’s 
heroines, albeit in a non-optical framework, see Mukherji, “False Trials and the 
Impulse to Try in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries,” 53–54.
36 Shakespeare, The Works of William Shakespeare. “Mongrel tragicomedy” is 
Sidney’s term: Sidney, Sidney’s “The Defence of Poesy,” 46.
37 See also Witmore and Hope, “Shakespeare by the Numbers.”
38 I happily acknowledge a delightful conversation with Georgio (Nubar) 
Gianighian and Pallina Pavanini about this in Venice, September 17, 2017.
39 Dream, 5.1.15.
40 Early modern “knowledge studies” have become increasingly visible in 
the last decade in the literary critical domain, going back to field-creating books 
such as Mary Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact and Mary Baine Campbell’s 
Wonder and Science. The time may have come for the much-needed turn from the 
topics of knowledge to themes of ignorance, stupidity, befuddlement, and forms 
of knowledge refusal. For early indications, see, for example, Adam Zucker’s 
“Twelfth Night and the Philology of Nonsense,” Carla Mazzio’s The Inarticulate 
Renaissance, or Katherine Eggert’s Disknowledge.
41 “The Blind Spots of Knowledge in Shakespeare and His World,” convened 
by Subha Mukherji, at the Shakespeare Association of America’s Annual Meeting 
at St. Louis in 2014.
42 Dawson and Yachnin, The Culture of Playgoing, 1.
43 Barthes, Leçon, 18.
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Essays and Responses




It’s Not Rocket Science
THOSE OF US WHO study art and aesthetic elements of culture more generally are used to dealing with a bit of ambiguity. It comes 
with the territory. In some instances, and for some critics, it defines the ter-
ritory. The unknown—or, more precisely, the likely unknowable—draws 
our attention to imagined landscapes or unreal visions of life and nature 
that we find in narrative and performance, form and phrase. Much of our 
work as scholars and teachers occupies this space of the likely unknowable; 
our rhetorical performances trace its outlines and fill it in; and our failures 
or successes (pedagogical, political, intellectual, and otherwise) can some-
times seem to depend on its preservation from one generation of scholars 
to the next.
Other fields of inquiry are, of course, more reliant on the language of 
mathematical exactness and the kinds of empirical identification it allows. 
Take rocket science, a discipline that is, along with “brain surgery,” a collo-
quial epitome of complex, specialized knowledge. Formulae and precision 
would seem to make the entire endeavor possible in the first place. Thrust, 
force, torque, the pull of the Earth upon us all: these are subject to numer-
ical representation and, thus, to the calculating minds of mythical geniuses 
scribbling on chalkboards and modeling engine performance.
Or, at least, that is how I imagined it, before the Internet showed 
me otherwise.2 Recently, actual rocket scientists were attempting to 
reverse engineer an actual rocket engine developed in the 1960s for 
NASA’s Saturn program. Saturn engines were individually built (there 
is no rocket-engine assembly line), and each had individual quirks that 
needed to be ironed out before it could be used to push human beings 
to the Moon. One of these quirks, discovered through trial and much 
error, had to do with the way fuel and oxidizing chemicals rotated as they 
burned in the engine’s combustion chamber, causing vibrations that, in 
turn, caused unwanted explosions. In the 1960s, engineers ginned up “a 
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set of stubby barriers” in the combustion chamber of each engine to solve 
this problem. At the time, nobody knew the optimal arrangement of these 
barriers. They worked, but as to the mathematically precise details of why, 
rocket scientists were in the dark.
Why am I bothering to write about this? My rocket-scientist read-
ers have likely already guessed the answer. The mysteriously effective 
problem-solving barrier was called a “baffle.”
In this context, then, a baffle is both an engineering enigma and 
a cohesive force for propulsion and lift. It is a materialization of limited 
ignorance located right in the burning heart of the moon landing, rocket-
ry’s signal achievement. I would like to keep this combination of mystery 
and effect in mind as I turn to Twelfth Night, a play that, like rocket sci-
ence, makes a space for unquantifiable causes, confusing encounters with 
objective experience, and, in the end, purposefully limited kinds of knowl-
edge. Twelfth Night is not rocket science. But it does, like the Saturn 
program, depend seriously on baffling elements that work in ways that are 
often difficult to ascertain.
“Do, or not do?”
Engines were not being baffled in Shakespeare’s day, but people were, and 
the term comes up twice in Malvolian contexts in Twelfth Night. Most 
importantly, it occupies the place of honor at the center of Olivia’s assess-
ment of all that has been done to her steward. In the play’s final scene, after 
Malvolio presents his list of grievances and Fabian admits to the outlines 
of the plot against him, Olivia offers a sliver of sympathy: “Alas, poor fool, 
how have they baffled thee!” (5.1.363).3 Modern audiences and readers 
are likely to agree. Malvolio has been entirely overmastered by Maria and 
her co-plotters: confused, misdirected, and, more directly, cut out of the 
shared circuit of common knowledge that defines wit and its attendant 
social dominance in Shakespearean comedy. Olivia, from the audience’s 
perspective, is right: Malvolio has been baffled.
One of the great pleasures of Twelfth Night, in this situation at 
least, is that we, the audience, have not been baffled: we are in on the baf-
fling processes here. The play shares in the tendency of most Elizabethan 
comedy to reveal its own mechanisms of intrigue in explicit detail as they 
occur. Not only are audiences in league with Toby and Maria when it 
comes to the manipulation of Malvolio, we are also clear from the outset 
of the action that Cesario is Viola; we quickly learn that Sebastian is alive 
and slowly making his way through Illyria; we see that Olivia has fallen 
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for the wrong twin; and, along with all this, we know that somewhere out 
there is a recognition scene waiting to happen. And, although the rise of 
tragicomic plotting with its unexpected revelations would eventually bring 
what we now call “surprise endings” into Shakespeare’s narrative architec-
ture and Jacobean drama more generally, Twelfth Night is not really that 
kind of play. The sense of befuddled wonder at the events of the final scene 
belongs mainly to the play’s characters. We already know who’s who and 
what’s what. We do not, at first glance, share in Malvolio’s baffled state.
But, if the narrative course of Twelfth Night is somewhat less than 
baffling to an audience watching it all happen, the language of the play is 
another story altogether, especially for modern readers and viewers. The 
rapid, punning jests that color so much of the dialogue in Twelfth Night 
are very difficult to understand, let alone laugh at, in performance or on 
the page. As Elizabeth Freund has suggested, the play uses Sir Andrew 
Aguecheek to model a version of this linguistic confusion.4 He can be seen 
as a sympathetic figure for a modern audience’s potentially uncomfortable 
experience of the play, and his verbal incompetence often mirrors our own, 
whatever our level of expertise. One of Aguecheek’s more obvious errors is 
particularly significant for my interests here. During our introduction to 
him in his first scene with Toby and Maria, he asks what may be the play’s 
most embarrassing question:
Aguecheek: I’ll ride home tomorrow, Sir Toby.
Toby: Pourquoi?
Andrew: What is pourquoi? Do or not do? (1.3.86–89)
It is easy enough to laugh at this moment, especially if you have the good 
fortune to understand more French than Aguecheek does (I do, but 
only barely). This is a language joke that does a fine job of yoking audi-
ence members into the community of knowledgeable jesters organized by 
Toby and Maria; it is a simple sign of Aguecheek’s ignorance which, like 
Malvolio’s harsh prudishness, guarantees a kind of social separation of alli-
ances, and puts most audience members on the privileged side of the play’s 
divide. We know what pourquoi means! We like cakes and ale!
But Aguecheek’s confusion with foreign languages is actually a signif-
icant directional signpost for Twelfth Night and the history of its editorial 
reception in particular. The play’s idiot, as it turns out, is not alone in his 
difficulty with romance languages. Just moments before Aguecheek fails 
his French exam, Toby tests us all with an exclamation to Maria that directs 
her attention to Aguecheek’s immanent entrance on stage: “What, wench, 
Castiliano vulgo, for here comes Sir Andrew Agueface” (1.3.41–42).5 
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Relatively speaking, there are few editorial problems in Twelfth Night, 
but Toby’s outburst is one of them. Nobody, and I mean nobody, has ever 
been able to figure out precisely what “Castiliano vulgo” means, or even, 
for that matter, what language Toby is speaking when he says it. Assuming 
that it is a Latin–Spanish–Italian hybrid, the phrase translates to some-
thing like “A Castilian, commonly put,” which is odd enough as it is; in 
its context (i.e., as an exclamation that either hails Sir Andrew or begins 
to turn Maria’s attention to his approach), it is entirely nonsensical. That 
is not to say that Shakespearean explicators have not done their best 
to explicate the phrase. Furness’s New Variorum rehearses, with typical 
bemusement, the failures of nearly two centuries of guesswork: Hanmer 
(1743–44) and Warburton (1747) emend “vulgo” to “volto,” to turn 
the phrase into the imperative: “Put on your Castilian face!” Although 
this idea presented later editors with a site for interpretation (What is a 
Castilian face? Is it serious? Brave? Do other playwrights refer to Spanish 
faces in some way?), there is no evidence that “Castiliano volto” was a 
functional idiom in England in any case (as Furness drily points out).6 
Halliwell (1856) suggests that “Castiliano vulgo” is the correct reading 
(he thinks Toby might be telling Maria to speak “in common Spanish, 
that is, in familiar language”), and editors have more or less followed suit 
since. Keir Elam, in the most recent Arden, admits to the ambiguity, put-
ting forth Mahood’s theory that the phrase means “Speak of the Devil,”7 
only to reject it for his own guess that the phrase refers to a variant for the 
word “castellan” (“castillian”), or castle-dweller, and, thus, to an expres-
sion used to greet fellow drinking companions.8
In some very simple, ordinary sense, the exact translation of these 
words is entirely irrelevant for the action of Twelfth Night, especially in 
performance.9 They serve their point simply in their explosive, meaningful 
noise: Sir Toby has a soft spot for romance languages (his probing “pour-
quoi” confirms it), and he uses them in particular around Aguecheek to 
draw lines between the two of them, indicating, first, his own sophisti-
cation and, second, Aguecheek’s lack thereof. It is more than possible to 
figure out what “Castiliano vulgo” is doing in the play without the guide 
of a gloss or a teacher: its basic effect (along with a few other instances I 
will discuss below) is to let audiences know that any relationship to foreign 
languages—even fake ones—is a marker in the field of cultural competen-
cies that defines and produces the play’s imagined Illyrian court.10
Scholarship, editorial debate, and the teacherly apparatus of his-
toricist philology compose and mark off locations in a cultural field that 
can look, at times, quite like that court. But, like Twelfth Night and the 
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Saturn rocket engine, literary criticism and dramatic performance are in 
part propelled by baffling elements that need not be resolved to do their 
job. My discussion of “Castiliano vulgo” and its investigators is an exag-
gerated synecdoche for that idea in its broadest expression. We (that is, 
literally, I, along with the specialist readers of this essay and the many edi-
tors, researchers, wonderers, and arguers who have come before us) circle 
around a term that is clearly in the right place. We attempt to figure out 
its function, its place in the machinery, and we see if we cannot keep that 
machine running. But, as we reverse engineer Twelfth Night, we might at 
times feel comfortable, like rocket scientists, celebrating when the thing 
blasts off without exploding, whatever our position of mastery over the 
design and meanings of the text. In this regard, Aguecheek’s utterly idiotic 
question—“Do or not do?”—might be one we ask ourselves every time we 
dive into the scholarly fray.
A Blind Spot of Knowledge
I hope the very presence of the words you are reading now indicates how 
I choose to answer that question. (Do!) The way I see it, the embarrass-
ing impossibility of textual mastery that lingers over Sir Toby’s mysteri-
ous exclamation clarifies the comic force of Twelfth Night and can help 
us think in valuable ways about the place of ignorance and unknowing in 
our own work. Again, the editorial response to “Castiliano vulgo” points 
the way: Furness himself, near the end of his discussion, concludes that 
we will probably never know what the phrase means, and W. A. Wright 
goes even further in the first Cambridge edition of the play (1863): “It 
is probable that these words have as much meaning now as they had in 
Shakespeare’s time, and that is none at all.”11 At the level of historical 
and/or literary evidence, these claims are actually much easier to support 
than any of the other theories put forth over the years. If the phrase is, in 
fact, a bit of foreign-sounding nonsense, it would take its place alongside 
the many, many other examples of that mode of speech in early modern 
English drama. Anyone who has read city comedy has run across inflected 
gibberish meant to approximate one language or another on the stage.12 
The work of Marjorie Rubright, Nina Levine, Andrew Fleck, and Lloyd 
Kermode among others has situated the English stage’s cacophony of 
tongues as a sign or effect of religious, commercial, and, most broadly, 
transnational mixture in early modern London and its environs.13 And, 
even setting aside this larger corpus of plays, Twelfth Night itself has other 
characters besides Toby who fake it, linguistically. Feste, famously, is the 
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most active of the bunch. Playing the part of Sir Topas, he greets the 
imprisoned Malvolio with the play’s other Spanish/Latin hybrid phrase, 
“Bonos Dies” (4.2.12). Elam calls this either “bad Latin” or “bad Spanish,” 
but, in either case, it is another loose reference to romance languages that 
charts modes of courtly knowledge. Aguecheek’s remembrance of one of 
Feste’s jokes works in similar ways: “In sooth, thou wast in very gracious 
fooling last night, when thou spok’st of Pigrogromitus, of the Vapians 
passing the equinoctial of Queubus” (2.3.20–23; whether Sir Andrew is 
mangling or accurately repeating Feste’s mock lecture is beside the point 
here). And, of course, Feste himself famously attributes his epigrammatic 
line—“Better a witty fool than a foolish wit”—to the entirely fictitious 
(but believably named) “Quinapalus” (1.5.33–34). Although fake names 
are not quite the same thing as fake words, they function in similar ways 
when it comes to the social logic of the text and its appeal to audiences. As 
is the case with “Castiliano vulgo,” the sound of “Quinapalus” does more 
work—both within the imagined world of the play and for the audiences 
who encounter it—than its infinitely receding literal meaning ever could.
We have reached an odd semantic vanishing point in which 
Shakespeare’s jokes about meaningless foreign words disappear into 
detailed, entirely useless explanations of these words’ meanings. To put it in 
terms suggested by this collection’s editor, we have reached, in “Castiliano 
vulgo” and its ilk, a blind spot of historical philology. The study of lan-
guage and culture is often pursued as a process of revelation or explication 
that presents the authoritative knowledge of the scholar as a light in the 
darkness. Mysterious knots of hidden content are unraveled in the name of 
clarification. But nonsense resists this process by worrying the threads of 
research into ever larger tangles. The blind spot here is neither the missing 
definition of a word itself, nor a failure of knowledge pertaining to content 
that might eventually manifest itself, but rather the inability of philologists 
over time to see when their usual strategies are insufficient. The more we 
struggle to explicate words such as “Castiliano vulgo,” the more brightly 
and clearly these blind spots reflect our own ignorance back at us.
Of course, a crucial effect of the more obviously ironic nonsense 
in Twelfth Night is to separate social or cultural action out from literal 
signification, then to make that separation an Erasmian object lesson for 
the idiot scholars who bluster their way around it.14 As one of those idiot 
scholars, this is a markedly troubling situation for me. The more I work 
on the intricate jokes and linguistic black holes built into Twelfth Night, 
the more I begin to identify with scholars who have spent lifetimes 
quibbling over words that very likely mean nothing at all. The more I 
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identify with these scholars, the more Twelfth Night insults me, and the 
more embarrassed I become about my own relationship to the language of 
the text, foreign or otherwise. This is not, I should say, a terrifically pleas-
ant encounter with comedy. But, before I give up on the utility of that 
encounter, I will point out that a crucial word in Twelfth Night registers 
my uncomfortable combination of humiliating affect and overmastered 
effect, even as it provides some thrust for the play’s comic arc. Much to no 
one’s surprise (I hope), that word is “baffled.”
When Olivia suggests that Malvolio has been “baffled” by Maria 
and the others, she is not really calling him “out-witted” or “flabber-
gasted” or “confused.” Though the term was just beginning to mean 
“hoodwinked” or “cheated” by the late sixteenth century, its more 
dominant uses all constellate around performances meant to disgrace 
and openly humiliate people, often men of rank. Spenser’s knights 
are occasionally baffled in The Faerie Queene, usually by having their 
shields or images reversed in a public display, meant to punish them for 
their lack of honor.15 A more elaborate description of the act appears in 
Holinshed’s Chronicles, appended with the marginal note “Baffulling 
what it is among the Scots”: “a man is openlie periured, and then they 
make of him an image painted, reuersed, with his héeles vpward, with 
his name, woondering , crieng , and blowing out on him with hornes, 
in the most despitefull manner they can, in token that he is worthie to 
be exiled the companie of all good creatures.”16 Thomas Nashe, among 
others, transposes this formal process of humiliation into joking con-
texts in Have With You to Saffron Walden (1596), where he imagines 
that people in some distant future “may baffull and infamize my name 
when I am in heauen, & shall neuer feele it” (sig. E4r).17 And, most 
importantly of all, Malvolio himself uses the term in this sense, directly 
after reading the mash note he assumes is from Olivia: “Daylight and 
champaign discovers not more. This is open. I will be proud, I will read 
politic authors, I will baffle Sir Toby, I will wash off gross acquaint-
ance, I will be point-device the very man” (2.5.156–59). In the midst 
of the play’s most pointed joke about misinterpretation and bad perfor-
mance, it is only fitting that today’s audiences misrecognize the premise 
of Malvolio’s plans for Toby. Earlier in the scene, before he reads Maria’s 
letter, the steward spins out his languid fantasy of leaving the Countess 
to her post-coital nap in order to finger a jewel and chastise Sir Toby for 
his poor behavior (40–78). Here, that fantasy is enriched by the notion 
of bafflement, the public disgrace of a knight, permitting Malvolio to 
grant himself the rank he hopes to achieve. Olivia’s use of the term as 
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she caps Malvolio’s humiliation is, therefore, much more caustic than it 
is ordinarily taken to be. He has been baffled like a knight, but he will 
never, ever be one.
Are we all Malvolios, as Stephen Booth suggests in a slightly dif-
ferent context?18 Are we all Aguecheeks, forced by history or basic 
incompetence into a position in which we do not even know what we do 
not know ? I would not want to overstate the claim. But being baffled is 
certainly a common outcome of Twelfth Night and early English comedy 
more generally. Our problems comprehending or translating the terms 
within it—in nonsensical foreign languages or in English itself—can ren-
der us similar to the characters on stage. But, whereas those characters get 
to disappear, we have to decide what to do with ourselves and our various 
failures. I will conclude simply by suggesting that, if we let ourselves be 
bullied out of our places as critics, teachers, writers, and thinking audience 
members, if we storm off stage swearing revenge on the pack of them, we 
will miss an important chance to reflect on the historical, material con-
texts of our bafflement. The word “baffle,” after all, has a political history 
built into it, one shot through with aggressive rituals of disenfranchise-
ment and visual abjection. It is likewise an incorporating force pertaining 
to and signifying the deepest modes of identification and rejection that 
performed humor enables. As Twelfth Night represents and referentially 
enacts these processes, it can, I hope, help us think more clearly about our 
own pedagogical relationships and our own encounters with (or reproduc-
tions of ) bafflement in our classrooms and around our conference tables. 
We may be rendered silent, or stupefied, by an unintelligible sense of won-
der or confusion built into theatrical or literary experience. We might fail, 
repeatedly, to explicate the inexplicable word. At the very least, we can 
provide a sensible context for this inarticulate outcome.
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Baffling Comedy, Baffling Ourselves:  
A Response to Adam Zucker
Stephen Spiess
What claims does the Shakespearean comedy make upon its audiences? 
Baffling commonplace receptions of nonsensical language, Adam here—
with enviable wit, verve, and lucidity—foregrounds the immense cultural 
energies pulsing through those inexplicable utterances that propel many 
an early modern comedic dialogue. Gibberish certainly renders hierar-
chies on stage, but the “burning heart” of this essay transcends such an 
(important) insight to suggest a far more discomfiting acknowledgment, 
one rooted in our own “embarrassed” relations to the characters, laughter, 
and languages of Twelfth Night. What, I now find myself wondering, does 
the play ask of us? What does it reveal about us? How might it incorpo-
rate us into its language games?
Such questions may threaten the autonomy of the play’s imagined 
world, but, as Adam demonstrates, any rigorous division of audience 
and action proves inimical to Twelfth Night’s comedic work. Not only 
are audiences yoked into the play’s various knowledge communities, 
as he suggests, but our alliances thereof buttress its comedic architec-
ture: throughout, dramatic irony structures the action and enables the 
play’s most uproarious conceits. These include, of course, the staging of 
Malvolio’s embarrassment (II.v), a scene that clearly establishes the play’s 
investment in the spectator as an essential component of, and active con-
tributor to, comedic representation.
But, in the comedy of (mis)interpretation, do we not also play the 
fool? Adam suggests as much, and his brilliant insight is to explore how 
the play’s comedic work continues into the present era. As trivial, asinine 
phrases such as “Castiliano vulgo” catalyze ongoing interpretive labor, 
Twelfth Night’s most insignificant signifiers emerge as its most productive 
terms: proliferating an endless joke across the centuries. Quixotic exegetes, 
myself included, are thus incorporated into Illyria’s language games, strug-
gling to explicate the “unknown knowns” of early modern language.19 We 
do not stand outside the joke (historically, linguistically, textually), but 
rather, like Andrew Aguecheek, sustain it, are a part of it, and are subject 
to it. Such a baffling kinship suggests the fecundity of linguistic igno-
rance and unknowing within and beyond the play. It also encourages new 
understandings of our encounters with this early modern comedy: how we 
confront, and are confronted by, its affects and effects.
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Looking ahead, I wonder how plays like Twelfth Night solicit 
audience “acknowledgment.” I draw this term from Stanley Cavell, whose 
epistemological readings of Shakespeare call for the type of invigorating, 
scholarly self-confrontation that Adam here demonstrates.20 This analytic 
move risks my own embarrassment, given Cavell’s contention that trag-
edy, not comedy, provides the essential structure for “skeptical doubt” in 
pre-Cartesian London (128). Comedy, as it were, remains on the episte-
mological sidelines, ignored and seemingly insignificant. I thus may appear 
foolish or, worse yet, witless for eschewing the logical points of engage-
ment in favor of a seemingly nonsensical touchstone. If so, I venture forth, 
as I take Adam and Cavell both to suggest, from exactly the right place.21
Cavell’s most provocative contention in Disowning Knowledge, for 
our purposes at least, locates playgoing audiences within the epistemo-
logical work of the Shakespearean stage. What does this mean? We might 
begin by recalling that, for Cavell, the various parables of Lear, Leontes, 
Othello, et al. pivot on a fundamental “failure of acknowledgment”—a 
catastrophic refusal to recognize, and reveal oneself to, another human 
being—that proves world-consuming. They destroy the world, and their 
loved ones, by refusing to confront their implication in it, and in them. 
“Acknowledgment” thus signals a revolutionary (if tragically disowned) 
act of self-reckoning : a radical willingness to place oneself before the 
other—to recognize them and, in so doing, to reveal one’s own imper-
fection, unknowing, and blindness. It also, Cavell insists, constitutes the 
very claim that Shakespearean drama makes on us: we must “confront the 
figures on the stage ... we must put ourselves in their presence, reveal our-
selves to them” (102–3). Such a demand is not resolved simply by altering 
the theater lighting and exposing those playgoers “sitting silently in the 
dark” to the gaze of onstage players.22 Rather, as Cavell suggests, we risk 
acknowledgment only by facing our own, impossible knowledge relations 
to the persons and realities depicted onstage, a dynamic that at once the-
matizes and “literalize[s] the conditions we exact for existence outside” 
(104).23 By failing to do so, by avoiding this summons, we not only rep-
licate but ultimately confirm what Cavell sees as the inherently tragic 
character of skeptical doubt.
But what of comedy? Is audience acknowledgment elicited only 
through tragic representation, only through plays that conspicuously 
engage the skeptical problematic? Although Cavell largely disowns 
comedy in Disowning Knowledge, his earlier study of Depression-era 
Hollywood films, Pursuits of Happiness (1981), suggests that particular 
comedic genres may work to resolve—under specific historical conditions 
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of possibility—the epistemological crises of Shakespearean tragedy.24 
Moreover, as Adam cogently demonstrates, one need not embrace the full 
armature of Cavell’s skeptical theorem to realize that Shakespeare’s com-
edies exercise their own profound pull upon playgoers. What is the nature 
of this appeal? What kinds of epistemological work do these plays foster, 
and how might our (failed) recognitions in comedy compare with those 
that Cavell finds in the tragic canon?
Situating us within the comedic work of Twelfth Night, Adam illus-
trates how confronting the baffling terms of early modern comedy might 
better inform our thinking about, and encounters with, these plays. I, for 
one, have found myself lost, confused, excited, and enlightened—both by 
this essay and in its nonsensical kinship to Disowning Knowledge. I now 
wonder whether comedy might provide an alternative structure for think-
ing through problems of knowing and ignorance in Shakespeare and his 
world. Reveling in the play of languages, identities, and bodies, works such 
as Twelfth Night encounter the skeptical dilemma in powerful ways yet to 
be acknowledged. As they incite unexpected relations and recognitions, 
do they not leave us as profoundly unmoored, exposed, and revealed as 
their tragic counterparts? If so, on what terms? Should we continue to baf-
fle Shakespearean comedy, as we must, I sense that we will find ourselves 
ever more confronted by, and complicit in, the very fictions (of genre 
and knowledge, at the very least) upon which our scholarship depends. 
Whether one recognizes this as a fundamentally tragic or comic condition 
may well depend upon how, and in whom, we see ourselves onstage.
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Knowing Games: A Response to  
Adam Zucker
Subha Mukherji
This agile paper, written with a delightfully light touch, opens our eyes to 
see in the light of what we cannot know. It focuses on the term “baffle,” and 
its affect and effect, in Twelfth Night to make us look hard at “problem- 
solving barriers,” like those used in making rockets, but in a literary/ 
textual/dramatic context where they proliferate into other kinds of pro-
ductive paradox. The phrase that encapsulates this double effect for me is 
“this combination of mystery and effect.” This cuts to the heart of the ideas 
and the critical method that this book is wanting to explore, and taps into 
an ignorance that creates its own epistemes. This is Paul de Mann territory 
of blindness and insight.
Adam explores this specifically in relation to the linguistic 
opacity—and dazzling nonsense—of certain words and phrases in 
Twelfth Night, most tellingly in Sir Toby’s “castiliano vulgo,” which tests 
and befuddles Aguecheek and us alike. What fascinates me is the sug-
gestion that this destabilizes the field of knowledge across the fourth 
wall—challenging the smug knowingness of the audience of this com-
edy (and many others), shared by the clever pranksters of the play, and 
frustrating textual mastery. Here, of course, this is exploited to hilarious 
effect—an exhilarating “explosive noise.” But, as Adam implies, this is 
nonetheless part of a subtle tension between our critical, spectatorial, 
and pedagogic instincts on the one hand and a temptation to surren-
der to bafflement on the other. Does anything similar happen in that 
Babel of a comedy, Love’s Labour’s Lost, itself in a double bind between 
exhibiting rhetorical mastery and freaking out at its own facility? The 
social aspect of this “blind spot of historical philolog y” is something 
I would love to be led to explore further. It is eye-opening to find out 
how established the connotation of humiliation was in the period 
when it came to the term “baffle.” I also wonder if the variant relation 
between “explosive noise” and meaning maps onto the chiastic relation 
between language and narrative that is suggested by the essay, with ref-
erence to what baffles the characters vis-à-vis what baffles us. I would 
love to know how far Adam thinks this can be explored or extended 
in Shakespeare’s work. Is there is a payoff in this critical paradigm that 
resonates beyond this play?
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But I  a lso wonder about how the drama of  asymmetrica l 
knowledges plays out in other genres, most notably in tragedies and 
tragicomedies. Are there affective and ethical implications and, if so, are 
these genre-specific? When Hermione says to Leontes, “You speak a lan-
guage I understand not” (III.ii.85), the counters shift, perhaps even too 
far afield. But the same play, at its end, seems to gesture towards the need 
for insouciance, to stop at the point beyond which we are not meant 
to go, as Leontes, whose “face hath felt the winter’s wind,” learns, like 
Keats’s thrush, when to “fret not after knowledge” (“What the Thrush 
Said,” lines 1, 9). But I think Adam’s focus on humor is germane. For 
humor is what brings unequal knowledges into piquant interplay, just 
as it induces simultaneous identification and rejection. A dramatic epi-
sode this essay calls to mind is in the last scene of Cymbeline—itself 
an extended joke on over-explication. I am thinking of the moment 
when Posthumus strikes Imogen dressed as a page with the words, 
“There lie thy part” (V.v.267): one that usually triggers smug giggles in 
the audience who are in on the secret (as they are not in The Winter’s 
Tale—which raises a whole different set of questions). It is a knowing, 
tragicomic joke that excises the affective reality of the gesture within the 
dramatic fiction as we savor our privileged knowledge that this is a boy 
playing the part of a girl playing the part of a boy, and that recognition 
is what absorbs our wit. But, after another five minutes of playing time, 
when any sense of the visual abjection of this misrecognition has faded 
as the scene keeps piling recognition upon recognition, Imogen comes 
right back at Posthumus and asks: “Why did you throw your wedded 
lady from you? / Think that you are upon a rock; and now / Throw me 
again” (309–11). The gutting emotional directness of her question is—
is it not?—an instance of bafflement coming back at the enfranchised 
to radically shift the barrier between “knowing minds” and “ignorant 
ones,” to use Adam’s terms. This rebuke to the tragicomic habit of dic-
ing with danger—sanctioned by the basis of the form in the idea of 
felix culpa (“happier far by affliction made”; “the danger not the death”; 
etc.)—raises the question of the affective cost of humor that feeds off 
such epistemic variance across the fourth wall. The unlevel playing field 
on Dover cliff in King Lear, where the blind Gloucester falls (almost 
farcically) flat on level ground, stages a comparable interrogation of the 
ethics of knowing games. Can we ponder such inscriptions of discom-
fort against the grain of genre to test the remit of blind spots? Do they 
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go beyond the question of what we do with our failures of understand-
ing , which Adam addresses, to challenge us to find a way of grappling 
with our failures of relationship? Indeed, do dramatic preservations of 
bafflement forge their distinct legibility by counterpointing the ecology 
of the theatrical event (onstage and in the playhouse) with moments of 
sharply foregrounded interpersonal encounter, fraught with incommen-
surabilities and, at times, their corrections?
NOTES
1 Portions of this essay were previously published in an expanded form 
in “Twelfth Night and the Philology of Nonsense” in Renaissance Studies 30, 1 
(2016): 88–101. Thank you to Jennifer Richards and Renaissance Studies for the 
permission to use that material here, and to Anne Prescott, for being the animat-
ing spirit of this piece.
2 The information that follows is drawn from Hutchinson, “How NASA 
Brought the Monstrous F-1 ‘Moon Rocket’ Engine Back to Life.”
3 All citations of Twelfth Night are taken from Shakespeare, The Arden 
Shakespeare Twelfth Night.
4 Freund, “Twelfth Night and the Tyranny of Interpretation,” 480–81: 
“Although he can cut a caper and has the backtrick as strong as any man in Illyria, 
in a verbally constituted and language-governed environment Andrew does not 
shine. Indeed, his incurable logo-deficiency and his repeated victimization by 
lexis makes him the ultimate underachiever.”
5 Though I am not going to quibble about it here, the punctuation in the 
Folio is very different: “What wench? Castiliano vulgo: for here comes Sir Andrew 
Agueface” (1623, sig. Y2v).
6 Furness, in Shakespeare, A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, 38.
7 On this reading, see also Killeen, “Twelfth Night,” 92–3.
8 See Elam, in Shakespeare, The Arden Shakespeare Twelfth Night, note to 
1.3.41, p. 173. Elam’s suggestion is by far the most convincing of the bunch. I 
should say also that there are many reasons for an editor to deviate from the spell-
ing of words in languages other than English in the Folio—“Pourquoi,” for exam-
ple, appears there as “Pur-quoy” (sig. Y2v).
9 My ideas here have been shaped by Stephen Orgel’s formidable essay, “The 
Poetics of Incomprehensibility.” See also Mazzio, The Inarticulate Renaissance, 
1–93.
10 On the cultural capital that adheres to the study or knowledge of foreign 
languages in early modern London and its drama, see Nina Levine’s work in the 
third chapter of Practicing the City: Early Modern London on Stage. On the par-
ticularly Italian contexts for Illyrian civility, linguistic and otherwise, see Elam’s 
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introduction in The Arden Shakespeare Twelfth Night, 58–67. And for the conti-
nental influence on ideas about civility more generally in England (linguistic and 
otherwise), see Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, esp. 79–106.
11 Cited by Furness, in A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, 37. See also 
Lisak, “Domesticating Strangeness in Twelfth Night,” 176: “Corruptions such as 
‘Castiliano vulgo’ may remain utterly obscure, except to Sir Toby.”
12 For other examples of putatively “foreign” babble, see the excellent fake 
French in Haughton’s Englishmen for My Money: “why he may speake flaunte 
taunte as well as French, for I cannot understand him” (sig. A4v); the remarkable 
Dutch-ish passage in Middleton’s No Wit, No Help Like a Woman’s, which begins 
“Quisquinikin Sadlamare” (3.157–58); and the gulling of Parolles in All’s Well 
That Ends Well.
13 Levine, Practicing the City; Rubright, Doppelgänger Dilemmas, esp. chapter 
3, “Double Dutch Tongues: Language Lessons of the Stage,” pp. 89–109; Fleck, 
“‘Ick verstaw you niet’”; Kermode, Aliens and Englishness in Elizabethan Drama. 
See also Dillon, Language and Stage in Medieval and Renaissance England; 
Hoenselaars, Images of Englishmen and Foreigners; Smith, “‘So much English by 
the Mother’”; and Clough, “The Broken English of Foreign Characters of the 
Elizabethan Stage.”
14 I am far from the first to suggest as much. See, recently, Stephen Booth’s 
work on the play in Precious Nonsense, which directly pertains to my project here.
15 See the entry on the term by Michael Leslie in Hamilton, The Spenser 
Encyclopedia, 206–7.
16 Citation from Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 827.
17 Cf. “A New Year’s Gift to Master G. R.,” a terrible, terrible poem in Gifford’s 
A Posie of Gilliflowers: “if I flinch, cry on me open shame,/ And where you come, 
doe bafful my good name” (sig. Q4v).
18 Booth, Precious Nonsense, 149ff.
19 See Donald Rumsfield’s productively convoluted formulation: “as we know, 
there are known knowns ... things we know we know. We also know there are 
unknown knowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns—the one’s we don’t know we don’t know,” 
reprinted in Garber, Loaded Words, 118.
20 Cavell, “Knowing and Acknowledging” and Disowning Knowledge in 
Seven Plays of Shakespeare.
21 On embracing “error” as an applied methodology for illuminating scholarly 
ideologies and assumptions, particularly about Shakespeare, see Zachary Lesser’s 
essay in this collection.
22 Strier, “Review, Disowning Knowledge,” 127.
23 On Cavell’s meta-theatrical thinking vis-à-vis acknowledgment, see espe-
cially Bruns, “Stanley Cavell’s Shakespeare,” and Dahl, “On Acknowledgement 
and Cavell’s Unacknowledged Theological Voice.”
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24 Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness. My emphasis on historical contingency here 
signals what I take to be the principal strength and, as pertains to Shakespearean 
comedy, the determining limitation of Cavell’s argument in Pursuits of Happiness. 
In that work, Cavell insists that the “definitive realization of the genre that 
answered the Shakespearean description” of a “battle between men and women 
for recognition of one another” could only emerge in a historical and cultural 
context informed by first-wave feminism, where a rethinking of sexual and gen-
dered difference fostered the “conditions [of ] viability” in which such acts of 
radical “reconciliation” could take place (18–20). Although Cavell positions 
this twentieth-century film genre as “an inheritor of the preoccupations and dis-
coveries of Shakespeare romantic comedies” (1) and positions The Winter’s Tale 
as a proleptic vision of such epistemological resolution in both this work and 
Disowning Knowledge, he fails to provide a corollary historical accounting for the 
nascent skeptical remedies he locates in Shakespeare’s romantic comedies.
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Chapter 2
Shakespeare’s Nuts1: The Blind Spots of  
the Edible Contact Zone
Jonathan Gil Harris
SHAKESPEARE’S NUTS. WHAT MIGHT my title mean? That I believe Shakespeare is nuts—stark raving mad? That I plan to speak 
about a part of his anatomy adjacent to his “one Will”? Rest assured: I do 
not seek to cast any aspersions on Shakespeare’s mental health—though I 
will be arguing here for a mode of Shakespearean thought that I call nutty, 
and that works less through rational progression and more through coun-
terintuitive long-distance leaps of the imagination. (The minds of the lover, 
the lunatic, and the poet are compact, after all.) And no, I do not wish 
to talk about Shakespeare’s nuts in the scatological sense—though I must 
confess that my essay is very interested in male bodies. Instead, I will be 
thinking about the edible nuts that appear in the writings of Shakespeare 
and some of his contemporaries. Or rather, I will be thinking about the 
ways in which these writers think with nuts—with walnuts, pignuts, hazel-
nuts, simple nuts, coconuts.
How much can we fully see a nut? And what does it even mean 
fully to see a nut? When we absentmindedly reach for peanuts, we rarely 
look closely at what we are about to shovel into our mouths. But I am 
not interested in getting us to look more closely at the physical matter 
of what we eat. Even if we closely inspect the dehiscent shell enclosing 
its edible kernel,2 there is much about the nut that we will remain blind 
to. Just as the commodity form effaces the labor that has produced it, so 
too does the nut that we see in the palm of our hand tend to avert our 
gaze from the realm of work. But I am concerned here less with the labor 
that produces the nut, distributes it globally, and makes it available to 
consumers as a snack. Rather, I am interested in the work, physical and 
imaginative, that the nut does in collaboration with us. And this work 
is a phenomenon largely concealed by the blind spots that surround our 
critical as much as our eating habits. For we are heavily conditioned not 
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to think of objects as active agents. As I will show, however, Shakespeare 
allows us to see the work that nuts do on us. For most of us, nuts are often 
next to nothing—metaphors for their own supposed insignificance. But 
sometimes Shakespeare’s nuts unexpectedly become portals into other, 
imaginatively capacious universes. In these instances, they reveal not only 
how they work on us, but also how we work with them. Even when we tap 
into nuts’ occasional uncanny power to transport us from absentminded 
nut-indifference to transformative flights of nut-inspired fantasy, however, 
we remain susceptible to another blind spot, one we share equally with 
Shakespeare. This is a blind spot that elides what I call the edible contact 
zone—the dynamic space of interaction within which people encounter 
not only other cultures, but also new foodstuffs and other objects that act 
on their bodies.
***
Shakespeare’s references to plant life have often been understood by critics 
through a pointedly localizing prism. The gilly-flowers and cow-slips men-
tioned in A Winter’s Tale and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, for example, 
are often supposed to bespeak his deep intimacy with the Warwickshire 
countryside of his youth.3 By contrast, I want to read Shakespeare’s nuts 
for their global valences—or, more specifically, for the way in which they 
prompt exorbitant, unexpected swerves from the local to the foreign, from 
the familiar to the alien, from the here and now to alternative universes.
To lend such a power to nuts might at first seem counterintuitive. 
What could be more familiar and unexotic than the quotidian nut? A 
walnut is a homely wallflower, not a nutty Clark Kent that, ripping off 
its outer covering, reveals itself to be an action-hero Superman from a 
distant planet. The nut’s tiny size predisposes us to think of it as meaning-
less and mundane. Certainly, Shakespeare’s nuts can serve as shorthand 
for the insubstantial and the insignificant: when Mercutio complains that 
Benvolio will “quarrel with a man for cracking nuts, having no reason 
but because thou has hazel eyes” (Romeo and Juliet 3.1.19–20), he deems 
the nut next to nothing—and certainly not worth getting all knotted up 
about.4 Similarly, Lafew dismisses Parolles as a lightweight nobody by say-
ing that “there can be no kernel in this light nut” (All’s Well That Ends 
Well 2.5.42). And Dromio of Syracuse, believing himself to be a victim 
of an otherwise inexplicable act of witchcraft, explains that devils use the 
smallest things for their black magic, such as “the parings of one’s nail, a 
rush, a hair, a drop of blood, a pin, a nut” (Comedy of Errors 4.5.69–70).
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But this last quote also suggests something uncanny about small, 
everyday things. In imagination, they can become portals to other, 
unknown universes beyond the immediately familiar and visible. Margaret 
Cavendish explores this property of small things in her poem “Of Many 
Worlds within This World”: “What several worlds might in an ear-ring 
be: / For millions of those atoms may be in / The head of one small, lit-
tle, single pin. / And if thus small, then ladies may well wear / A world of 
worlds, as pendants in each ear.”5 Cavendish writes here under the influ-
ence of mid-seventeenth-century atomism, which reworked the classical 
philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius’s conviction that all visible forms 
are comprised of invisible, irreducible atoms.6 But Shakespeare, writing 
fifty years earlier, does not need a theory of atoms to wonder what several 
worlds might in a nut be. When Hamlet claims that, “I could be bounded 
in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space” (Hamlet 2.2.260), 
he hints at the capacious world within its seemingly diminutive shell. 
Which is to say: for Hamlet, the nut’s contents ramify beyond its seem-
ingly small size.
Indeed, Shakespeare’s nuts are generally minute portals through 
which other, larger worlds can be accessed. The self-amplifying power 
of the minuscule thing finds many suggestive points of departure in 
Shakespeare’s imagined fairy worlds. A Midsummer Night’s Dream features 
diminutive creatures with everyday plant names such as Peaseblossom 
and Mustardseed; they are joined by the fairy Puck who can assume the 
minute form of a “crab [-apple]”in a “gossip’s bowl” (2.1.47–48). Yet 
these tiny, nut-like characters, named for everyday plants, are also crea-
tures of another, larger demi-monde that, extending from Athens to the 
perfumed air of India, can “put a girdle around the earth.” And nuts them-
selves feature in the play’s economy of amplification: Titania tells Bottom 
that, “I have a venturous fairy that shall seek / The squirrel’s hoard, and 
fetch thee new nuts” (4.1.34–35). Indeed, the nut is Shakespeare’s favored 
fairy vehicle from the everyday to fantastical worlds. Romeo and Juliet’s 
Queen Mab travels in an “empty hazelnut” (1.4.68), leading humans into 
their dreams. All these tiny fairy-nuts uncannily conflate the local and the 
exotic, the close-to-hand and the globally imported, the Heimlich and the 
Unheimlich. They are objects, but they are also agents, working on and 
with human bodies to transport them to otherworldly destinations.
The nut’s power to prompt imaginative swerves from the minutely 
local to the capaciously global parallels the complexities of the word 
“mundane.” Something mundane is quotidian, familiar, local. Yet the 
word derives from the Latin “mundus,” meaning world; in other words, 
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“the mundane” is uncannily haunted by the trace of the French “le monde,” 
which includes the globally distant and undiscovered. This uncanny con-
vergence of the mundane and the global is also legible in the everyday 
“walnut,” to which Petruchio disparagingly compares Katherina’s small 
hat in The Taming of the Shrew. Although the walnut grew in England, 
it was commonly believed to be of Persian origin, and, although the first 
syllable of the walnut’s name might seem to evoke a mundane “wall,” it 
derives from the Old English word “wal,” meaning “foreign”—also the 
etymological root of “Welsh.”7
But the play that most sustainedly foregrounds the mundane uncan-
niness of the nut is The Tempest. Again, its nuts are turnstiles between the 
local and the foreign. It is only appropriate that the vessel transporting 
the Milanese and Neapolitan nobles from Italy to Africa and beyond is a 
“ship ... no stronger than a nutshell” (1.1.50). The metaphor is designed to 
suggest weakness, but it also—within the larger networks of fugitive nut 
work that I am sketching here—hints at a capacity for abrupt transition 
from one world to another, for lurching from the still to the violent, for 
swerving from the familiar to the unfamiliar.
The foreign shore onto which the nutshell ship releases its European 
passengers is itself nut-ridden. Caliban, who has already acquainted 
Prospero with “All the qualities o’ th’ isle,” including its “barren place and 
fertile” (1.2.339, 240), promises to do the same for his new master, the 
drunken Stephano. He says that “with his long nails,” he will “dig thee 
pig-nuts” (2.2.168)—a kind of underground chestnut otherwise known 
as an earthnut and a hawk-nut. And these pignuts are just one item from a 
menu of island delicacies that also include “clustering filberts” (2.2.171), 
or hazelnuts. The two nutty items appear together with exotic foods such 
as “the nimble marmoset” (2.2.170), a South American species of monkey. 
Yet the island’s nuts would have come across to Shakespeare’s audiences 
not as exotic but as altogether familiar. The pignut was so called because it 
was beloved of English pigs, which would snuffle out and root up this pal-
atable snack from the soil of English woods and fields.8 And the filbert or 
hazelnut, although often associated with Turkey and the Levant, grew in 
southeast England as well.9 The nuts of The Tempest thus oscillate between 
the exotic and the English, the Unheimlich and the Heimlich.
Throughout his work, then, the nut encourages Shakespeare to 
swerve in imagination between points that are simultaneously adjacent and 
remote. This habit is what I call nutty thought. Nutty thought fastens onto 
unexpected, aleatory proximities between seemingly distant phenomena 
and places. It is nutty, in both senses of the word, to assume such seemingly 
random points of connection. But, in some ways, nutty thought is of a piece 
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with Shakespeare’s famed penchant for the pun, which seizes on acoustic 
commonalities between otherwise unrelated concepts. (That is one reason 
why I have assailed you with so many nutty puns, to note the natty knots 
knitted by Shakespeare’s nuts.) But what is it about the nut that should pro-
voke Shakespeare’s uncanny conflations of the local and the global?
Part of it, no doubt, has to do with the way in which, during an age 
of discovery and globalization, nuts were to Shakespeare and his audiences 
both familiar fruits of the English landscape and metonymies for unfamil-
iar parts of the world. Many nuts that we now take for granted and whose 
origins we have by and large deracinated were, in Shakespeare’s time, 
luxury foreign imports from the Middle East and Asia. The almond was 
imported from the Levant; the pistachio from Turkic regions of central 
Asia. Other nuts were shipped from the Americas. Examples include the 
Brazil nut, cultivated in and imported (obviously) from Brazil; the pecan, 
which derives from a North American Algonquin word for a nut requiring 
a stone to crack; and the peanut, first cultivated in what is now Paraguay.10
Perhaps the most suggestive nutty metonymy for non-European 
lands was the coconut, native to tropical climates from the Americas and 
Africa to Asia and the Pacific. It was not known to Shakespeare, as far as we 
can tell. But news of the coconut commanded at least one English writer’s 
attention. And that was less because of the coconut’s exotic origin than 
because of—to rephrase Hamlet—the infinite space within it. As George 
Herbert remarked in his poem “On Providence,” “The Indian nut alone 
/ Is clothing, meat and trencher, drink and kan, / Boast, cable, sail and 
needle, all one.”11 Here we can recognize something close to the uncanny 
logic of Shakespeare’s nuts. For Herbert, the coconut contains within itself 
“several worlds” that ramify beyond its ostensible size. It both is unfamil-
iarly “Indian”—a term that can refer indeterminately to Asia and to the 
Americas12—and it supplies all the familiar comforts any English person 
could wish for: clothes, food, drink, rope, building, and shipping materials.
There is a religious dimension to Herbert’s paean to the coconut, of 
course. Turning the coconut from a minute insignificance into a bottomless 
font of goodness is the nutty effect of divine providence. Shakespeare may not 
have known of coconuts. But the providential logic that can convert an alien 
object into a bringer of familiar comforts is very much part of the universe 
of The Tempest: when Miranda asks Prospero how they arrived on the island, 
he replied “By Providence divine” (1.2.159). This lubricates a conviction that 
the island will provide for the needs of its European visitors. And, indeed, the 
nuts of the island likewise exist only to serve (with the help of Caliban) would-
be colonial masters such as Stephano, a little like the riches of the island of 
Ternate in John Fletcher’s 1621 tragicomedy, The Island Princess: 
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We are arrived among the blessed islands
Where every wind that rises blows perfumes
And every breath of air is like an incense ...
Nothing we see, but breeds an admiration.
The very rivers as we float along,
Throw up their pearls and curl their heads to  
court us.
The bowels of the earth swell with the births
Of thousand unknown gems and thousand riches.
Nothing that bears a life, but brings a treasure ...13
Fletcher does not refer here to nuts. But his vision of the inanimate island 
landscape willfully yielding its riches to its European visitors is similar to 
how Caliban imagines his island’s nuts for Stephano. The nuts, he sug-
gests, exist simply to serve Stephano’s needs.
For a Stephano, it may be a consoling fantasy that the “nutty” swerve 
from home to New World should bring him face to face with familiar nuts 
that answer his Old World needs and therefore bring him back to himself 
(even if they might also serve to make him seem like a pig ). But what if 
the pignuts’ radical nuttiness were to be fully realized at the moment of 
their consumption? What if, upon being eaten, the pignuts did not answer 
Stephano’s immediate need but instead abruptly transported him some-
where else? Does a nut transform the body that eats it? In other words, 
how much may the nut have an agency of its own?
In my evidently misspent childhood, I used to love a series of Disney 
comics that gently parodied the Superman story. The series shows how 
Mickey Mouse’s dim-witted friend, Goofy, is transformed into a semi-
superhero named Super-Goof when he eats, of all things, a kind of peanut 
called a “super-goober.” He may not morph into a creature from another 
planet such as Krypton, but he does magically acquire ill-fitting under-
wear, a badly tied cape, and one puny bicep. Clearly, the super-goober 
nuts are not just passive objects. When eaten, they are agents of transfor-
mation, making Super-Goof less a superhero than a hostage to a new set 
of bodily imperatives he cannot quite control: he is made to fly, though 
with a horrifying lack of skill that has him banging into walls and falling 
into puddles. So, what if the pignuts and filberts that Caliban promises 
Stephano had a rogue agency like that of the super-goobers? How might 
the island nuts transform him? We never find out, of course, because we 
never see Stephano eating them. More broadly, the play is not interested in 
continuing its nutty voyage to new places, as it is ultimately too invested 
in going home to Europe.
SHAKESPEARE’S NUTS  55
So, let me stage a nutty intervention of my own—a swerve from the 
English of The Tempest to a scene in another language from another part 
of the world. This scene is a real-life counter-Tempest from Shakespeare’s 
lifetime: its protagonist goes abroad but does not return home, and he 
encounters nuts in his new location that transform him forever. We will 
take a sea voyage to an island, with many hardships, magical monsters, and 
some strange alcoholic brews. But this is not the story of a man named 
Stefano. It is the story of a man named Stephens: Thomas Stephens, other-
wise known as Tomas Estevão and Pâtri Guru.
***
The name of Thomas Stephens is familiar to scholars of early modern 
English literature as a passing reference in Ralph Fitch’s account of his trav-
els through India and Southeast Asia, the first English travelogue about 
the subcontinent.14 In 1583, Fitch and three other Englishmen had jour-
neyed to India to see if they could break into Portugal’s lucrative trade 
with the Orient. On reaching the island of Goa, they were arrested and 
imprisoned. But Fitch and his companions were freed after the interven-
tion of a mysterious “Father Stephens,” a Jesuit refugee from England resi-
dent in Goa.15 Fitch tells us hardly anything about this earlier Englishman. 
However, there are many more surviving details about Stephens’s life story 
than we would know simply from reading Fitch. Copies survive of two let-
ters that Stephens wrote to England from India—one to his father, and one 
to his brother—as well as two works that he published in India. And some 
archival evidence from England, Italy, and Portugal helps us sketch out the 
details of his life story. It is a story of religious dissidence, exile, linguistic 
acculturation, and transformation—by a nut.
In certain respects, Stephens’s life is a subjunctive version of 
Shakespeare’s.16 Both were born in rural western England in the mid-
1500s—Shakespeare in Warwickshire in 1564, Stephens in Wiltshire 
in 1550. Both received a good school education that emphasized classi-
cal poetry, especially Ovid, in ways that they remembered later in their 
professional creative lives. Both had literary flair. And both probably 
came from dissident Catholic families at a time when Protestantism had 
become the official state religion. The difference is Stephens took his 
religious faith so seriously that he chose to flee England in 1574, after 
his close companion Thomas Pounde was arrested and imprisoned in 
the Tower of London. In the wake of Pounde’s capture, Stephens fled to 
Rome—we do not know how—and enrolled as a novitiate in the Society 
of Jesus. Five years later, the Society granted him permission to go to 
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Goa to aid the Jesuit mission there. Stephens travelled first to Lisbon, 
from where he set sail with twelve other Jesuit missionaries in a fleet of 
five ships on April 4, 1579. The fleet voyaged around the Cape of Good 
Hope and arrived in Goa on October 24.
Seventeen days after Stephens’s arrival in India, he wrote a letter to 
his father describing the long sea journey.17 It is a fascinating document, 
not least because it is the only surviving piece of writing by Stephens in his 
native English. There are occasional mentions of the providence of God 
with regard to Stephens’s health and the good winds that propelled the 
ship to India. But the letter foregoes any display of missionary zeal and 
cleaves more closely to another genre: the fabulous travelogue. Stephens 
offers detailed descriptions of exotic marvels that he saw during his sea 
voyage around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope—the stuff of John 
Mandeville’s and other medieval travellers’ tales. He tells his father about 
his sightings of a medusa jellyfish, of strange birds with seven-span wings, 
and of a miraculous fish “which hath wings and flieth.”18 In all these 
instances, Stephens effaces himself: invisible in the marvellous scenes he 
describes, he offers each as an occasion “to glorify Almighty God in His 
wonderful works and such variety in His creatures.”19
Yet, even as Stephens steps out of frame throughout this slideshow 
of exotic marvels, we can see another tendency lurking in the background 
of his letter. He also observes how the journey to India pathologically 
transforms the flesh of sea voyagers: Stephens explains, in what seems to 
be a description of the symptoms of scurvy, that those who undertake 
such a long journey are likely to “fall into sundry diseases, their gums grow 
great and swell, and they are fain to cut them away, their legs swell, and all 
the body becometh sore and so benumbed, that they cannot stir hand or 
foot, and so they die for weakness.”20 And he talks also of the experience 
of crossing into the “Burning Zone” near the equator, where sea voyagers 
suffer “so many inconveniences of heats and lack of winds that they think 
themselves happy when they have passed it.”21 In other words, Stephens 
had begun to note the transformation of European bodies in foreign envi-
ronments. He was not simply watching a marvellous spectacle of a brave 
new world that providentially took care of him: he recognized that this 
new world was, more accurately, an environment that had permeated his 
body, in the form of disease and heat.
In a letter he wrote to his brother Richard in 1583, Stephens notes 
that he was “tried by a serious illness” shortly after he reached India.22 We 
do not know what illness it was—quite possibly dysentery, the plague of 
many a new arrival—but it obviously felled him with particular force, 
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given that he could still recall its gravity four years later. This was but the 
first of many bodily transformations that he was to undergo in Goa. But 
his letter to his father, so sparse on detail about his Indian destination, 
does show that his attention had already been arrested by another form of 
Indian matter he took into his body—a new fruit he had not seen before: 
the coconut. He writes at the very end of the letter that “the drink of this 
country is good water, or wine of the palm tree, or a fruit called cocoas.”23 
Stephens had clearly already sampled coconut water, a powerful antidote 
to the loss of body salts caused by sweating in India’s extreme heat. As we 
will see, this was the beginning of a long and profound relationship that 
transformed his body and its habits.
The Goa in which Stephens landed in 1579 was an increasingly bel-
licose beacon of Christianity.24 Thanks to St. Francis Xavier’s aggressive 
work in converting Konkan Brahmins after he came to India in 1542, the 
Jesuit mission in Goa had become a major force in shaping the culture of 
the region. Francis Xavier bequeathed to the mission a distinctive legacy 
of intolerance.25 Horrified by what he regarded as the idolatrousness of 
Goa’s Hindus, he recommended setting up the Inquisition in Goa. He 
took little care to study local customs and languages: his aim was to save 
souls. If Hindu temples needed to be destroyed to bring the word of God 
to the infidels, that was simply a grim necessity.
Stephens approached his mission rather differently. He took 
considerable pains to learn local customs and tongues: clearly a gifted 
linguist—he quickly became fluent in Portuguese—he also acquired 
Konkani, the local language of both Goa and the northern Malabar 
coast. In the frontier village of Rachol, where he lived for most of his 
four decades in India before his death in 1619, speaking Konkani was 
a necessity. Indeed, he became so fluent that he wrote (under the name 
of Tomas Estevão) the first Konkani grammar book, the Arte da lingoa 
Canarim.26 We do not know who his teachers were, but he evidently spent 
considerable time in the company of Konkani speakers. Just as impres-
sively, he devoted himself to learning Marathi, the language of “high” 
literature among the Brahmins. It was in Marathi, sprinkled with some 
Konkani, that Stephens composed—under the name of Pâtri Guru—his 
epic 11,018-line poem about the history of the world from Creation to 
the coming of Jesus. He called the poem the Kristapurana—the Story 
of Christ. First printed in 1616 on a press at the Rachol seminary, the 
Kristapurana became enormously popular with the local community of 
Brahmin converts and, subsequently, with Malabari Christians and even 
Marathi-speaking non-Christians.27
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The Kristapurana arguably achieved a quasi-colonial end—bringing 
Christian lore to the locals.28 But Stephens did not simply dress up Jesuit 
Christian doctrine in workmanlike Marathi. He also demonstrably fell in 
love with the language, in a way that Indianized not just the Christianity 
he sought to preach, but also his own body. This much is apparent from 
the best-known section of the Kristapurana, in which Stephens praises the 
beauty of Marathi:
Zaissy puspã mazi puspa mogary
Qui parimallã mazi casturi




Bhassã madhe manu thoru
Maratthiyessi
[As the mogra among flowers
As musk among perfumes
So among languages is the beauty
Of Marathi
As among birds the peacock
As among trees the kalpataru
So among languages is
Marathi].29
We might choose to read this passage as a strategic tour de force designed 
to hook an Indian readership. Stephens had carefully studied not just the 
medieval Marathi puranas—epic stories of creation, gods, and kings—but 
had also become adept in one of Marathi’s most distinctive poetic forms: 
the ovi stanza, employed to great effect by the Brahmin Marathi poet-saint 
Eknath (1533–99), a contemporary of Stephens.30
But, in appropriating Eknath’s distinctive style, Stephens was not 
simply speaking to his readers in the language and the poetic form of the 
region. He was also lending voice to powerful personal experiences of his 
attachment to his new home. In his ovis, Stephens opened up his body 
to the touch of a world supposedly separate from him. For the landscape 
Stephens describes in his praise of Marathi is not designed simply to hook 
his Indian readers; it also bears the imprint of his own sensuous interac-
tions with it. Here, if briefly, we can glimpse Stephens’s own delighted 
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body in Goa, smelling mogra (jasmine) flowers, hearing the cry of the pea-
cock, gazing upon the kalpataru tree. And this body is the missing point 
of connection between landscape and language, a language that seems to 
have induced in him a similar delight. Which is to say: speaking Marathi 
changed Stephens.
Speaking Marathi also changed the Christianity he attempted to 
bring to his readers. The Kristapurana retells stories from the Old and New 
Testaments. Yet the Christianity he explains is one that has been adapted to 
Indian, and even Hindu, concepts. He calls Jesus, for example, a swami. But 
the Hinduization of Stephens’s Christianity is perhaps most clear from one 
word choice in the above passage: “calpataru,” or kalpataru tree—under-
stood most often among inhabitants of the Konkan coast as the coconut tree.
Throughout the Kristapurana, Stephens invokes the “calpataru.” 
Here he adapts a traditional Hindu motif for Christian purposes: the 
kalpataru is, in Sanskrit mythology, a divine tree that has the power to 
grant all wishes, as a result of which Indra the god-king takes it with him 
to paradise. Consequently, “calpataru” provides Stephens with a power-
ful translation for the Tree of Life in the Garden of Eden, which is how 
he uses the word at the poem’s beginning. This typifies how Stephens 
gravitated toward Hindu concepts. He probably did so less out of a deep 
sympathy than a pragmatic sense of the main constituency for his poem, 
Brahmin Hindus who had converted to Catholicism. There was another 
shrewd calculation behind his adaptation of the kalpataru. As his paean to 
Marathi makes clear, his use of the word also serves to localize the Edenic 
tree in Goa. Indeed, the kalpataru was equated by the inhabitants of the 
Konkan coast with the coconut tree, because of its ability to provide for a 
wide spectrum of human needs.
This was a tradition with which Stephens was evidently familiar. In 
the letter he wrote to his brother, he remarks of the coconut tree that:
It gives oil, liquor (vinum), toddy (lac), syrup (mel) sugar and vine-
gar. Coir-rope is also made from it to tie with, and its branches 
are used to protect huts from rain. It gives fruit all the year round, 
which are rather nuts than dates, resembling a man’s head. When 
the exterior rind has been removed, they rival the size of two fists. 
Inside, the fruit contains water like light beer and good to quench 
one’s thirst. It is so plentiful that, after drinking from one fruit, you 
would not look for another. In the interior of the nut is a kernel 
lining it all over like a covering and forming a prized article of food. 
The shell furnishes the blacksmith with charcoal. Those that live 
near the sea not only load their boats with the tree, but also utilise it 
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for making ropes and sails. You will find hardly any piece of writing 
except on its leaves. Those that live on land invariably make use of 
them to shelter themselves from rain.31
Here, we can see Stephens the Goan ethnographer not so much describ-
ing the kalpataru as rehearsing an oft-repeated local narrative about it. 
Yet it is clear that his relation to the kalpataru was embodied as much as 
it was conceptual. As we have seen, the long letter Stephens wrote to his 
father in 1579, rich in details about his fantastic sea voyage to Goa, refers 
to the “drink of this country” derived from palm trees: here, he invokes 
either coconut water or toddy, the zesty alcoholic brew he mentions in 
his letter to his brother. Each drink has a significant impact on the body. 
Coconut water is an excellent guard against dehydration; electrolyte-rich, 
it has a cooling effect in the heat. And its alcoholic derivative toddy is 
a fine protector against the cold. It is very difficult to imagine Stephens 
having done without either drink during his four decades in India. In the 
last three years of his life, prior to his death in 1619, he struggled to take 
food because of a chronic stomach problem; it is highly likely that coco-
nut water would have been a regular part of his sickbed diet. It is likewise 
difficult to imagine Stephens, earlier in his life, avoiding the multiple uses 
of the coconut in its many other forms: eating the coconut’s white flesh 
by itself or mixed into tasty dishes such as the kishmur fish curry that is so 
plentiful in the region; using its husk hair as coir for rope; employing it as 
charcoal for cooking or other fires; sheltering under its leaves in the mon-
soon; even writing on it as a substitute for paper—indeed, it is tempting 
to imagine drafts of the Kristapurana written on the leaves of kalpataru—
Stephens must have been familiar with all these.
In other words, Stephens’s “calpataru” is not simply a local figure 
that translates a Christian concept. It is the catalyst for an entirely new 
ensemble of bodily habits, habits that differ from how Stephens had used 
his body in England. If Stephens imbues the kalpataru with miraculous 
properties in the Kristapurana, it is partly because the coconut also helped 
transform him from Thomas Stephens the English religious dissident into 
Pâtri Guru the Marathi poet. The coconut, therefore, was for Stephens the 
secular version of a consecrated communion wafer: his body was trans-
formed by it, whether through eating its flesh, drinking its water, burning 
its rind, plaiting its husk hairs into rope, using its bark as a shelter from the 
rain, or writing upon its leaves.
The coconut may have provided Stephens, as it did George Herbert, 
with an illustration of the workings of divine providence and the principle 
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that God makes everything for some use—or, in the case of the kalpataru, 
for potentially infinite use. Yet the coconut does not always function in 
such straightforwardly theological fashion in the Kristapurana. When 
Stephens invokes it, he does not do so simply to translate key concepts 
of Christian doctrine for his Marathi-speaking readers. He also localizes 
those concepts, displacing and transforming them in ways that vividly 
conjure the details of the Goan landscape. When, for example, Stephens 
describes the rebuilding of Jerusalem, he writes that:
Draqhe vely puspa taru bhina zahale
Zuna taddamadda bhumy paddale
Teanche tthai vruqhe vaddhale
Apaisse
[Grape vines, flowers and trees fell apart
Old high coconut and palm trees fell to the ground
In their place trees grew
Naturally].32
Here, Stephens imagines a Jerusalem that has fallen from its former glory, a 
glory associated not just with vines and flowers, but also with the coconut 
tree. His term for the latter in this passage is not the heavenly kalpataru of 
Sanskrit mythology, however, but “taddamadda”—a local Konkani word 
that, describing the soaring height of mixed groves of coconut and palmyra 
trees, helps Stephens reimagine the original Jerusalem as a version of the 
contemporary Konkan coast. As a result, the paradisal bliss that Christian 
doctrine associates with a lost past is subtly outsourced to Stephens’s and 
his readers’ Indian present.
Describing the animals afflicted by the waters of the Great Flood, 
Stephens again evokes the local coconut-rich landscape with a word that 
points to neither Christian doctrine nor Hindu mythology, but an actual 
experience of a Goan coconut tree. This time the word in question is Marathi:
Veagra bocaddiyã saue põuaty
Zalli siha sardhalla craddaty
Zallachare manuxanssi mellaty
Nariyelli vari
[The tigers swim with the sheep
In the water the lions play with smaller cats
Those living in the water meet men
Atop the coconut tree].33
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Stephens here describes the devastation wrought by the biblical flood 
as an inversion of cosmic order: its water levels the hierarchical distinc-
tions between species and between heights, placing mighty and weak 
animal, treetop and submarine seascape, in unexpected proximity. For 
modern readers, this might sound less like the flood as conceived in the 
Bible than a description of the tsunami that crashed into India’s coconut-
lined Coromandel Coast in 2004. But the stanza has a more specifically 
Goan resonance. Stephens’s concluding line invokes the Nariyelli, a com-
monplace Marathi term for the coconut; the image he conjures with the 
Nariyelli, of men atop the coconut tree, is a powerful one in Goa even 
today. For the coconut trees of the region are scaled daily by agile men 
who tap the fruit for water and toddy. Stephens may not have adapted his 
body to clamber up coconut trees in search of libations. During his forty 
years in India, however, the Nariyelli was the agent of numerous other 
recalibrations of his body and its flesh.
These recalibrations of the flesh are why we cannot dismiss Stephens 
as simply an agent of European colonial power. To this day, his name is asso-
ciated in Goa with the flowering of Konkani as a literary language.34 And 
Stephens has additionally served as a standard-bearer for Goa’s other indig-
enous languages: in the mid-twentieth century, at the height of the Quit 
India movement, his praise of Marathi from the Kristapurana was posted 
widely in non-Christian venues throughout Goa, such as the Saraswat 
Brahman Samaj’s library in Margão.35 Stephens did not just convert 
Brahmins to Christianity. He and his Christianity were also transformed 
by the Goan ecosystem, including the coconuts he encountered there.
***
In light of Stephens’s coconut, then, we can revisit Stephano’s pignut. 
When we read the two nuts contrapuntally, we might see Stephens’s 
Marathi poem as a counter-Tempest, and Shakespeare’s English play as a 
counter-Kristapurana.36 Written unbeknownst to each other in the early 
1610s, they constitute a conflicting canon of early modern nutty writing. 
They also represent sharply different ways of thinking about the experi-
ences of migrant bodies and the agency of food in the contact zone.
The phrase “contact zone” is, of course, Mary Louise Pratt’s. She 
uses it to refer to “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple 
with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of 
power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived 
out in many parts of the world today.”37 Pratt’s definition of the contact 
zone is curiously disembodied: it rightly thinks about cultural encounters 
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and power relations, but it finesses the ways in which these encounters and 
relations are mediated by, and imprinted on, bodies. The documents of 
early modern literary nut-writing allow us to put not just human but also 
non-human bodies back into what we might call the edible contact zone.
The Tempest’s pignuts are never allowed to be anything other than 
fodder that serves the European migrant’s need to continue functioning 
as himself. As we have seen, the play’s nuts are simply inert commodi-
ties accumulated through indentured native labor for consumption by 
European masters. The nuts exist only to maintain European health and to 
safeguard a political economy in which European supremacy is assumed. 
By contrast, the Kristapurana, and indeed the life story of Stephens in 
Goa, suggest that nuts are not simply consumable goods. They are also 
actors that transform migrant bodies. In Shakespeare’s plays, the nut has 
an uncanny power to swerve from the familiar to the strange. But that 
power is somehow diminished as soon as the nut becomes food; then it is 
simply a means by which a European can remain a European. What I have 
called Shakespeare’s capacity for nutty thought, then, is nonetheless blind 
to an embodied power that Stephens more fully recognizes—that the nut 
not only comes from a brave new world, but can also open up a new world 
within the body of the person who eats it. This opening up is equally an 
adaptation to a larger ecology—an edible contact zone—within which 
nuts and humans meet, become bonded as fellow actors, and with trans-
formative effect.
No matter how much the nut may transform settler bodies within 
the edible contact zone, however, we must still attend to the shaping polit-
ical economy within which the nut is made available to its foreign eater. 
The mere fact of transformation by a nut does not mean that larger colo-
nialist social relations and forms of labor must be likewise transformed. If 
Stephens did not himself clamber up coconut trees to retrieve coconuts, 
who did? Which Calibans cracked his coconuts for him? Which Calibans 
labored to safeguard his health? In telling the story of the miraculous 
powers of the coconut in Goa, it is perhaps too easy to forget the stubborn 
power of an economy in which labor was divided in entirely colonialist 
ways. Stephens was doubtless the beneficiary of an early version of this 
economy—which is to say, he must have assumed the privileges of a gora 
sahib (white master) served by Indian peons.
Yet there were other economies at work in Stephens’s career, econo-
mies in which power was not organized in quite so predictable a fashion. 
From whom did he learn local languages, including vernacular Konkani 
and high Marathi? From whom did he learn the complexities of the 
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ovi form? From whom did he learn about Eknath? Stephens immersed 
himself in the local literary tradition in a way that few other early European 
settlers did and, as a result, mastered Konkani, Marathi, and their poetic 
forms. But his education would have demanded that he submit to other 
local masters. How much did he have to submit, not just intellectually, but 
also physically, to his Indian gurus? How, for example, did he sit during his 
Marathi lessons? How did he turn the pages of Marathi Puranas—perhaps 
inscribed on coconut leaves—such as Eknath’s? How, in short, might his 
body have adapted not only to the plant life, but also to the classrooms of 
the Konkan coast? How did his body change in ways that not only served 
the ends of the Portuguese colonial state but also traced the outlines of 
rather different modes of contact between foreigner and local?
In the edible contact zone of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Goa, then, the asymmetry of power relations in favor of European colo-
nialist hegemony cannot always be presumed in advance. The coconut 
was, in Stephens’s case, a node within a complex, dynamic network of 
social relations that entailed considerable fluctuations of power, iden-
tity, and bodily habits. Within and without its nutshell, we find infinite 
space, at least in terms of lifeworlds that exceed the standard narratives of 
colonial history and European imperialism, including The Tempest. And 
that is why, in my nutty reworking of The Tempest prompted by Thomas 
Stephens’s Kristapurana, Stephano will not only eat the nuts Caliban 
gives him: he will also learn the language of Caliban and Sycorax, write 
an ode to Setebos, and train his fingers to dig banquets of pignuts under 
the bewitching influence of fenny—that is, cashew-nut liqueur. In my 
Tempest, then, Stephano—like his near-namesake Stephens—will go nuts.
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Flying Blind, Going Nuts: A Response to  
Jonathan Gil Harris
Subha Mukherji
This delightful tour de force of nutty thought does not only give us a 
tantalizing route into nuts and people, colonialism and consumption, 
Prospero’s isle and the island of Goa, The Tempest and the Kristapurana, 
Stephano and Stephens. It also opens casements onto the power of small 
things to act as unsuspected portals for worlds of possibility, realized or 
longed for, the capacity of passive objects to function as active agents 
of epistemic swerves into worlds elsewhere—in life and in fiction, for 
actors, authors, and readers alike. It draws us into the blind spots that we 
need to outstare for such insights. Methodologically, then, it goes to the 
heart of the idea behind this book. The diminutiveness of such puncta—
needle-like wounds and apertures that lead us into woody places in the 
text that are hidden from the light of common day and common sense—
makes it particularly delicious that the tiny fairy in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream is the one whose ad/venture it is to fetch new nuts for the charac-
ter who is most “translated” by a physical change. And it is a translation 
that registers in literal-minded Bully Bottom’s language, which smacks 
more numinously but less literally of nuts than Thomas Stephens’s: the 
weaver weaves himself into sense as he tries to grasp the texture of his 
dream, which feels—well, a bit like having gone blissfully nuts. For the 
lovers too, who feel something similar at the end of that play, it happens 
through a substance infiltrating the body (the love-juice). A larger point 
arising is that of somatic agency in knowledge. For all the fashion of 
body criticism, have we asked the right questions about embodiment and 
epistemology?
Interesting , too, is the transition from spectator to inter-actor. 
The flying fish and obscure birds of Stephens’s epistolary report of his 
long sea voyage give way to the coconut that becomes “incorporate” in 
the porous colonial body (as the Gothic queen Tamora becomes incor-
porate in Rome) and cross-cultural poetry. What knowledges do such 
osmoses as these instill in the human agent who is also inscribed by the 
non-human object, which takes on agency as it transforms him? Is the 
coconut like Bottom’s ass’s head, a physical object—a prop—that trans-
forms being without usurping it quite? What complicates the structural 
symmetry of transactions is that one of the agents is an inanimate fruit. 
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Is its surprising agency constituted or undermined by the knowingness 
of the person ingesting or absorbing it, unlike the passivity of the human 
agent when Puck squeezes love-juice into Titania’s eye? Can the meto-
nymic object be a stage prop too? How conscious is Thomas “Stephano” 
of the cultural capital to be drawn from the edible contact zone of a 
foreign environment where he not only wants but needs to be accepted? 
How easily can this relation be destabilized, and does that require the 
agency of the colonized? Even when the “other” is a nut rather than a 
manipulative foreign queen, how reversible is the agent–object relation 
in this exchange?
The other factor I wonder about, in the specific context of the 
nariyel, is that of labor. Does it matter that it probably was not Patri 
Guru Stephens who climbed the tall tree, as Gil says, but an agile, “won-
drous necessary” native, quite possibly someone in a servant capacity, 
aiding colonial provision in unfamiliar heat (not to speak of the culti-
vation of the trees)?38 Does the prehistory of the coconut getting into 
the body of the missionary foreigner change the counters in this act of 
transformation? A story I grew up hearing comes back to haunt me. 
My friend Santanu’s family, from our South Calcutta neighborhood, 
had a trusty servant, “Ramani,” who had served a British family home 
in the city before Independence.39 He was a great raconteur. One of 
his stories was how his British masters would call out for him—the 
“khansama” or “Johnny”—and offer him a penny if he could crack open 
a coconut: “Johnny Johnny, one penny” was the refrain. When the 
water was extracted, the “shaheb” would drink it and say “good water, 
good water.” Ramani-da also recalled how the British played football 
with “narkols” (and Americans “soccer,” when they visited briefly to 
drop a bomb on the Howrah Bridge). So the coconut in this second 
scenario was not just an agent in the labile contact zone but func-
tional in homosocial bonding and phenomenological change through 
an act of colonial bricolage in the world of Western sports: reinvented 
as a ball, it impinged on the white male body and its practices, not 
just as taste and texture but as exertion, not as pulp but as play—to 
be chased, dribbled, exchanged on the plains of Bengal; entering the 
zone of competitive contact (who gets “passed” the coconut-ball), and 
then to be prised open to be savored, all filtered through the memory 
of Ramani the manservant (ban-ban Ca-Caliban) who was called upon 
to serve it and paid in small change for his small labor. In his later post- 
independence days, the subaltern spoke, to his new (Bengali) masters, 
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their children and their friends—like Iachimo in captivity, repossessing 
the scene with performance. The nut can be a prop for the native 
too! But then again, did he have the last word? The memory trace is 
cathected through these middle-class children, now academics in the 
West. The point is that these relations are often uncanny “walnuts” 
themselves—I love the way Gil touches on the etymology of the word, 
suggesting both quotidian wall and threatening foreignness. It reminds 
me of what Derrida calls the paradoxical affiliation of hostis—etymo-
logically evoking both host and guest, for between host and hostage is 
one small step, as Lear knew when he was turned out “at gates,” his own 
gates, by his daughter and son-in-law.
And yet, even as I raise these questions, I am moved by the sense of 
joy and indeed of “love,” as Gil puts it, that comes across in the ovi stan-
zas of Stephens’s Marathi poetry. Through all the social constructivism we 
may be legitimately tempted to test the thesis against, there is a certain 
irreducibility of affect that can only be conveyed elusively in the feel of 
the poetry and—perhaps in a segue into self—in Gil’s delightful narra-
tive (i.e., it takes delight in capturing this), even while he acknowledges 
shrewd calculation, strategy, and pragmatism underlying some of Thomas 
Stephens’s moves. This interests me not only personally and biographi-
cally, but also critically. Is affect one of the blind spots in the necessarily 
politicized field of contact zone studies? Have we found a way of fully 
incorporating it yet in the knowledges we seek through our obstinate 
questionings and disciplinary rigors? What I find missing in a lot of the 
relevant critical writing is play—which this essay is quick with. And this in 
turn makes me wonder if the edible, audible, and olfactory contact zones 
are not potentially also zones of a peripateia in the migratory, especially 
colonial, plot? That something can in fact reverse at these thresholds, and 
a transition can be effected from one stage to another? Perhaps Stephano 
fails to enter the proffered dream because in this, Shakespeare’s most com-
pact and Aristotelian play, the encounter has to be momentuous rather 
than processive; the shift from object to agent does not get fully trig-
gered (unlike, perhaps, in The Winter’s Tale)—though I wonder where 
Puck stands in this spectrum. Stephano is not made of words either, in the 
way that so many of our Shakey characters are. And language, as Barthes 
knew, is a skin—another surface of contact. Gil’s reading of the language 
of Stephens’s poetry (and letters) opens up the possibility of tracing bod-
ily knowledge through linguistic texture—from one form to another is a 
fluid passage.
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Yet the boundary of potential passage remains fugitive and pre-
carious, which is why I wonder if desire needs to be brought into the 
equation for a full understanding of such encounters. I would love to hear 
what place it has in Gil’s larger narrative and project. At the cost of risk-
ing a relapse into the conceptual from the embodied, I want to put some 
pressure on the kalpataru as a generic metaphor, rather than, straightfor-
wardly, a coconut tree. In different parts of India, the name is given to 
different trees: the famous kalpataru in Badrinath, for example, is a mul-
berry tree; the one I knew in our village home in Birbhum was a banyan. 
Also called the kalpavriksha, the kalpataru is, after all, etymologically and 
semantically, as well as in Hindu myth and Sanskrit literature, the “wish-
fulfilling tree”—kalpa is a derivative of the Sanskrit kalpana, meaning 
imagination, fantasy. It evokes the fantasy and desire of the white body 
to not just claim, but belong to, a paradise of osmosis that might replace, 
even displace, or transform, an anti-paradise of possession, conversion, 
and conquest of a non-white, largely non-Christian people. In Agamben’s 
terms, the end sometimes wants to forget its beginning. Perhaps the 
haunting , namaaj-like chants of the Kristapurana in present-day Goa, 
distantly resonant in Cambridge and Delhi on YouTube, are a token of that 
forgetting—which is also an alternative form of memory; a re-membering 
at once assimilative and recuperative. The precise impossibility of this, in 
Stephens’s case, makes poignant his poetics and somatics of desire, and 
makes his literary use of the coconut “lawful as eating,” if only in a lived 
romance.40 The body is not elided, but both sensed and emplotted. Might 
one go as far as to say that embodiment and narrative are woven together, 
just as doctrine dissolves into affect, as Stephens gives Christian concepts a 
local habitation and a name?
Even if Shakespeare’s Stephano failed to either feel or recognize 
the transformative potential of the merely edible nut, Shakespeare knew 
about the potency of nutty thought—not just in relation to small objects 
or infiltrating substances, but liminal moments, spaces, even creatures—
for example, dreams as a threshold state of heightened perception. What 
Gil’s argument draws in is the sense of an active transaction. The point 
about the multiform, polylavent nut is that it is, and is not, a nut. It is an 
operative counterpart for that dimension of the theatre that trains us to 
see double, with parted eyes. As a point of entry, it tempts me into my 
own nutty swerve, and makes me introduce a point of exit into a world 
apart: “Exit, pursued by a bear” (The Winter’s Tale 3.3.58). Theseus 
and common sense tell us that a bush is a bush and a bear is a bear, but 
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the play shows us that a man can turn into an ass! So the bear in The 
Winter’s Tale is both material and metonymic, and, through the terrible 
sportiveness of its own act of eating (and the clown’s recounting of it), it 
somehow makes lawful the transition between winter and spring, cru-
elty and joy, death and life, loss and restoration, the “familiar” Sicily and 
the “strange” Bohemia; indeed, between tragedy and comedy. Perhaps 
it also has something to do with the fluidity of bears—the polar bears 
brought into England and put on show by Henslowe et al., and their pos-
sible interchangeabilty in the theatre with bears of fantasy presented by a 
big bouncy person in bearskin. The edible contact zone where Antigonus 
becomes mere food but Perdita is rescued into life is also the eldritch 
space of tragicomic reversal and formal experiment, and a surrender to a 
world elsewhere. Is there a generic story that I am trying to get at? Should 
I be? Or have I eaten too many nuts?
Infinite riches in a little nut! But remember, ceci n’est pas une noix ...
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Jesuit”; in a private letter written from Goa in January 1584, he says that Stephens 
and Marco “did sue for us unto the Viceroy and other officers,” And, “if they had 
not stuck to us, if we had escaped with our lives yet we had long imprisonment.” 
Fitch’s letter is also reproduced in Locke, The First Englishmen in India, 89.
16 My biographical information about Stephens derives from the follow-
ing sources: Saldanha, The Christian Puranna of Father Thomas Stephens of the 
Society of Jesus; Schurhammer, “Thomas Stephens 1549–1619”; Singh, “The First 
Englishman in India”; and Southwood, “Thomas Stephens.” See also Harris, The 
First Firangis, 47–70.
17 Stephens’s letter to his father is reproduced in Saldanha, The Christian 
Puranna, xxvi–xxx.
18 Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxvi, xxvii.
19 Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxviii.
20 Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxviii.
21 Saldana, The Christian Puranna, xxvii.
22 Stephens’s Latin letter to his brother Richard is also reproduced in 
Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxx–xiv
23 Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxx.
24 My discussion of pre-Portuguese and early colonial Goa is indebted to de 
Souza, Goa Through the Ages; Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 381–91; and 
Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500–1700, 80–85.
25 For an extensive if somewhat reverential biography of Francis Xavier, see 
Schurhammer, Francis Xavier.
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26 My discussion of Konkani is indebted to Ivo Coelho’s introduction to the 
facsimile edition of Stephens, Arte de Lingoa Canarim.
27 Original editions of the Kristapurana do not survive, so I have worked 
with Saldanha’s 1907 Marathi edition. The Marathi of this edition is rendered 
in Roman rather than Devanagari script. All English translations are mine, with 
considerable help from Vibha Kamat and Suresh Walawalikar.
28 It is important to remember that, even if the Jesuits initially worked 
with the sanction of the Portuguese colonial state, they were not identical to it. 
Although King João III had appointed Francis Xavier as his Apostolic Nuncio 
in Portuguese India, the Jesuits did not operate straightforwardly within the 
machinery of colonialism and empire. Stephens’s mission to translate the Word of 
God into local vernaculars may have not fallen foul of state law in his lifetime, but 
it did later, as, indeed, did the Jesuit order in general. After several years of sus-
tained pressure, the colonial authorities banned the use of vernacular languages in 
1684 and declared Portuguese the sole official language. Stephens’s Kristapurana 
suddenly became a problematic text. The poem went even further underground 
with the (temporary) suspension of the Jesuit order in 1773, as a result of which 
many texts associated with the Society of Jesus were destroyed. This might be the 
reason why not a single copy of the first three editions of the Kristapurana sur-
vives today. But, in the wake of the vernacular language ban and the suspension of 
the Jesuits, the Kristapurana survived in largely secretive, oral form among Goan 
and Malabari Christians. In the process, it became a powerful rallying point for 
anti-colonial sentiment; it was still recited with pride by Marathi-speaking Indian 
freedom fighters at the height of Gandhi’s Quit India Movement in the 1940s.
29 Saldanha, The Christian Puranna (Auasuari 1, ovis 123–24).
30 Stephens’s debts to Eknath, as well as to earlier practitioners of the ovi 
tradition such as Dnyaneshwar, are discussed by Staffner, “Fr. Stephens’ Christa 
Puranna,” and Silva, “Thomas Stephens, S. J.”
31 Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, xxxii–xxxiii.
32 Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, 179 (Auasuari 33, ovi 16).
33 Quoted in Saldanha, The Christian Puranna, 42 (Auasuari 7, ovi 77).
34 The association of Stephens’s name with the flowering of Konkani as a liter-
ary language is in no small part due to the Thomas Stephens Konknni Kendr in 
the Goan parish of Bardez, which houses an extraordinary archive of Konkani 
texts by Stephens and other non-Portuguese Goan writers of the past four cen-
turies. Stephens has also recently become a figurehead for the indigenous Romi 
Konknni Movement, whose objective is to have Roman-script Konkani declared 
one of the official languages of Goa.
35 This story comes from Vibha Kamat.
36 The practice of reading “contrapuntally” means reading a text from the 
double perspective of imperialist ideology and the means of production or forms 
of resistance that it might efface, “with an understanding of what is involved when 
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an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important 
to the process of maintaining a particular style of life in England” (Said, Culture 
and Imperialism, 66).
37 Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone,” 34.
38 A phrase used by Beatrice-Joanna to describe Deflores, the charismatic 
court servant who at once repels and fascinates her and who both serves and dom-
inates her through erotic complicity, in Middleton and Rowley, The Changeling, 
5.1.92.
39 Delighted thanks go to Santanu Das, the source of this story, himself a 
raconteur par excellence.
40 Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, 5.3.111, in The Arden Shakespeare.
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Chapter 3
Eyes Wide Shut: Seeing and  
Knowing in Othello
Supriya Chaudhuri
“Give me the ocular proof.”
(Othello, 3.3.363)1
IF KNOWLEDGE, LIKE VISION, has its blind spot or punctum caecum, the analogy with the faculty of sight would suggest that it is a 
not-knowing at the very core of knowing, one for which knowledge seeks 
incessantly to compensate. The point is relevant to Othello, a play obsessed 
with seeing, yet one that repeatedly falls back upon imagined spectacles 
as substitutes for visual evidence. “Give me the ocular proof,” says Othello 
to Iago: “Make me to see’t.” To this Iago replies, “Would you, the supervi-
sor, grossly gape on? / Behold her topped? ... It is impossible you should 
see this” (3.3.363–64, 398–99; 405). The exchange has been much com-
mented on in a number of contexts, from Shakespeare’s literal dependence 
upon Cinthio for the phrase “ocular proof,” to the links between spying, 
sexual jealousy, and theatrical spectatorship.2 Nevertheless, it retains its 
power to trouble us, constituting the paradox at the heart of the play’s vis-
ual dynamic. The impossibility of Othello’s actually seeing the act of adul-
tery that Iago attributes to Desdemona is almost physically tied in to the 
assumed primacy of sight in their relationship: on her part, the fact that 
“she had eyes, and chose me” (3.3.192), and, on his, the call to witness: 
“Look where she comes / If she be false, O then heaven mocks itself / I’ll 
not believe’t” (3.3.281–83). Yet that very reliance on the evidence of the 
eyes, signaled more than once in this play, is betrayed by the fluency with 
which seeing becomes a metaphor or a mental act, from Desdemona’s see-
ing “Othello’s visage in his mind” (1.3.253) to Othello’s frantic probing of 
the “monster” in Iago’s thought, “too hideous to be shown” (3.3.110–11). 
So too, as Iago calmly assures him, where knowledge cannot be based upon 
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sense perception, it must be derived from “imputation and strong circum-
stances” (3.3.409): that is, from inference and background information. 
There is a curious link here to the psychophysiology of the blind spot in 
the human eye.
Anatomically, the punctum caecum, first detected by the French 
physicist Edmé Mariotte in 1668, is the small area in the retina where 
the optic nerves pass through the optic disc, thus making vision possible. 
Lacking photoreceptors entirely, the junction forms a blind spot, or stain 
(Mariotte named it la tache aveugle) in the field of sight. This hole—a 
punctum, or puncture at the heart of seeing—is filled in by the physiol-
ogy of binocular vision, the other eye supplying what one does not see, 
repairing the neural gap by a visual overlap, and restoring “wholeness” to 
sight. But, even when the blind spot is isolated—if one sees with a sin-
gle eye—the brain’s psychological mechanisms work to “paper over” the 
neural gap with information from the background, so that there is no per-
ceptible empty space or stain in the field of vision. The place of the spot 
we do not see is filled in by what is adjacent to it in the visual field. The 
phenomenological analogy, with consciousness and the cognitive process, 
was not far to seek. In May 1960, Maurice Merleau-Ponty began a section 
of his “Working Notes” for the unfinished manuscript of The Visible and 
the Invisible with the following statements:
Blindness (punctum caecum) of the “consciousness.”
What it does not see it does not see for reasons of principle, it is 
because it is consciousness that it does not see. What it does not see 
is what in it prepares the vision of the rest (as the retina is blind at 
the point where the fibers that will permit the vision spread out into 
it). What it does not see is what makes it see.3
“What it does not see is what makes it see.” Inevitably, Merleau-Ponty 
is fascinated by this blindness at the origin of sight, by the fact that the 
seeing eye is occluded at the very point where vision becomes possible. 
For him this constitutive incapacity of sight is key to the complex psycho-
physical relation between body and world, visible and invisible, toucha-
ble and non-touchable: like Shakespeare, he uses the analogy of the glove 
to speak of the reversibility of inside and outside.4 Jacques Lacan refers to 
these passages repeatedly in Seminar XI to work through his idea of the 
inside-out structure of the gaze (le regard), and the notion of “scotoma” 
(blind spot) or “scotomization,” a metaphor for méconnaissance (mis-
recognition) in his celebrated analysis of Holbein’s “The Ambassadors.”5 
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For Merleau-Ponty, the “blind spot” of consciousness is what we cannot 
even acknowledge as a lack because consciousness works to conceal it. 
Othello’s blind spots are very much a phenomenon of this kind: the point 
is not that he fails to see but that his imagination persuades him he is see-
ing what is not there to be seen.
In Vanities of the Eye, the historian Stuart Clark argued that the 
“ocularcentrism” of the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, associated 
with “the rationalization of sight,” perspectival naturalism in painting, and 
major advances in optics, in fact generated a profound visual crisis.6 Taking 
his title from the Oxford scholar George Hakewill’s The Vanitie of the Eye 
(1608), a scathing attack on the faculty of sight, Clark suggests that early 
modern visual regimes were, despite their power, subject to deep internal 
uncertainty: “John Berger once wrote: ‘The relation between what we see 
and what we know is never settled’; my argument will be that this relation 
was particularly unsettled in late Renaissance Europe. In one context after 
another, vision came to be characterized by uncertainty and unreliability, 
such that access to visual reality could no longer be normally guaranteed. 
It is as though European intellectuals lost their optical nerve.”7
Right from antiquity to the seventeenth century, the relations 
between the three elements of the Aristotelian chain of cognition, per-
ceiver, medium, and perceived object, were being renegotiated. Medieval 
optics, divided between conflicting theories of vision and cognition 
in Greek science, was signally advanced by Arab philosophers such as 
Al-kindi and Alhazen, but the question of how visible species, or “like-
nesses” of objects in the visual field, were propagated by the eye to the 
brain and received by internal senses such as imagination continued to be 
problematic.8 Even after Johannes Kepler’s discovery of the inverted reti-
nal image (pictura) produced through intromitted rays received by the 
crystalline lens (thus explicitly distinguishing the physical optics of image 
formation from the psychological optics of vision), the problems were by 
no means solved. Clark concludes that the 250 years between the early 
fifteenth and late seventeenth centuries ended in a “collapse of the ‘repre-
sentational’ model of vision based on species,” while “visual anomalies and 
paradoxes multiplied to such a degree that they overwhelmed the cogni-
tive theory that permitted them to occur.”9 In consequence, it is the very 
primacy accorded to sight in most accounts of the senses and of the cogni-
tive process that allows Hakewill to prove, “That the eies serue not only 
as treacherous porters, and false intelligencers in naturall and artificiall 
things, but also as secret intelligencers, for discovering the passions of the 
minde and diseases of the body.”10
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Yet, as Clark acknowledges, the period is also characterized by 
intense visual hunger, not unrelated to the Augustinian “lust of the eyes” 
behind Othello’s demand for ocular proof, and the sexual innuendo on 
“satisfaction” with which Iago responds (3.3.397).11 What is rendered 
obscene and “hideous”—or, by a folk etymology discussed by Michael 
Neill, hidden—in Othello is the sexual act itself, which Stanley Cavell, in 
an influential reading of the play, makes equivalent to murder: “My guid-
ing hypothesis about the structure of the play is that the thing denied our 
sight throughout the opening scene—the thing, the scene, that Iago takes 
Othello back to again and again, retouching it for Othello’s enchafed 
imagination—is what we are shown in the final scene, the scene of mur-
der. This becomes our ocular proof of Othello’s understanding of his two 
nights of married love.”12
At the very start of the play, Brabantio is roused from his dream 
by Iago and Roderigo’s crying the news of his daughter’s sexual truancy 
aloud: “Even now, now, very now, an old black ram / Is tupping your white 
ewe!” (1.1.87–88). Shouted into the darkness of the night, Iago’s lewd 
visualization of the carnal act corresponds, Brabantio confesses, to the 
substance of his dream: “This accident is not unlike my dream / Belief of it 
oppresses me already” (1.1.140–41). What Brabantio does not see is what 
he has already seen in his dream, and therefore already “knows.” For him, 
the transition from the “eye of the mind” to the bodily eye—Aristotle 
had declared in his De Anima that “visual images appear even to those 
whose eyes are closed”—is superseded by what we might call a preemptive 
leap of cognition.13 Yet what father dreams of his daughter so engaged? If 
we recall Prospero’s “take my daughter” injunction to Ferdinand in The 
Tempest (4.1.13–23), we must say: every Father, which, in a Lacanian 
sense or under the sign of patriarchy, includes husbands and brothers. 
There is a running parallel between Brabantio and Othello through the 
play, especially in the insistence on Desdemona’s obedience, filial or mari-
tal (1.3.179–80, 4.1.255–56, and 3.3.89). That Desdemona, in a response 
worthy of Cordelia herself, has carefully divided her duty and obedience 
between father and husband is irrelevant in this proprietary context. Once 
married, Desdemona has no wish to put her father “in impatient thoughts / 
By being in his eye” (1.3.243–44). Brabantio’s impatience, like Othello’s, 
is surely less anger than a form of sexual jealousy fixed on the object “in 
his eye,” but not in his possession: an object towards which, in a crucial 
aspect, he has been blind.
For a play so obsessed with the faculty of sight, Othello records a 
persistent anxiety about actual seeing. When Desdemona declares that 
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she “saw Othello’s visage in his mind,” she refuses the conventional receiv-
ing of visual images, or species, in her mind, instead replacing Othello’s 
physical “visage” by a composite of his mental qualities, which become 
the imaginary object of her “seeing.” How, Brabantio asks, could a girl 
brought up so modestly as Desdemona “fall in love with what she feared 
to look on?” (1.3.99). The answer that both Othello and Desdemona give 
to this question has more to do with the faculty of hearing than that of 
sight, with the “greedy ear” Desdemona opened to “devour” Othello’s dis-
course, urging him to “dilate” his adventures (1.3.150, 154). At one level, 
this love seems exemplary, a product of what the senator calls “such fair 
question / As soul to soul affordeth” (1.3.114–15), rather than the charms 
and poisons of which Othello stands accused. At another level, however, 
there appears to be something missing. The Neoplatonic “soul to soul” 
communion of Donne’s “The Extasie” or “The Good-Morrow” is founded 
on the exchange of looks between the full, dilated eyes of the lovers as they 
gaze at each other (“My face in thine eye, thine in mine appears,” “The 
Good-Morrow,” 15).14 Though the terms “dilate” and “dilation” in Othello, 
brilliantly linked by Patricia Parker both to narrative elaboration and ana-
tomical scrutiny, suggest the opening up of hidden sights or secrets (as in 
Iago’s “close dilations,” 3.3.126), the plighting of troth between Othello 
and Desdemona is explicitly linked to the opening of the ear that receives 
the “dilations” of rhetoric, rather than to the opening of the eyes—“secret 
intelligencers for discovering the passions of the minde,” as Hakewill 
called them.15
If Othello has charmed Desdemona through her ear, Iago too 
resolves, “I’ll pour this pestilence into his ear” (2.3.351). Iago is convinced 
that Desdemona’s love, its violence founded on no more than Othello’s 
“bragging and telling her fantastical lies,” will not survive, as “her eye must 
be fed” (2.1.221, 223). Are the lovers’ eyes wide open or wide shut? The 
dilation of the pupil of the eye, commented on as early as the tenth cen-
tury by the Baghdad physician al-Razi, known in the west as Rhazes, was 
traditionally held to indicate sexual arousal, so that women in Renaissance 
Italy used drops of poisonous belladonna or deadly nightshade to enlarge 
and brighten their eyes.16 Whether or not Desdemona followed this prac-
tice, Iago deliberately comments on the sexual provocation of her gaze 
(“What an eye she has! Methinks it sounds a parley to provocation”), to 
which Cassio responds rather feebly: “An inviting eye, and yet methinks 
right modest” (2.3.21–22, 23). The Italian name belladonna, alluding to 
the plant’s use as a beauty aid, was applied by John Gerard in his Herball 
(1597) to solanum lethale, deadly nightshade or, as Gerard called it, sleepy 
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nightshade, closely related to the equally deadly mandragora or mandrake: 
“This kind of Nightshade causeth sleepe, troubleth the mind, bringeth 
madnesse if a few of the berries be inwardly taken, but if moe be giuen 
they also kill and bring present death. Theophrastus in his sixth booke doth 
likewise write of Mandrake in this manner, Mandrake causeth sleepe and 
if also much of it be taken it bringeth death.”17
“Nor poppy nor mandragora,” says Iago of Othello, “Nor all the 
drowsy syrups of the world / Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep / 
Which thou owedst yesterday” (3.3.333–36). Mandrake was also believed 
to be an aphrodisiac, so Othello may stand to lose more than just sleep. But 
what he has already lost—in some sense, appears never to have enjoyed—
is the full reciprocity of the dilated gaze, the “look” that he fears to meet 
in death: “How dost thou look now? / ... This look of thine will hurl my 
soul from heaven / And fiends will snatch at it” (5.2.270, 272–73). Like 
Desdemona’s dead father, whom the sight would have driven to a “desperate 
turn,” Othello cannot endure “possession of this heavenly sight” (5.2.205, 
276). Even more than the lust of the eyes, it is the impossibility of fully 
returning the gaze of the other that constitutes the core of the Othello plot. 
Cavell and Neill are surely right in reading “the tragic loading of this bed”—
the “object” that Lodovico commands Iago to “look on,” before it is hidden 
from us (“The object poisons sight. / Let it be hid,” 5.2.361–63)—as the 
very thing “denied our sight” through the play’s course.18 Yet the obscen-
ity of this sight indicates more than a transgression of sexual and racial 
boundaries: it points to a failure of the sight, even a poisoning of it, echo-
ing the play’s obsession with charms, drugs, and poisons such as belladonna 
or mandragora, which could also cause blindness and death. The lovers’ 
inability to use their eyes, whether as secret intelligencers (with Hakewill) 
or true witnesses, like Donne’s lovers, whose “true plain hearts do in the 
faces rest,” suggests that Othello’s blind spot is Desdemona, or something 
in her; hers is Othello, or something in him. By the time Othello demands 
of Desdemona, “Let me see your eyes. / Look in my face” (4.2.25–26), 
he can no longer recognize her, nor she him. As Desdemona kneels and 
Othello commands Emilia to shut the door, he sees only the product of his 
and Iago’s imagination: “I took you for the cunning whore of Venice / That 
married with Othello” (4.2.91–92).
Philosophically understood, this failure of sight is inevitable at the 
point of what Merleau-Ponty would call the intertwining or chiasm of 
the seer with the seen: reversibly, being seen, a point of overlap that never 
entirely matches. His phrase, “reciprocal insertion and intertwining of 
one in the other,” powerfully recalls another of Donne’s images of visual 
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exchange: “Our eye-beames twisted, and did thred / Our eyes, upon one 
double string” (“The Extasie,” 7–8).19 Reading this section, Lacan com-
ments on how “consciousness, in its illusion of seeing itself seeing itself, 
finds its basis in the inside out structure of the gaze.”20 In another of his 
working notes from May 1960, Merleau-Ponty wrote: “When I say then 
that every visible is invisible, that perception is imperception, that con-
sciousness has a ‘punctum caecum,’ that to see is always to see more than 
one sees—this must not be understood in the sense of a contradiction.”21
The blind spot in Othello’s consciousness is located where he sees 
himself being seen, misapprehending both himself and the other whose 
gaze is intertwined with his own. In consequence, the forensic process of 
probation is bound to fail, because the place of what he cannot actually see 
in the play is taken up by a superfluity of visual signs and material tokens 
that are either misrecognized or overvalued, creating a false compound of 
perception and inference.22 Even what should lie at the core of belief, the 
truth of reciprocated love between himself and Desdemona, becomes an 
object of slanderous reportage as his blackness converts him to a specular 
self he must explain or defend. As audience, as spectators, we are drawn, as 
Neill suggests, into a prurient and overwhelmingly visual curiosity about 
the hidden marriage bed and the actual or deferred scene of physical con-
summation, ending in Cavell’s monstrous question, “Well, were the sheets 
stained or not? Was she a virgin or not?”23
The stain in sight (la tache aveugle) is precisely what we cannot 
see. Cavell’s impossible query is central to his reading of the tragedy “as 
a kind of epistemological problem, or as the outcome of the problem of 
knowledge.”24 Sexuality, the marker of human separateness, is at the heart 
of this skeptical crisis. For Othello to accept his own sexual knowledge of 
Desdemona is to recognize her as other to himself: faced with the impos-
sibility of that recognition, he chooses rather to degrade and destroy 
her. Impressive as this reading is, it proceeds, as Howard Marchitello 
observes, “upon a series of assumptions on Cavell’s part—assumptions 
about sexuality, Othello and Desdemona’s wedding night, and about nar-
rative and ocularity—, assumptions, in fact, that are very nearly identical 
to Othello’s.”25 That Marchitello then proceeds to compare Othello’s 
“anatomization” of Desdemona with Vesalius’s cutting open of the bod-
ies of pregnant women suggests that Cavell’s reading has more of a hold 
on him than he is willing to admit.26 Unquestionably, the play’s central 
problem is that of knowledge, including sexual knowledge, but there is 
a kind of misogynist reduction here. The tragedy does not proceed from 
Othello’s epistemological crisis alone: the problem of knowledge afflicts 
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everyone in the play, and we share in it as “knowing” spectators in a 
catastrophe we are powerless to prevent. Othello is, to an extent unpar-
alleled elsewhere in Shakespeare, the object of our gaze: his blackness, 
his military judgment, his sexual prowess, his vulnerability, his jealous 
folly, are on display, made into a spectacle by Iago’s relentless, malicious, 
possibly erotic obsession with him. The principal external mark set on 
him is that of his race, his visible difference from others. Black actors 
in particular have had difficulties with this overdetermined, in-your-face 
stage presence: Adrian Lester is on record as having tried to deal with it 
by including more actors of color in the cast.27 Nevertheless, the visual 
overrepresentation or theatrical excess that singles Othello out remains a 
major obstacle to our understanding him.
Seeing Othello involves a kind of blindness, manifested in the pho-
bic responses of Brabantio and Iago to Othello’s color, but most in his own 
self-doubts: “Haply, for I am black . . . or for I am declined / Into the 
vale of years—yet that’s not much— / She’s gone, I am abused” (3.3.267, 
269–71). But other sights and things in the play are also infected, like 
the “infected house” (4.1.21) of Othello’s memory, by this disease of sight. 
Objects, gestures, and actions receive the full weight of a predisposition 
to overvalue the visual sign while persistently mis-seeing it or seeing it 
only in the imagination. In fact, ocular evidence is largely misleading and 
almost wholly manipulated in the play. Both Brabantio and Iago accuse 
Desdemona of deceitful appearances, and Iago constructs an entire chain 
of false inference from Cassio’s visible behavior, first for Roderigo in Act 2, 
then for Othello in Act 4. Most weight, in this play of insistent verbal and 
visual repetitions, falls upon a single material object, the handkerchief, 
seen where it should not be, imagined where it is not. “I saw the hand-
kerchief ” (5.2.66), says Othello. For him, this seeing converts a murder 
to a sacrifice, and Desdemona’s denial “stones” his heart and makes him a 
murderer: surely Yeats had this in mind when he observed that too long a 
sacrifice can make a stone of the heart?28 Othello’s handkerchief, spotted 
with strawberries, dyed in mummy from maidens’ hearts, a gift (of con-
fused provenance) from Othello’s mother, dropped, picked up, planted, 
employed as exemplum, is a site of fetish-desire as well as a visual signal. In 
the rich and intricate corpus of commentary that has grown up around it, 
from Lynda Boose on its spots to Ian Smith on its dye, the handkerchief 
has been shown to function as a metatextual placeholder for the play’s gov-
erning obsessions: virginity, blackness, wedding sheets and shrouds, ocular 
proof, blind spots, delusion, folly.29 It is so clearly a displaced representa-
tion of Othello and Desdemona’s wedding sheets, spotted with hymeneal 
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blood, that its loss and errancy, to the extent that its embroidered design is 
sought to be taken out (copied, but also perhaps removed?), set in motion 
a kind of cognitive truancy that ends in Desdemona’s commanding Emilia 
to lay out her wedding sheets on what is to be her deathbed. Inevitably, 
we do not see the handkerchief again after Act 4, when Bianca declares 
to Cassio that, “I’ll take out no work on’t” (4.1.154), as what we see is the 
wedding bed, repository of Desdemona’s faith and love, but converted, in 
Othello’s chilling (and more than faintly absurd) doggerel, to the unchaste 
site where her impure blood must fall: “Forth of my heart those charms, 
thine eyes, are blotted, / Thy bed, lust-stained, shall with lust’s blood be 
spotted” (5.1.35–36). Powerfully, bathetically, the couplet plots together 
the play’s preoccupation with love, charms, eyes, blots, bed, lust, blood, 
and spots. In fact, Othello does not shed Desdemona’s blood, leaving the 
wedding sheets to bear chaste witness to his folly and her love. If Cavell’s 
question remains unanswered, the handkerchief is a material, visible sur-
rogate, though it can scarcely be prominent on stage, justifying Boose’s 
and Smith’s focus on attributes (spots, color) that might actually serve 
as visual signs.30 But it is also a Lacanian objet petit a, carrying an enor-
mous cognitive overload as fetish-thing and love-token. We know more 
about it than we see, through Othello’s mesmeric account of its weaving 
by a 200-year-old Sibyl from hallowed silk, its dyeing in mummy from vir-
gins’ hearts, its use as a love-charm, and his injunction to Desdemona to 
“Make it a darling, like your precious eye!” (3.4.68). Given this magical 
aura, Desdemona’s loss of what should have been the apple of her eye is 
like losing the eye of the Gorgon that could turn men into stone, a story 
explained by Hakewill as an allegory of “the suddaine astonishment of 
men at the raies of her rare beauty.”31 At the same time, there is a bathetic 
disjunction, as Rymer noted, between “so remote a trifle” as a handker-
chief, and the “passion and repetition” the object attracts in the play.32
If the handkerchief is a visible, risible token of Othello’s cognitive 
confusions, causing the blinding physiological reaction of an epileptic fit 
(4.1.35–43), its immaterial counterpart is that “cunning whore of Venice” 
whom Othello identifies in Desdemona, and whom Iago projects as a 
cultural stereotype of Venetian women. This imaginary being is directly 
invoked by Iago in the temptation scene and rapidly takes shape as a com-
plex of sensuality, sophistication, immorality, and cunning, about whom 
Iago professes an extreme and worldly knowingness, which he seeks to 
communicate to Othello. Knowingness, as a substitute for knowledge, is 
precisely the mode of cognition that fosters méconnaissance. It is founded 
in the background of preconceptions from which information can be 
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drawn to supply the cognitive map, even where perceptual knowledge is 
lacking. When Thomas Coryate came to report his travels into France and 
Italy in 1608, he was already well informed about the famous Venetian 
courtesans, seeking only to validate what he already knew.33 But Iago 
affects a much greater degree of knowingness than the relatively naïve 
Odcombian traveller, offering his worldly wisdom about the conduct of 
Venetian wives as a substitute for anything that Othello can validate from 
his own experience. In consequence, what Othello sees as a forensic, pro-
bative process—“Make me to see’t, or at the least so prove it / That the 
probation bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on” (3.3.367–69)—is 
fatally corrupted by Iago’s interposing local knowledge before proof: “I 
speak not yet of proof ... I know our country disposition well” (3.3.199, 
294). It is this kind of knowingness that supplies the deficit of the per-
ceptual blind spot, and it may be worth suggesting that both spotted 
handkerchief and lustful whore are blind spots of knowledge perceptually 
overlaid by information derived from assumption and conjecture.
In conclusion, I will offer some comments on the theatrical fate, 
post-Othello, of these two signs: material and immaterial, the hand-
kerchief and the whore. Ben Jonson’s Volpone, written around 1605–6, 
reworks several plot elements from Shakespeare’s Othello, performed at 
court on November 1, 1604 and written by mid-1602. Influence is usu-
ally understood as a linear, temporal sequence, but, if we recall Jonathan 
Gil Harris’s brilliant exposition of time in Othello, we might reflect 
how questions of influence too can be illuminated by Michel Serres’s 
celebrated use of the “handkerchief ” analog y to explain collapsed or 
“crumpled time.”34 Serres uses two metaphors to explain temporal rela-
tions: first, the idea of percolation or filtering , observing that “Time 
doesn’t flow: it percolates”; and second, the handkerchief that can be 
crumpled to make spatially distinct points contiguous, and torn apart to 
separate what was proximate.35 The uncanny relevance to Othello of an 
analogy involving a handkerchief—a temporally confused object in the 
play if ever there was one, given its crucial position in the “double time” 
of the last three acts—naturally does not escape Harris’s attention. But 
additionally, influence requires us to use the notions of percolation on 
the one hand and collapsing on the other. It asks us to attend, as Serres 
does, to the idea of temporal succession as well as the fact of an experien-
tial, pleated time where objects and events are in surprising conjunction. 
Unsurprisingly, then, Othello and Volpone are related not only by parody 
but also by prolepsis, and similar relations can be found to obtain between 
many of the plays produced around the turn of the century. In particular, 
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it is impossible to miss the generic mixtures and textual echoes that link 
Shakespeare’s tragedies from this period with Jonson’s “comical satyres” 
that (mostly) precede them, a point made by the late Russ McDonald.36 
The repetitive combination of sexual obsession, misogyny, fetishism, and 
the psychopathology of violence pushes us towards discarding notions of 
influence for something closer to an ecology, a sort of moral climate.
Both Othello and Volpone may be classed as plays about knowledge. 
In both, the engine of plot is driven by a “knowing” knave who exploits 
the ignorance, folly, or self-deception of those around him. Both make 
play with the unreliable relation of seeing to knowing, and with blind 
spots of knowledge that function like unseen stains in the cognitive field. 
Parallels and links between the two plays are numerous: I will focus here 
on two, the handkerchief and the whore.37 In Volpone, these signs appear 
initially to be replete with meaning, as they are in Othello, but they turn 
out in fact to be empty, denied functional privilege, forgotten or discarded 
in the course of the play. When Brabantio accuses Othello of stealing 
Desdemona from him “by spells and medicines bought of mountebanks” 
(1.3.62), he anticipates Volpone’s disguising himself as a mountebank, 
Scoto of Mantua, in which role he induces Corvino’s wife Celia to drop 
him her handkerchief in payment for a cosmetic powder wrapped in a 
paper (Volpone, 2.2).38 Celia is accused by the jealous Corvino of play-
ing “an actor with your handkerchief,” though he is less like Othello 
than like Jonson’s own earlier creation, Thorello, in Every Man In His 
Humour (a play in which Shakespeare acted when it was performed in 
1598).39 Corvino charges Celia with having made an assignation with 
the mountebank through the exchange of handkerchief and paper, and 
we are treated to a truly spectacular display of jealous rage and sadism. 
Subsequently, however, these objects disappear entirely from the plot and 
from everyone’s minds. The handkerchief is a real, material object, but, 
like all such objects of everyday life that we constantly misplace or lose, 
it is lost somewhere midway through the play. On the other hand, Mosca 
attempts to get rid of Lady Politic by inventing a Venetian courtesan with 
whom, he says, he has seen her husband riding in a gondola. Once intro-
duced, the figure proves surprisingly hard to dismiss, being identified 
first with Peregrine, then with Celia in the first trial scene, and finally 
with Lady Politic herself, but, in that bathetic conclusion, she fades 
before the comic menace of Mosca’s threats (5.3.40–45). The courtesan, 
so central to all cultural typologies of Venice, floats through the play as 
a signifier that, like all stereotypes, has no materiality at all. The figure 
introduced by Mosca is a travelling, phantom appearance, settling now 
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on one character, now on another. In fact, the immateriality of this figure 
oddly replicates the insubstantiality of Iago’s talk about super-subtle, pro-
miscuous Venetian wives (also a cultural stereotype), who are no more in 
evidence in Othello than the courtesan is in Volpone.
If sexual knowledge constitutes a blind spot in Othello, money is 
the blind spot in Volpone, a play addressing what Karl Marx described as 
“the fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof.”40 Volpone explic-
itly dissociates himself from labor or industry, but is obsessed with the 
fetish-value of gold, which he hoards in a site of primitive accumulation, 
his treasure chamber. Unwilling to put his financial capital into circula-
tion, he falls prey instead to the delusion that human beings, in a capitalist 
economy, can become fluid and current, like money: that he can freely 
employ a succession of “character-masks” (again, Marx’s term) to medi-
ate social relations and maximize profits from each interaction. Volpone’s 
role-playing, like that of Mosca and the captatores, is directly related to 
the commodity-value—that is, the fetish-value—of the objects he pursues, 
especially Celia, described by Mosca as “Bright as your gold, and lovely as 
your gold!” (Volpone, I.1.575). The problem here is that, as Marx puts it in 
a passage that appears to have a direct bearing on the notion of the blind 
spot, the qualities of commodities are at once “perceptible and impercep-
tible by the senses”:
In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the 
subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of 
something outside the eye itself. But in the act of seeing, there is at 
all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from 
the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between 
physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the 
existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value relation 
between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, 
have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and 
with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite 
social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantas-
tic form of a relation between things.41
In comedy, a form of imposture that Jonson seems to have regarded 
with distrust, laughter is itself a commodity, one that Volpone actively 
pursues in the second trial scene, pretending to be dead so as to witness 
his clients’ discomfiture when they learn that Mosca is his heir.42 What 
he fails to see is that, once set in motion—even through the archaic 
mechanism of inheritance rather than in the market—his own wealth, 
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so much the object of universal desire, will act, as Marx foretold, as “a 
born leveller and cynic ... ready to exchange not only soul, but body, 
with any and every other commodity.”43 Volpone’s unmasking is there-
fore symbolic on many levels: at the most basic, it strips both master 
and slave, Volpone and Mosca, of the status that accrues to them as 
owners of commodities that they have neither made nor used, that exist 
for them only as an inventory of fetishized objects.
Given that the thrust of Jonson’s plot is towards a relentless demys-
tification of commodity capitalism and its sustaining illusions, it is 
scarcely surprising that he should extend this uncompromising critique 
to the fetish-object as such. What interests me about Jonson’s reusing of 
devices that are markedly overdetermined in the tragic plot of Othello is 
the way in which he subjects them to a radical undervaluation: that is, 
he robs them of both significance and function. At one level, Volpone 
is a reductive reading of Othello, ironing out the “crumpled handker-
chief ” of the tragic plot and reassigning relatively minor and transitory 
places—in the clear, harsh light of comedy—to exactly those elements of 
fetish-obsession and sexual delirium that drive its protagonist to disas-
ter. At another, it magnifies enormously the imbalance instituted in the 
Othello plot between what the audience knows and what the play’s char-
acters know. It seizes upon this imbalance—historically attested as one of 
the reasons why the play is so painful to watch—as a critical component 
of its comic plot, making us complicit in Volpone and Mosca’s defraud-
ing of the captatores, and later in Mosca’s attempt to outwit his master. 
Like Iago, Volpone and Mosca take pleasure in co-opting us into a guile-
ful malignity which is, if not entirely motiveless, certainly far in excess 
of what a simple profit motive might demand. Esse est interesse: being is 
being in, as we realize to our cost, for the play is made by us as much as by 
anyone in it. This complicity, which is as much a source of discomfort in 
Volpone as our ineffective knowledge is in Othello, suggests that Jonson is 
exploring, with Othello perhaps somewhere in his mind, the limitations 
of the drama of knowledge.
For fictional knowledge too has its blind spots: “what it does not 
see is what makes it see.”44 As it is as much an invention as the fictional 
content it claims to read, it fails to recognize its own limitation and pow-
erlessness. Othello’s blindness to the delusions of sight and mind practiced 
upon him by Iago, his inability to understand that his view is compro-
mised by its origin at a point of non-reciprocity, is matched by our own 
inability, as audience, to intervene in a spectacle that is enacted for us, 
but does not return our gaze. We are “knowing” spectators, but cannot 
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intervene in the action. Cavell uses the word “impotence” in reference to 
Othello, and he is not referring to sexual impotence per se.45 Knowledge, 
the kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions—lies, Plato would call 
them—is not power but powerlessness. Is this because fiction, by demand-
ing our acquiescence, robs us of agency? I think that Jonson is deeply 
worried about this problem, just as Shakespeare was in Othello, and as 
he was to be again in The Winter’s Tale, a play of knowing but powerless 
agents if ever there was one.
SEEING BLINDNESS  89
Seeing Blindness: A Response to  
Supriya Chaudhuri
Jonathan Gil Harris
Supriya offers a brilliant unveiling of how Othello, in the words of Stuart 
Clark, loses its optic nerve. What her essay allows us to see is the blind-
ness at the center of the play’s fantasies of seeing—or, rather, how blind-
ness is the basis of sight. This punctum caecum comes into shimmering 
focus through a variety of interpretive strategies: rigorous historiciza-
tion (Stuart Clark’s account of the seventeenth century’s crisis of sight), 
deft theoretical exfoliation (Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenolog y of mis-
cognition, Lacan’s méconnaissance), suggestive critical contextualization 
(Michael Neill’s reading of the spectacle of Desdemona’s marriage/death 
bed, Stanley Cavell’s speculation about the “ocular proof ” of sexuality), 
and artful comparative reading ( Jonson’s Volpone and its revisualization 
of Othello’s handkerchief ). In other words, Supriya makes the play’s blind-
ness visible through a panoply of artful critical interventions.
This panoply uncannily mirrors the diversity of what the play’s char-
acters blindly do to the handkerchief. They “persistently mis-see”—which, 
as Supriya’s Lacanian phrasing insists, is equally to “see”—the handker-
chief through many different strategies of reading it. Desdemona first 
produces it as a remedy for Othello’s headache; Emilia then transforms 
it into a gift to win the affection of her husband, Othello into a matri-
lineal heirloom from an Egyptian sibyl and a token of fidelity gifted by 
his father, Cassio into a fashionable item stitched with impressive “work,” 
Bianca into a proof of infidelity, Iago into a “medicine” that induces epi-
lepsy. The handkerchief is, like the problematic of seeing in Supriya’s essay, 
multiply historicized, theorized, contextualized, compared.
The insubstantial shred of “linen” so reviled by Thomas Rymer is 
“persistently mis-seen” not just by the play’s characters, but also by its 
audiences, thanks to the multiple stains of narrative it acquires. As Supriya 
remarks, in an elegant pun that suggests not only the French term for 
blind spot and Othello and Desdemona’s imagined spotted nuptial sheets, 
but also the stains of a crumpled and pocketed handkerchief, “The stain in 
sight (la tache aveugle) is precisely what we cannot see.” Yet it is the “stain 
in sight”—blind spot and imaginary projection alike—that also allows us 
to see. In the case of Othello, multiple “stains in sight” prompt us not only 
to see the otherwise unseeable handkerchief, but also to visualize, through 
the handkerchief, what we are otherwise blind to (sex, Egyptian magic, 
artisanal labor, the act of interpretation itself ).
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As a result, Supriya’s multifaceted reading strategy might seem less 
an unveiling than a repetition of the play. We should then feel compelled 
to ask: what is the blind spot behind her compulsion to see blindness in 
Othello? And here a potentially infinite regression suggests itself: what 
is the blind spot behind my compulsion to see the blind spot behind 
Supriya’s compulsion to see blindness?
Of course, and this is the beauty of Supriya’s essay, she is aware of 
this regression and how it ensnares Othello’s spectators. It is one of the 
reasons she claims, toward the end of the essay, that: “We are ‘knowing’ 
spectators, but cannot intervene in the action. Cavell uses the word ‘impo-
tence’ in reference to Othello, and he is not referring to sexual impotence 
per se. Knowledge, the kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions—
lies, Plato would call them—is not power but powerlessness.” Precisely. 
And this is what makes Othello so painful for many of its viewers: we know 
what the characters do not, yet we are helpless to “intervene.”
But, in seeing the characters’ blindness, to what extent do we also 
mis-see our own blindness, both in the obvious sense of denying it and in 
the Lacanian sense of misrecognizing an image? How does this misrecogni-
tion subtly transpose what Cavell sees as the spectator’s “impotence” into 
a perverse agency, albeit an agency that we disavow? How do we blindly 
intervene in the play, even as we think we are just watching it?
To answer these questions, we might take a detour through another 
of Shakespeare’s plays equally obsessed with the blindness of seeing : A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream. As Helena notes, in what might serve as a sum-
mary of the play, “Love looks not with the eyes but with the mind. / And 
therefore is winged Cupid painted blind” (1.1.234–35). Helena describes 
the blinded sight not just of the lover, unseeing “things base and vile” and 
“transposing” them “into dignity” (1.1.232, 233), but also of the theatri-
cal spectator. To see Pyramus and Thisbe, we also have to actively unsee 
Bottom and Flute; to see Helena, we have to actively unsee the boy actor 
playing her. These unseeings exemplify what James Calderwood has called 
the anamorphism of the play. Seeing blindness in Othello may provoke anx-
iety and a sense of impotence, but, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the 
blindness that subtends anamorphic sight becomes the enabling condition 
of a delighted poesis or creative remaking. When Theseus says that he does 
not believe in antique fables and complains that, in imagination, “how eas-
ily is a bush supposed a bear” (5.1.22), we laugh, knowing of course that 
he is a character from an antique fable, a fabulous bush who imagines him-
self a realist bear. But the pleasure we might take in Theseus’s self-blindness 
is also potentially a narcissistic pleasure, not only in knowing “Theseus” 
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better than Theseus does, but also in our studied blindness to the fact that 
this fabled character who does not believe in fables is really an actor playing 
a fabled character, transposed by our own as much as the actor’s imagina-
tive art into a superhero. Theseus “himself ” notes this transposition when 
he tells Hippolyta to cope with the rude mechanicals’ performance by cul-
tivating a strategic blindness to its dreadfulness: “the worst are no worse if 
imagination amend them” (5.1.209–10).
A Midsummer Night’s Dream, then, reminds us of our own art in 
seeing (through) blindness. We want our blind spots even as we crave full 
vision, because “full” vision is always the product of blindness. And this, 
paradoxically, is the blind spot we most unsee—that is, we unsee our own 
artful labor in “amending” the object even as we think we see the object 
itself. Supriya’s essay is an anamorphic illustration of this artfulness, even 
as it seems to cast light primarily on Othello “itself.” I would add that her 
essay also performs an elegant counterpoint to my own contribution to 
this volume. If, as I argue, we easily unsee the agency of visible objects 
upon us, Supriya reminds us of how we equally unsee our own agency as 
viewing subjects of those objects. Either way, we both argue for seeing 
blindness.
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Towards an Epistemology of the Stage?  
A Response to Supriya Chaudhuri
Stephen Spiess
What does the theater know ? At the conclusion of this remarkable 
essay, we find ourselves looking at Jonson and Shakespeare looking at 
audiences, at their own craft, perhaps even at us, across their respective 
fictions. Behind them, one glimpses the specter of Plato, that detractor 
of mimesis and derogator of theatrical knowing, ever-haunting discus-
sions of the “kind[s] of knowledge” produced onstage. He is a phan-
tom, a fleeting presence, a wound: he is, I want to suggest, the punctum 
of this essay.
I draw here not from Mariotte, Merleau-Ponty, or Lacan, but rather 
from Roland Barthes, for whom punctum connotes that “off-center detail,” 
that minor element or feature that “rises from the scene, shoots out of 
it like an arrow, and pierces me.”46 For me, the scene is imagined rather 
than represented: a fiction of my mind’s eye as opposed to a photograph 
or daguerreotype. As I scan the page, those five letters (P-l-a-t-o) perform 
a type of work similar to the Barthesian punctum, expanding beyond the 
frame, threatening to circumscribe the possibilities for theatrical knowing. 
Can we envision theater without Plato? How has the Platonic injunction 
blinded us to what theater might know or render knowable? What is con-
cealed or misrecognized in a Western philosophical tradition that rejects 
the “kind of knowledge that is produced by fictions?”
The central irony of this dismissal is etymological rather than vis-
ual. As with its cognates “theorem,” “theory,” and “theorist,” the English 
“theater” derives from a constellation of Greek terms (theatron, thea, 
theasthia) that join sight to speculation, view to thought, observation to 
contemplation.47 A site for thinking through seeing, theater neverthe-
less remains a blind spot in Western epistemology, even as contemporary 
knowledge regimes, governed by a commitment to empirical observation, 
increasingly link sight with knowledge.48
Yet theater is also, as Supriya aptly demonstrates, a site for query-
ing relations of thinking to seeing, including how human consciousness 
might interact with and inform what one sees (and vice versa). Here, the 
London stage emerges as a powerful medium through which writers and 
dramatists could think through their period’s “intense visual hunger,” 
including the various anxieties that accompanied such “ocularcentrism.” 
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These recursive dynamics imbue plays such as Othello and Volpone with 
affective force, as audiences can observe how the plays’ various fictional 
personae see, feel, think, and “know” in relation to information that they 
do—and, crucially, do not—possess. Concurrently, playgoers can scruti-
nize how the Moscas, Volpones, and Iagos of the world attempt to shape 
such “knowing” through particular conceptual frameworks or categories 
of thought. Attending to these latter practices, I submit, can help us envi-
sion the epistemological dimensions of theatrical thinking.
I take my cue here from Supriya, whose reading of Brabantio high-
lights the relations between this patriarch’s “preemptive leap of cognition” 
and those infamous, pornographic promptings of Iago and Roderigo. 
However unsavory, it is clear that the latter duo’s rhetorical construc-
tions do not, ipso facto, persuade Brabantio of his daughter’s “treason” 
(1.1.167). Rather, what this opening scene dramatizes is precisely how 
such lascivious images come into alignment with, and become significant 
in light of, a preexisting conceptual template encoded within a father’s 
dream vision. Iago, in other words, is not the progenitor of (the idea of ) 
Desdemona’s “sexual truancy,” but rather its midwife: his lewd inferences 
provide an interpretive framework—the wayward daughter—that helps 
to determine how this convoluted mise-en-scène signifies to Brabantio. 
As the exchange progresses, playgoers watch this grid of intelligibility 
fall into place: Desdemona’s domestic absence is immediately accepted as 
proof of paternal deception, a sign that confirms Brabantio’s (preexisting) 
“belief ” in his daughter’s duplicity (1.1.141).
When Brabantio later insists upon the veracity of his perceptions, 
testifying before the Venetian council in the third scene, he sutures 
signification—fatally, one might argue49—to knowledge: what he 
“knows” (or accepts as knowledge) about his daughter’s contested 
meaning s is  definitively l inked to how the words,  actions,  and 
dreams of the preceding scene have been rendered intelligible to him. 
Brabantio may never witness Desdemona’s supposed transgression, but 
he does not have to: Iago summons a powerful interpretive framework 
that allows, indeed encourages, him to see it everywhere.
These vexed relations of sight and signification, conceptual cat-
egories and knowledge claims, are further queried in the play’s fourth 
act, where audiences watch Othello watching Iago “question Cassio of 
Bianca” (4.1.94). As with other meta-theatrical representations, this 
exchange is fueled by differing knowledge bases: those of the characters 
onstage, but also between these characters and spectators. The latter 
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are aware of four crucial facts: first, that Othello has demanded “ocu-
lar proof ” of Desdemona’s deception; second, that Iago, by way of 
response, has encouraged him to envision her liaison(s) with Cassio, 
and thus to “think” her a “whore”;50 third, that Iago frames his staged 
conversation with Cassio as addressing this adulterous relationship; 
and fourth, that the general is unaware that his subordinates are really 
discussing Bianca, not Desdemona. Lacking such basic information, 
Othello tragically misreads the lieutenant’s “smiles, gestures and light 
behavior” as evidence of his wife’s infidelity (4.1.103). In so doing, he 
demonstrates how easily signifiers can be transferred from one field of 
meaning—Cassio’s relationship with Bianca—to another and accepted 
as truth. In the hands of Shakespeare (and Jonson), dramatic irony 
becomes a vehicle for epistemological inquiry: configuring an asym-
metrical knowledge relation between playgoers and characters, this 
dramaturgical device invites scrutiny of how duplicitous yarn spinners 
structure their counterparts’ seeing and knowing practices.
Thinking in such terms illuminates the particularized functions of 
“handkerchief ” and “whore” in these dramas of sexual knowing. On the 
one hand, both appear to operate as necessary supplements to problems 
of sexual knowledge: entities that emerge in place of, and substitute for, 
a particularly “recalcitrant” object of social and critical inquiry.51 I am 
persuaded furthermore that the handkerchief operates as a type of episte-
mological fetish: a desired object that promises a certain type of knowing. 
But the “Cunning Whore of Venice” might best be conceived as a concep-
tual framework rather than a spectral fiction: a field of intelligibility that 
allows opaque events, dreams, and objects to signify in recognizable—we 
might even say predictable—ways. How Iago, Mosca, and Volpone weap-
onize this framework informs their respective knowledge games and each 
play’s affective work.
Looking back at Shakespeare and Jonson, I imagine these two 
actor-playwrights casting a critical, knowing eye back towards the 
ghost of Plato. What, they seem to ask, is his blind spot? In Ion, one 
of the philosopher’s lesser-known dialogues, we find Socrates merci-
lessly dismantling the knowledge claims of an Athenian rhapsodist. As 
with all “reciters and actors,” this figure, Socrates insists, possesses no 
knowledge of his own: he simply represents the experience and insights 
attained by others—the charioteer, the carpenter, the fisherman, the 
wool-spinner, and so on. In contrast to the imitator, these latter figures, 
Socrates suggests, accrue a certain specialized knowledge, one forged 
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through their unique relations to, and laborious experiences with, par-
ticular objects, bodies, and events.52 Similar knowledge(s), Pamela H. 
Smith has argued, circulate in the early modern period, underpinning 
what she calls “artisanal epistemologies”: frameworks for understand-
ing the world informed by the artisan’s ability to imitate the “creative 
power of nature itself.”53
Although Smith does not address theater practitioners, her argu-
ment urges reconsideration of the various knowledges that actors and 
dramatists possess about the world, their craft, and the “fictions” they 
produce onstage. Given their relationship to the human body, the arts of 
representation, the nature of language, and the contexts of performance, 
what might the actor-playwright tell us about seeing and knowing, cogni-
tion and categories of thought, theater and epistemology? How do they 
perceive or understand the spectator’s role in producing what is known or 
knowable onstage? I am not thinking here of that famed “Southern yokel,” 
so memorably described by Stanley Cavell, “who rushes to the stage to 
save Desdemona from the black man.”54 Rather, as my opening comments 
suggest, I wonder how such plays pierce us: bringing own beliefs, biases, 
and conceptual categories into question. If such frameworks emerge from 
the social, how do we distinguish between the fictional and real? Can 
our present work—this probing of blind spots, these excavations of early 
modern (un)knowability—offer new ways of seeing such relations? Can 
Shakespeare and Jonson help us (re)think an epistemology of the stage?
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1 Citations from Othello are from The Arden Shakespeare.
2 See Adams, “‘Ocular Proof,’” for the verbal link to Cinthio’s De gli 
Hecatommithi; Parker, “Othello and Hamlet,” and Maus, “Horns of Dilemma,” for 
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3 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 248.
4 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 263.
5 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 82–114.
6 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 1–2, referring to Ivins, On the Rationalization 
of Sight.
7 Clark, Vanities, 2, referring to Berger, Ways of Seeing, 7.
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Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages; Lindberg, Theories of Vision from 
al-Kindi to Kepler; and Akbari, Seeing Through the Veil.
9 Clark, Vanities, 20.
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eous” as hidden or off-stage, see Neill, “Unproper Beds,” 394–95.
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14 Donne, The Major Works, 90.
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22 Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare, 136–41.
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25 Marchitello, “Vesalius’ ‘Fabrica’ and Shakespeare’s ‘Othello,’” 530.
26 Marchitello, “Vesalius’ ‘Fabrica,’” 532–36.
27 See Ayanna Thompson’s introduction, Othello, 90.
28 W. B. Yeats, “Easter 1916,” 57–58.
29 Boose, “Othello’s Handkerchief ”; Smith, “Othello’s Black Handkerchief.”
30 Neill, “Othello’s Black Handkerchief,” argues that the handkerchief might 
have been dark not black.
31 Hakewill, The Vanitie of the Eye, 34–35.
32 Rymer, A Short View of Tragedy, 160.
33 Coryate, Coryats Crudities, Hastily Gobled up in Five Moneths Trauels, 
261–271.
34 Harris, “Crumpled Handkerchiefs,” 169–87.
35 Serres, with Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture and Time, 58–60.
36 McDonald, “Othello, Thorello, and the problem of the foolish hero,” 
51–67.
37 For relations between the two plays, see Tyson, “Ben Jonson’s Black 
Comedy”; Tulip, “The Intertextualities of Ben Jonson’s Volpone”; Marchitell, 
“Desire and Domination in Volpone”; and Dutton, “Jonson and Shakespeare.”
38 Citations from, Jonson, The Alchemist and Other Plays.
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Chapter 4
What Emilia Knew: Shakespeare  
Reads James
Aveek Sen
FRANCIS FORD WONDERS IN The Merry Wives of Windsor if “experience” might be “a jewel—that I have purchas’d at an infinite 
rate” (2.2.194–95).1 I believe that a critical approach to Shakespeare’s 
plays and poems has to engage with their truth to ordinary as well as 
extraordinary human experience. This is not a repudiation of historicism, 
but an acknowledgment of how we create, encounter, live, understand, and 
become history. Our reading of Shakespeare is nourished by our percep-
tions of, and curiosity about, other people, other lives and relationships, 
and by the books we read, the pictures we like to look at, the films and 
music we cannot forget—Keats’s “world of Circumstances.”2 It is the world 
that holds the canon, the non-canon, and the archive, and enriches, com-
plicates, distracts, and even frustrates teaching and scholarship.
The renewal of my interest in Othello is linked to a few everyday 
events: teaching Shakespeare to a group of high-school students; con-
versations with an undergraduate anxious about her theatrical debut as 
Emilia; listening again to Tullio Serafin’s 1960 version of Verdi’s operatic 
version; and finally—hence the title of my essay—an abiding, and often 
harrowed, fascination with the relentless difficulties of Henry James’s late 
fiction, especially The Golden Bowl, The Wings of the Dove, The Turn 
of the Screw, and The Sacred Fount. Having freed myself professionally 
from having to “apply” theory as a tool kit for “unpacking” texts, I have 
at last begun to take pleasure in theory—a pleasure that is not essentially 
different from the pleasures of art, literature, and conversation. Instead 
of placing both Shakespeare and Henry James on the literature side of 
the theory–literature divide, my reading of Othello will use James to read 
Shakespeare. The fact that James knew his Shakespeare is of less interest 
to me than my conviction that Shakespeare knew his James. In any case, 
two frightfully intelligent people are perfectly capable of reversing the 
direction of conventional literary history.
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In its Jamesian reading of Shakespeare, this essay is an attempt to 
translate the Emilia-marks on the Shakespearean page into a probable and 
possible woman incarnated in the theatre. Emilia—and perhaps Gertrude 
and Portia—are very much in the same league as James’s Maggie Verver 
and Milly Theale. I find both Maggie and Milly, the princess and the dove, 
profoundly sinister creatures—in the depths of their half-willed capacity 
for denied and resisted knowledge, for seeing what they want to see and 
believing what it suits them to believe, for their skillfully averted recog-
nitions, and then for using these evasions and denials to arrange people 
into situations—pathetically, yet magnificently, “with a high headshake” 
as James would say. They are, in the language of this book, consummate 
“blindspotters.” The fullest account of this is given in Kate Croy’s descrip-
tion of Milly Theale to Merton Densher in The Wings of the Dove: “She 
never wanted the truth ... She wanted you. She would have taken from you 
what you could give her and been glad of it, even if she had known it false. 
You might have lied to her from pity, and she have seen you and felt you 
lie, and yet ... she would have thanked you and blessed you and clung to 
you but the more. For that was your strength, my dear man—that she loves 
you with passion.”3
There is nothing squeamish or sentimental in the way James con-
fronts sordidly tragic human arrangements. But this hard, unflinching 
gaze—chillingly captured in John Singer Sargent’s portrait of the writer—
also belongs to the “master of nuance and scruple” that Auden had written 
about in his poem, “At the Grave of Henry James” (line 55).4 It is the James 
for whom a high reticence, a fastidious disdain for providing “weak speci-
fications,” became an imperative of good taste.5 This called for a narrative 
method of fathomless suggestion, of being able to intimate just about 
everything without saying very much, forcing the reader to bring to the 
text a whole universe of observation, interpretation, suspicion, surmise, 
and inference. James’s account of how such “utmost conceivability” works 
within the story—as suggested in the preface to The Turn of the Screw—
could well be a description of how the Iago–Emilia marriage works on the 
reader, spectator, actor, or director: “Only make the reader’s general vision 
of evil intense enough ... and his own experience, his own imagination, his 
own sympathy ... and horror ... will supply him quite sufficiently with all 
the particulars. Make him think the evil, make him think it for himself, 
and you are released from weak specifications” (Turn of the Screw liv–lv).
It is no coincidence that those words—observation, suspicion, sur-
mise, inference—are keywords in the Iago-language, particularly in the 
quasi-legal and empiricist language that Iago refines for Othello in Act III, 
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scene iii, Shakespeare’s great suggestion scene. To “suggest” had a corrupt-
ing, evil frisson in Shakespeare’s English, lost in modern usage: “Two loves 
I have, of comfort and despair, / Which, like two spirits do suggest me still” 
(Sonnet 144, lines 1–2).6 This Jamesian and Shakespearean art of sugges-
tion is a way of representing reality—not always, or not simply, a world of 
fact, but a world of the probable and the possible, which often demands 
from us a corresponding act of what A. D. Nuttall called “humane infer-
ence,” “a willingness to enter the proffered dream.”7 By looking at Emilia 
alongside some of James’s characters, we begin to see the remarkable scope 
of Shakespeare’s mimesis as one of the founts, perhaps even the sacred one, 
from which James drew the resources for his art.
In Othello, Shakespeare interlaces a tragic opera with a domestic 
novel. The play’s mimetic registers cover the entire range from Verdi to 
something like Ingmar Bergman’s six-part television serial of the 1970s, 
Scenes from a Marriage—a series of episodes with titles such as “The Art of 
Sweeping Things under the Carpet” and “In the Middle of the Night in a 
Dark House Somewhere in the World.” When Shakespeare took the story 
from Giraldi Cinthio’s collection, the Hecatommithi, published a year after 
Shakespeare was born, he made a few startling changes that define Emilia’s 
role in the play. First, Cinthio’s Iago was driven by his unreciprocated lust 
for Desdemona, whereas Shakespeare’s Iago remains sexually uninterested 
in her. He would have been less monstrous if he had, indeed, fallen in love, 
or lust, with Desdemona. He mentions, almost unmindfully, that Othello 
may have slept with Emilia and coolly considers the possibility of deciding 
to resent this, but only to give a salutary edge to his professional rancour. 
At every other level, and most of all at the sexual level, Iago does not care if 
his wife, Emilia, is being unfaithful to him. His principal motive, declared 
in no uncertain terms, is professional envy. In fact, although Iago is the 
prime and inexhaustible source of the play’s sexual imaginings, he remains 
the only person unmoved by lust, focused single-mindedly on his own 
sense of professional deprivation.
This is the sort of person Emilia has been married to for a few years. 
In Cinthio, they have a three-year-old daughter. In Shakespeare, they 
appear to be childless. In Cinthio, both the couples were married for a 
while—and Othello and Desdemona very happily married—before things 
start going terribly wrong. In Shakespeare, the “long time” of the Iago–
Emilia marriage is juxtaposed with Othello and Desdemona’s “short time,” 
with the latter’s conjugal inexperience. Iago’s scheme operates in this “long 
time,” giving to the play its notorious double time scheme. This lends to 
the operatic intensity of Othello and Desdemona’s soaring passion a more 
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mundane and novelistic dimension of “slow time.” Unlike Othello and 
Desdemona, who come too soon to the iron gates of life, Iago and Emilia 
have had world enough and time in which to turn over the many accre-
tions of a “long” marriage.
The mid-eighteenth-century English translation of Cinthio, obvi-
ously influenced by Shakespeare, describes Emilia as “fair and honest.”8 
Desdemona spends a lot of time with her at Iago’s house, and, during one 
of these visits, it is Iago who uses his infant daughter to filch the hand-
kerchief from her. But, although Cinthio deprives Emilia of agency in the 
handkerchief plot, he gives her full knowledge of the matter: “The Ensign’s 
wife, who knew everything (for her husband had wished to use her as an 
instrument in causing the Lady’s death, but she had never been willing to 
consent), did not dare, for fear of her husband, to tell [Desdemona] any-
thing” (389). Then she disappears altogether from Cinthio’s narrative as 
Iago’s plot unfolds. Desdemona is clobbered to death by Iago with a stock-
ing filled with sand, Othello is slain by Desdemona’s relatives, and Iago 
dies miserably at home after being severely tortured. Unspecified periods 
of time pass between these events. Emilia, however, reappears at the very 
end of Cinthio’s story as the sole survivor and repository of the facts of the 
case. “All these events were told after his death by the Ensign’s wife, who 
knew the facts as I have told them to you,” says Cinthio’s narrator (395).
What Shakespeare does with this is extraordinary, and wonder-
fully Jamesian. He exactly reverses Cinthio’s use of Emilia, which gives 
her knowledge but no agency. Shakespeare’s Emilia is persistently associ-
ated with the handkerchief-stealing, the lowest plot element in the play. 
He gives her full agency at this level. But simultaneously, the question 
of her knowledge—and, equally important, her motive—is kept unclear 
to the very end and grows tantalizingly opaque. Agency, consciousness 
and motivation, doing and knowing, are therefore finely and inscrutably 
wedged apart. The “register” of Emilia’s consciousness remains obscured 
by what James calls, in The Golden Bowl, “a great white curtain.”9 James 
also declares in his preface to The Golden Bowl that the “essence of any 
representational work is of course to bristle with immediate images” (23). 
But this bristling “representative surface” and “the play of representational 
values” (both 35) in no way detract from the “appeal to incalculability” 
(21). By making Emilia embody the incalculable, while associating her 
with the vicious triviality of the handkerchief plot, Shakespeare places her 
across an entire range of “representational values,” from low intrigue to 
high tragedy, although visually she is always kept in the margins of the 
action, in the penumbra of the Othello darkness. In The Golden Bowl, as 
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the tragedy of Charlotte and Amerigo’s entrapment in adultery moves 
into the sublime, the sordidness and horror of the situation begin to be 
felt more and more relentlessly in Maggie’s own curtained consciousness. 
This counterpointing of an ascent into tragic sublimity with an inexorable 
descent into quotidian horror is exactly paralleled in the interlacing of the 
Othello–Desdemona love duet with the Iago–Emilia marriage.
***
Emilia’s first appearance in the play is in a scene that “bristles” unyield-
ingly. This is the opening scene of the second act in Cyprus—a long scene 
of desultory conversation among the Venetians, as they wait on the head-
land for Othello’s arrival. Desdemona is anxious and restive, and her com-
panions—Emilia and Iago, together with the worshipping Cassio and 
the inflamed Roderigo—try to help her while away the time. The texture 
of this scene brilliantly captures the drift of polite social talk, what Iago 
calls “chronic[ling] small beer” (2.1.160). But there is an Emilia-shaped 
hole in this texture, very similar to those astutely choreographed scenes in 
Jane Austen—usually at balls, private theatricals, or in the Upper Rooms 
in Bath—where her mousy, silent heroines are silhouetted against a back-
ground of chatter. This is how we initially get to know Catherine Moreland 
in Northanger Abbey or Fanny Price in Mansfield Park.
As Emilia joins this little gathering, Cassio greets her with a kiss, 
assuring her husband that it is merely a “show”—although somewhat 
“bold”—of “courtesy” (2.1.99). Iago immediately absorbs Cassio’s cour-
tesy into his own brand of bawdy: “Sir, would she give you so much of 
her lips / As of her tongue she oft bestows on me / You’d have enough” 
(2.1.100–102). To this Desdemona interjects, “Alas! She has no speech” 
(2.1.103). Iago disagrees, for Emilia talks so much in bed that he can-
not go to sleep—“In faith, too much; / I find it still, when I have list to 
sleep” (2.1.103–4)—but allows that perhaps, in front of Desdemona, 
Emilia “puts her tongue a little in her heart, / And chides with thinking” 
(2.1.106–7). Then, and only then, Emilia answers him: “You have little 
cause to say so” (2.1.108). The impeccable playfulness that Cassio and 
Desdemona have kept up so effortlessly between them has therefore been 
broken into twice: once by Iago’s gratuitous and suggestive disclosures 
regarding Emilia’s bedroom habits, and then by Emilia’s words, “You have 
little cause to say so.” She is the first to use the play’s most famous word, 
“cause,” and her smouldering quietness immediately strikes a contrary 
note. She directly and exclusively addresses her husband in a conversa-
tion that has so far been strenuously public. What do her words imply? 
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She could be saying, “You are misrepresenting me to these people because, 
actually, I hardly speak at all,” thereby endorsing Desdemona’s “Alas! She 
has no speech.” Or, she could be picking up Iago’s intriguing “she ... chides 
with thinking” in order to say, “You can’t say this because you have no idea 
of what I think.” Either reading immediately opens up an area of darkness 
that is always present at the heart of the play: the realm of what another 
person could be thinking. It is an inwardness that is imponderable, can-
not be possessed, and is therefore obscurely threatening; it later becomes 
Iago’s trump card and Othello’s greatest fear. Later in this scene, Iago’s 
mock-misog ynist badinage with Desdemona imagines a woman who 
“could think, and ne’er disclose her mind” (2.1.156). And, after Iago has 
successfully aroused in Othello the desire for “ocular proof ” (3.3.363), he 
describes Desdemona’s “honour” as “an essence that’s not seen” (4.1.16). 
But it is Emilia who first begins to embody this essence, this baffling and 
maddening reticence that resists the will to intimate knowledge. And her 
identification with this quality happens in the midst of social chatter.
Desdemona salvages this potentially embarrassing moment between 
husband and wife by starting to flirt with the husband. Her flirtatiousness 
in this scene is also a part of her innate graciousness: her good breeding 
makes her unwilling to impose her own impatience and nervousness upon 
others. Emilia again refuses to join the little game of fishing for compli-
ments being played by Iago and Desdemona, and again there is a quietly 
dissonant moment between husband and wife, a vicious little aside. “You 
shall not write my praise,” says Emilia. “No, let me not,” answers Iago 
(2.1.116). Is this playful, or nasty?
Throughout the scene, Iago skates smoothly between badinage and 
concern. He plays along with Desdemona, yet also lets her know, with 
just the right degree of unobtrusiveness, that he is alert to her restlessness, 
while understanding and respecting her good manners in concealing it in 
public. His hasty aside with Emilia contrasts with his brief exchange with 
Desdemona, who asks, sotto voce, in the middle of all this talk, “There’s 
one gone to the harbour?” (2.1.120). “Ay madam” (2.1.121), Iago imme-
diately assures her, before resuming, in a different voice, the public façade 
of playful unconcern. Emilia is throughout a spectator to her husband’s 
canny and customized attentiveness. As he keeps it up with Desdemona, 
Emilia is expected to keep it up with him—not out of a natural and 
mutual conjugal rhythm, but out of a tight, furtive pressure put on her by 
her husband, an occasional twitch of what James calls the “silken noose” 
(The Golden Bowl 553), a pressure that it is up to Emilia to keep out of the 
public eye. What builds up in this scene, in a kind of tedious “long time,” is 
the sense of a wordlessly resentful fear confronting this wordless pressure, 
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a slow arm-twisting that achieves an unsavory, precarious, but continu-
ally resisted complicity between husband and wife. Shakespeare creates a 
space for this little portrait of a marriage between two “high-wrought” 
moments, between Cassio’s vaulting praise of the “divine Desdemona” 
(2.1.73) and the fine rapture of her reunion with Othello: “O my fair war-
rior! ... My dear Othello!” (2.1.180) The beautiful music of the “enchaféd 
flood” (2.1.17) introduces and concludes this quotidian interlude of tense 
small talk, for which Verdi could not have made room in his opera.
***
Emilia, however, is not allowed to remain just a passive looker-on. And, 
in drawing her into the action, Shakespeare blurs, again in a very Jamesian 
manner, the line between active and passive. Profound and unsparing ques-
tions of volition and responsibility are raised by both artists. In the preface 
to The Golden Bowl, James writes about “the religion of doing”: “the whole 
conduct of life consists of things done, which do other things in their turn, 
just so our behaviour and its fruits are essentially one and continuous and 
persistent and unquenchable, so that the act has its way of abiding and 
showing and testifying, and so, among our innumerable acts, are no arbi-
trary, no senseless separations ... We recognize betimes that to ‘put’ things is 
very exactly and responsibly and interminably to do them” (36).
Neither Emilia nor Maggie ever quite faces the fact that even vic-
timhood does not absolve them from this “religion of doing.” Emilia’s 
ineffectuality and submissiveness within her own marriage inevitably and 
actively begin to determine the brutalization of Desdemona’s. What we see 
her doing in the face of this unavoidable fact is choose between her loyalty 
to Desdemona and her own stakes in the situation. What does she want to 
keep, to have and to hold? Up to what point can she risk these investments 
so that she could stay on Desdemona’s side? And where does she draw the 
line in this matter? Shakespeare’s gaze on Emilia as she confronts or evades 
these questions and decisions is minute and unflinching. He makes her 
steal and lie—acts that lead up to the violence at the end. Similarly, in The 
Wings of the Dove, James does not hesitate to present Milly Theale’s appar-
ently selfless generosity as also a way of “promoting her [own] illusion,” 
her spectral millions ruining other relationships, creating “communities 
of doom” (6, 8).
***
Iago’s evil is sub-tragic, and its ability to trivialize tragic gravitas finds its 
best symbol in the play’s legendary handkerchief. Compared with the slow 
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unfolding of the suggestion scene between Othello and Iago, the moment 
when Emilia picks up the handkerchief is teasingly brief. It reminds me 
of the Ancient Mariner shooting down the albatross, inexplicably, in an 
instant, and of the absolute externality of that single, momentous act in 
Coleridge’s otherwise nightmarishly inward poem: “with my cross-bow / 
I shot the ALBATROSS.”10 Shakespeare’s depiction of Emilia’s act is also 
strangely shallow, lacking any obvious psychological depth, thus giving 
it a brief, fleeting quality. Paradoxically, Emilia speaks a soliloquy at this 
point, which is more self-addressing than taking the audience into con-
fidence (as her husband frequently does). “My wayward husband hath a 
hundred times / Wooed me to steal it,” she tells herself (3.3.296–97). This 
then is in “long time.” “Steal” betrays an awareness of wrongdoing, which 
is fudged by “wayward,” investing Iago with a self-willed perversity that 
somehow absolves Emilia from being clear-headed about what she is up 
to. “It’s just one of his weird obsessions,” she tries to convince herself. And 
then comes the locus classicus of willed evasion: “what he will do with it / 
Heaven knows, not I, / I nothing, but to please his fantasy” (3.3.301–3). 
The sequence of words, “not I, / I nothing,” is a tantalizing chiasmus link-
ing disavowal of knowledge with female self-effacement, although the 
repeated “I”s inscribe the self as a repressed moral agent. The “I” can also 
be heard as “Ay” (as in “Ay, my lord”), and the sounds form a “no–yes–yes–
no” sequence (not–ay–ay–nothing).
Emilia’s subjectivity here attempts to shrink to a “nothing,” to disap-
pear altogether into a state of complete moral inaction. However, another 
level of mysteriousness is negatively invoked by her words—a realm of 
imputed or transferred agency that is linked, not to a rational motive, but 
to “fantasy,” something subjective, arbitrary, ungovernable, and unknow-
able. In this connection, even “Heaven knows” suggests much more than 
a mere colloquialism, invoking a sphere of inscrutable operation that 
indulgently encompasses human action. The dialogue between Emilia 
and Iago, which follows this soliloquy, places the handkerchief within a 
different nexus. The handkerchief moves out of the Othello–Desdemona 
marriage and becomes a counter in the play of control and appeasement 
between the other couple. We are given the first stark glimpse of Emilia’s 
tensely resentful, yet helpless, investment in Iago when he reduces her 
to a cussedly teasing, ineffectual juvenility, snuffing out her token resist-
ance. She tries again to fudge the issue of stealing, devising an elaborate 
way around Iago’s brutal question, “Hast stolen it from her?” (3.3.314). 
Iago denies her any moral high ground with a vengeance, as if pointing 
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up her own hypocrisy in pretending not to know why he wants the hand-
kerchief. The shallow compassion of Emilia’s “Poor lady, she’ll run mad / 
When she shall lack it” (3.3.321–22) suddenly reveals a heartlessness in 
Emilia that tries desperately to match Iago’s.
This brief dialogue is discomfiting because it depicts something that 
absorbed both Shakespeare and James. In The Wings of the Dove, James 
calls it “the inevitabilities of the abjection of love” (296). The writer of the 
sonnets and creator of Antonio in The Merchant of Venice knew abjection 
very well, and his exploration of it in these texts and in Othello hinges 
around the word, “use.” Emilia and Desdemona play with the word at the 
end of the willow scene: “let them use us well” (4.3.101). “The only horror 
is not to be used,” says Patroclus in Marguerite Yourcenar’s Fires.11
***
But perhaps Emilia shoots her albatross, not when she picks up the hand-
kerchief, but when she lies to Desdemona about it. This lie is truly her act, 
and it will come back to haunt her later. The clown who heralds this scene 
quibbles continuously on lying. This transition from stealing to lying in 
Emilia’s moral unfolding takes place alongside Othello’s now inexorable 
movement towards what Iago calls “the door of truth” (3.3.410), a phrase 
that suggests an inaccessibly private realm that shuts Othello out. Again, 
Emilia’s lie constitutes the briefest moment: “Where should I lose that 
handkerchief, Emilia?” / “I know not, madam” (3.4.23–24). It is the sim-
plest disavowal of knowledge. She quickly changes the topic to Othello’s 
jealousy, and then Othello enters: “Look where he comes” (3.4.31). It is 
Emilia who announces, almost furtively but with a rising alertness, the 
entry of both their husbands, quickly adapting her tone. This creates a 
peculiarly unsettling atmosphere of female complicity—a complicity that 
Desdemona begins to rely on, but we cannot trust, for we know Emilia 
better. She witnesses Othello’s anger over the lost handkerchief, and after 
he leaves Desdemona again expresses her puzzlement over losing it. Emilia 
changes the topic again, but this time her evasion is more complex. She gets 
into her railing-against-men mode with a little outburst beginning, “’Tis 
not a year or two shows us a man” (3.4.104–7). Like the other long speech 
in the willow scene (4.3.85–102), it sharpens the sense of her ineffectual-
ity within the situation. She seems to have drawn the line with her lie. She 
would defend Desdemona’s honor valiantly to Othello, as she does a little 
later. But that is all. And this withdrawal on her part contributes to the 
growing sense of Desdemona’s vulnerability, in the play. Emilia’s occasional 
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bouts of eloquence suggest genuine and complex personal resonances, but 
most of them are strategically timed to prevent other conversations. Her 
eloquence can actually “do” nothing to help Desdemona.
This is why a sentimental reading of the willow scene overlooks the 
nature of Shakespeare’s theatrical and mimetic achievement in it. Emilia is 
“with” Desdemona in this scene, but they talk across the abyss of Emilia’s accu-
mulated lies and silences and of her by-now-quite-settled sense of what she 
cannot, and will not, do for Desdemona. They are together on the other, inti-
mate, side of the “door of truth,” but it still remains half open for Emilia to 
leave—and she knows this. She must, and will, leave at the end of the scene. 
This too, like the small beer scene, is a scene of desultory conversation. But 
there is an ineffable inner-chamber whimsy in Desdemona, in spite of the abid-
ing pensiveness. Woven into this pensiveness is an obscure sense of foreboding, 
of a suspended brutality that dimly gathers around Emilia’s ministering, but 
strangely detached, presence. When Desdemona asks Emilia if the itching 
in her eyes “bode[s] weeping,” Emilia answers, “’Tis neither here nor there” 
(4.3.57–58). It is a peculiarly reflective scene in which the two women’s, espe-
cially Desdemona’s, inchoate forebodings are not left behind, but suddenly 
appear so surreally incomprehensible that they produce a lightheadedness 
which can be kept up only for a while, and only in the still center of a storm.
Towards the end of the scene, Desdemona initiates an important con-
versation about unfaithful wives, which gets Emilia going until she takes over 
entirely with her last impassioned oration on wives having “sense” (4.3.93). 
In the course of this conversation, the two women move further and further 
apart in their moral stance regarding sex outside marriage. Emilia comes out 
a materialist and a pragmatist, Desdemona an idealist. Emilia thinks, “The 
world’s a huge thing: it is a great price / For a small vice” (4.3.68–69). It is 
clear from what follows that by “price” she does not mean “the price to be 
paid”; her “price” is a variant spelling of “prize.” She will risk her fidelity if 
the world is her reward. She also thinks that such a deed can be undone, 
the wrong quickly made right if only it is done “well i’ th’ dark” (4.3.66), 
whereas Desdemona would rather not do it at all “by this heavenly light” 
(4.3.64). Emilia and Desdemona inhabit disparate visions of marriage and 
separate moral universes, and there is, in Emilia’s “religion of doing,” room 
for a lie or two, as long as she is not asked to kill.
***
But, in a few moments, Emilia is made to move on from stealing and lying 
to greater vices. Shakespeare compresses what, in Cinthio, is like a slow 
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draining away of life through a long series of just but brutal punishments. 
Completely reworking Cinthio’s ending , he pitches Emilia into quite 
another mode than what she was created for. After learning of Roderigo’s 
death and Cassio’s wounding, Emilia reenters the “door of truth” as the 
ghostly echo of Desdemona’s smothered voice. It is as if she has suddenly 
discovered center-stage histrionics, till the final exit. Shakespeare is inter-
lacing again, and at more than one level. First, the double anagnorisis: 
Othello and Emilia both face the truth of their respective marriages and of 
their purblind conduct in this sphere. Neither survives this—Othello kills 
himself, and Emilia is killed by Iago. More interestingly, Emilia’s assump-
tion into high tragedy does not quite free her from remaining implicated 
in lying. Her extreme vocal presence in the last scene is nuanced to the end 
with a wealth of Shakespearean mischief, similar to what James keeps up 
with his dying dove, Milly, till the very moment of her death, and after. 
For both Othello and Emilia, facing the truths they either had no access 
to or had deliberately kept at bay means losing everything, everything they 
had staked. In the case of Emilia—who dies on another woman’s marriage 
bed—what she lets go of is the idea of “home.” As in his earlier “Speak 
within doors” (4.2.146), Iago charges her now to “get you home,” and she 
replies, “Perchance, Iago, I will ne’er go home” (5.2.191, 193–94). So, 
Emilia’s generic elevation from novella through domestic tragedy to high 
tragedy becomes a measure of what she loses.
But James wrote of higher, more resilient, loyalties than Emilia’s in 
his shorter fiction. His 1887 story, “The Liar,” is narrated by a painter who 
had been rejected by a woman twelve years before he meets her again; she 
is now married to the “raconteur,” Colonel Clement Capadose.12 This colo-
nel is known to be “a thumping liar” (273), modeled on a gentleman, “the 
most unbridled colloquial romancer,” James once met at a dinner party 
in London.13 The morbidly jealous painter contrives to paint Colonel 
Capadose in such a way as to expose his pathological lying, in order to 
“execute a masterpiece of ... legitimate treachery” (283). The once-rejected 
painter wants to draw out a confession from the woman who had rejected 
him, now a liar-colonel’s wife, that her life “would have been finer” with 
the painter (286). Although the cruel accuracy of the painter’s portrait 
breaks her down for a while, it is eventually destroyed, and she remains 
loyal to her husband. James describes the painter’s attempted exposé as an 
“ineffectual experiment” Writing to his friend, Theodora Sedgwick, James 
mentions some of his female readers who “declare it is monstrous to have 
represented [the liar’s wife] as not taking the artist into confidence—& as 
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sticking to her husband.” “We move, my dear Theodora,” James adds, “in 
dim & tortuous labyrinths & we sit in eternal darkness.”14 This is the sort 
of terrain in which Emilia “moves” with Iago.
There is a fine irony working upon Emilia at the end of Shakespeare’s 
play. Desdemona dies lying in order to protect her husband: “She’s like a 
liar gone to burning hell” (5.2.127). But Emilia is denied the moral satis-
faction of exposing Othello, for which stern task she was raring herself up 
with every moral absolute she could invoke. But Othello confesses imme-
diately, and then Emilia is faced with the truth about her husband. She 
repeatedly reduces Iago’s evil to compulsive lying, lacerating herself with 
the word “lie”: “You told a lie, an odious, damned lie! / Upon my soul, a 
lie, a wicked lie!” (5.2.176–77) But, in speaking “as liberal as the north,” 
she suppresses her own lie to Desdemona and tells a half-truth about her 
agency in stealing the handkerchief (5.2.218). Iago points this out: “Filth, 
thou liest” (5.2.229). But Desdemona, the only witness to Emilia’s error 
of commission, is now dead. There is something excessive about Emilia’s 
dying moments, which speaks of a torment different from that of being 
married to an evil man. ( James speaks of “the beautiful little eloquence 
involved in Milly’s avoidances” (299)). I cannot help finding Emilia’s final 
moments slightly comic. But her last words are significant: “So speaking 
as I think, alas, I die” (5.2.249). In drawing attention to her final integ-
rity of speech, these words remain opaquely self-reflexive. They fold in 
upon themselves, without actually letting on what she thinks. Cinthio’s 
Emilia knows and tells all at the end. But, in Shakespeare, between Iago 
and Emilia, the circle of lies and silences remains closed. Emilia dies full 
of words, but never really managing to sound her silences. Bleeding but 
not killed, Iago becomes an embodiment of the ultimate silence, opting 
for an infernal reticence that will give out nothing : “Demand me noth-
ing. What you know, you know. / From this time forth I never will speak 
word” (5.2.300–301).
The maddening circularity of Iago’s black hole of a sentence—
“What you know, you know”—reminds me of the experience of reading 
The Sacred Fount. It is James’s sublime joke, largely at his own expense, 
teased out into a novel. At the end of this impossible work, the beautiful 
Grace Brissenden, driven to the last exasperation by James’s pathologically 
Jamesian narrator, asks the narrator, “Then what on earth do you think?” 
But soon giving up on a clear answer, she says, simply, “My poor dear, you 
are crazy, and I bid you good-night!” (218).
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Minding Shakespeare’s Gaps: A Response  
to Aveek Sen
Tanya Pollard
In a New Yorker essay titled “On Omission,” the writer John McPhee sug-
gests that writing depends crucially on the art of choosing what to leave 
out. “The creative writer leaves white space between chapters or segments 
of chapters,” he explains. “The creative reader silently articulates the 
unwritten thought that is present in the white space. Let the reader have 
the experience. Leave judgment in the eye of the beholder.”15 McPhee notes 
in passing—or rather, cites Harold Bloom as observing—that Shakespeare 
exemplifies the power of omission: “what he leaves out becomes much 
more important than what he puts in” (48). McPhee’s essay offers a use-
ful frame for Aveek’s haunting account of Emilia’s silences and the blank 
spaces that they invite or challenge us to fill. Aveek calls our attention to 
disturbing gaps that both become stories in themselves and prompt fur-
ther possible stories.
Shakespeare’s omissions have shaped those of others, and Aveek 
points out that Henry James cultivated the art of the gap in ways that 
can sharpen our understanding of its earlier versions. In particular, 
James’s acute readings of Shakespeare offer lenses through which we can 
reread Shakespeare’s earlier absences. If we view Shakespeare through 
James-tinted glasses, what might we be newly enabled to see? Aveek 
makes a persuasive case that attending to the willed evasiveness of 
James’s female figures illuminates uncomfortable underpinnings behind 
Emilia’s apparent support for Desdemona. We associate the play’s 
drama of knowledge especially with Othello’s insistent demands for it, 
but Emilia’s insistent denials of knowledge can slip between the gaps 
of our attention. Similarly, many associate the play’s drama of intimacy 
primarily with the doomed marriage between Othello and Desdemona, 
and secondarily with the pact between Othello and Iago, but the com-
plex ties between Desdemona and Emilia are as central to the play as 
they are under-examined.
Although she speaks little, and conveys almost nothing of her 
thoughts, motives, marriage, or history, Emilia’s impact is enormous. 
Without her conveyance of the handkerchief to Iago, and her ongoing 
concealment of this maneuver, Othello would never encounter the so-
called ocular proof that catalyzes and crystallizes his faith in Iago’s stories. 
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Without her status as trusted confidante, moreover, Desdemona would 
lack the intimate interpersonal spaces in which she is moved to reflect 
on love, loyalty, willows, and weeping, communicating and heightening 
grief in ways that sharply escalate audiences’ affective stakes. If Emilia is 
to Desdemona as Iago is to Othello—a dangerous interlocutor, whose 
intimate access and ability to inspire trust bring about the play’s terrible 
denouement—we would do well to pay more attention to the crucial 
silences that create this uneasy power.
Emilia is far from consistently silent. Her conversation with 
Desdemona is breezy and bawdy, and she speaks sharply to her hus-
band. She almost speaks sharply to herself ; in an unguarded moment, 
she comes close to acknowledging the cruelty of her actions. As Aveek 
observes, she anticipates the impact of the handkerchief ’s disappear-
ance: “Poor lady, she’ll run mad / When she shall lack it” (3.3.321–22). 
Yet she both occludes her role in this theft and commits herself to con-
cealing it, answering Desdemona’s queries with a direct lie: “I know not, 
madam” (3.4.24). She goes on to hide the truth further by omission, 
standing by silently while Othello interrogates and berates Desdemona 
on the handkerchief ’s disappearance, without ever inter vening , 
explaining , or distracting. Nor does she offer help when Desdemona 
laments to her, “Sure, there’s some wonder in this handkerchief: / I am 
most unhappy in the loss of it” (3.4.90–91). Actively eliding her privi-
leged knowledge and complicity, she presents herself as aligned with 
Desdemona in perplexity and victimhood. The two of them, she sug-
gests, are both women beleaguered by male aggression: “They are all 
but stomachs, and we all but food” (3.4.105). She speculates sympa-
thetically on the possible causes of Othello’s jealousy as if she had no 
insiderly access. When she tells Othello, “I durst, my lord, to wager she 
is honest,” she offers to “Lay down my soul at stake” (4.2.12–13), but 
she will not go so far as to lay down her secret. Othello, wrongly—or 
perhaps rightly—observes of her non-confession, “She says enough” 
(4.2.20). Emilia says little, but what she says, combined with what she 
does not say, is enough to convict.
Attending to Emilia’s silences makes for uneasy reading of her final 
scenes, when she rants indignantly, and with apparent incomprehen-
sion, about the injustice of Othello’s suspicions. “A halter pardon him,” 
she curses, “and hell gnaw his bones! / Why should he call her whore?” 
(4.2.138–39). Has she forgotten her theft, Desdemona’s anxious queries, 
and her own dismissive evasions? Or is she obstructed by a blind spot large 
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enough to block the link between the handkerchief ’s disappearance and 
Othello’s jealousy, despite her intimate access to direct conversations on 
this topic? Emilia’s silences conceal multitudes and complicate our under-
standing of the play’s terrible end. By doing so, they also prompt, invite, 
and even require our own further stories—including stories that some 
(maybe Henry James) might formalize. Shakespeare’s gaps prove fertile, if 
dangerous, sites. We ignore them at our peril.
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Darkness Visible: A Response to Aveek Sen
Subha Mukherji
What Aveek uses James to anatomize brilliantly is the way Shakespeare 
shows us how we do not know and how we arrange not to see, and some-
times intimates why, though motives and impulses can glimmer beyond 
such intimations, perhaps even intentions: who knows what William, or 
Henry, knew—except perhaps Michael Wood!16 Should we even ask?
The one thing William did know, though—as this essay makes 
us see—is the charge of Emilia’s journey from the woman in Cinthio 
who “knew everything” to the enigma in Othello who “[knows] not,” 
yet “thought so then” (3.4.24; 5.2.191). Aveek sees this as a journey 
that puts agency and knowledge at variance. Yet silence or passivity can 
be an exercise of choice, and I wonder whether Shakespeare’s play does 
not suggest an alternative model of agency, rather than “wedging apart” 
knowing and doing. For the dimension of knowledge at play in Emilia’s 
“curtained consciousness,” no less than Maggie’s, is knowingness—hover-
ing in a shadowland between complicity and resistance. From which side 
are we looking at the curtain? And who draws it? Correspondingly, it is a 
kind of obscurity that both baffles and invites reading, teetering between 
absence and mystery, cat and cavity, as it does between comic triviality and 
tragic recess. In representational terms, the analogy is exact. After all, in 
The Golden Bowl, the source of the phrase Aveek quotes, Maggie shares her 
curtain with Amerigo’s “new friends,” including Mrs. Assingham, whose 
“state of mind [...] had resemblances to a great white curtain,” in turn com-
pared to “white air that was like a dazzling curtain of light, concealing as 
darkness conceals, yet the colour of milk or snow.”17 Like a blind spot on 
an image of the retina, dazzlingly dense? The direction of invisibility—as 
of obscuration—is dizzyingly reversible when it comes to the diaphanous 
texture of Shakespeare’s or James’s characters. No less gauzy is the range of 
elusive paradigms that the essay draws out: whimsy, fantasy, and fancies 
as varieties of ungovernable, irrational, arbitrary states that can feel like 
knowledge to the subject (though like a nightmare to the object, as with 
Hermione, confronted by Leontes’s visceral conviction, which is also the 
basis of her legal conviction in his court). They are also, of course, possible 
forms of unknowing. But gossamer to ghost is one small step.
Desdemona, Toni Morrison’s lyrical, multimedia adaptation of 
(mainly) the “willow scene” in Shakespeare’s Othello—performed at the 
Barbican in summer 2012—is shaped around three posthumous meetings 
Desdemona has.18 The main encounter is that between Desdemona and her 
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mother’s maid Barbary, in Morrison’s vision the second African character 
imagined but absent in Othello, who died singing the song of lost love that 
“will not go from [Desdemona’s] mind” (4.3.29); for “Barbary is what you 
call Africa,” as she says to Desdemona (p. 45), evoking the “Barbary” courtiers 
who arrived and fascinated London in 1600, as well as the Barbary corsairs 
(or North African pirates) who had started raiding British shores and ships 
at the time when Othello was first performed. This exchange happens in an 
Africa which, in Shakespeare, could only be displaced onto Othello’s mind: 
remember Desdemona’s tellingly ambiguous phrasing, “I saw Othello’s visage 
in his mind,” almost as if she had to bypass his skin—turn it into a blind spot 
of sorts—to see the real, fair Othello (1.3.248). That is in a scene where she 
expresses, with touching frankness, her desire to accompany her newly wed 
husband to the wars “for the rites for which [she loves] him” (1.3.253). It is 
also the moment when the new bridegroom Othello declares, with strange 
defensiveness about the sexual chemistry between them, that he is kind of past 
it, and wants Desdemona with him in Cyprus to enjoy mental affinity alone: 
I therefore beg it not
To please the palate of my appetite, 
Nor to comply with heat the young affects
In my defunct and proper satisfaction,
But to be free and bounteous to her mind.
(Folio, 1.3.257–61)
Famously, this passage has been a blind spot of textual scholarship, itself 
refusing to read the blind spot of Shakespeare’s Venice which, in turn, 
has been internalized by its alien military hero. Editors (such as Norman 
Sanders in the New Cambridge edition) have often tended to follow Lewis 
Theobald’s emendation to “distinct” to skirt round the apparent misfit of 
“defunct” with the context; others—following Edmond Malone—have 
gone with Q1’s “disjunct,” which neither sees nor unsees—“neither here, 
nor there,” as Emilia would say (4.3.58). Yet other scholars, such as Hulme 
and Salgado, have resorted to more tortuous ways of getting round the 
embarrassment caused by this textual “baffle”—to adapt Adam Zucker’s 
term in this volume—by reading “defunct” to mean “discharged,” by a 
dysfunctional (in the English syntactical context) analogy with the Latin 
form, which demands an ablative to make sense as “discharged from.”19 
Some (such as Peter Alexander) have suggested that a minor emendation 
of “my” (Q1 and F) to “me” would help make grammatical sense of the 
lines if conjoined with “defunct”: “the young affects / In me defunct” in 
a parenthesis, taking the cue from Q1’s comma after “heat,” absent in F: 
“Nor to comply with heat, the young affects in my defunct, and proper 
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satisfaction.” But even this emendation seems unnecessary, given the 
non-congruence of early modern punctuation with ours. A. D. Nuttall, 
a consummate reader of eloquent textual wobbles, favors this emenda-
tion, but also thinks, surely rightly, that the syntactic awkwardness is a 
case of “naturalistic confusion” in a character who is anxious to obscure 
the sexual implications of his race in a society where he is a prized gen-
eral but becomes an “old black ram” tupping their white ewe the moment 
he becomes Desdemona’s lover.20 For me, the balancing of “my ... satis-
factions” and “her mind” makes syntactic sense. It is the deeper affective 
indecorum masked by social decorum that gives me pause, as well as a way 
of seeing. On hearing Othello out, the duke declares to Brabantio that 
his son-in-law is “more fair than black” (286). In the very way blackness 
becomes white to the eye, its dense refusal to reflect light in the alleys of 
“Venice” trips us up and makes us look harder. The Malian singer Rokia 
Traoré, as Barbary, sang the willow song hauntingly as a blues number in 
Desdemona. Is it not strangely apposite that Morrison’s Africa becomes 
a photographic “negative” of the original’s location? A place where all 
things that could not be looked in the face in Venice are translated into 
face-to-face encounter? But her mimetic aim is in sync with Shakespeare’s: 
making darkness visible. And so, in this work, when Desdemona con-
fronts Emilia with accusations, Emilia responds with sharp defensiveness, 
lacking shades where she can hide from what she “knew,” where knowing 
can take cover from doing.21 In the afterlife of characters, in the afterlife 
of the play, Africa surfaces and claims the conscious mind and its merci-
less clarities, along with all the specific affective knowledges available but 
resisted. Desdemona accosts Emilia here: “Didn’t you acquiesce to all of 
Iago’s demands, even the most vile, corrupt ones? [...] Your dangerous, 
murderous silence led to my death,” and mocks her “survival strategies” 
(42–43). In Emilia’s reply, the tone of resigned, lonely insouciance carries 
over from the older play: “Life is what it is. [...] To own my life, I had to 
forge a secret path” (42–43). But she also confronts Desdemona and her 
class for “[taking ] devotion for granted,” and challenges her privileged 
and sentimental knowledge claims: “I am glad you never knew how des-
perate life is for the truly orphaned” (44). After such knowledge, what 
forgiveness? “I know not, madam,” Shakespeare’s Emilia might say. “All 
is known here,” Morrison’s Desdemona might answer, as she does when 
Emilia protests to her: “Did you know I was the first to lay dying next to 
you?” (42).
So, though Cinthio did not quite know his Shakespeare, did 
Shakespeare know his Morrison, as he “knew his James”? How does 
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James’s knowing feel for the pulse of unknowing relate to such resur-
rections as Morrison’s? his representation of what is unrepresentable 
not only between self and Other, but to the self itself ? Is there a risk of 
homogenizing acts of ambiguous knowing? How are we to orchestrate, in 
composition or in reception, distinct if related disavowals of knowledge? 
And what is the role of a gap of time in filling what Tanya Pollard (in her 
response), after John McPhee, calls the “white space[s]” in Shakespeare’s 
own texts, as sequels step into the breach of his open endings? Do the 
unknowings of Emilia, and indeed of Desdemona and Othello, invari-
ably belong with the reticence of willed resistance, as Aveek suggests, as 
opposed to the after-world of Desdemona where they are brought into 
light? Or are they to Morrison’s retrospective vision what Billie Holiday’s 
“Strange Fruit” is to Nina Simone’s? Holiday’s 1939 rendering is fragile, 
uncomprehending, and ballad-like, as it comes out of the heart of a reality 
it is trying to bear, and make sense of; an as-yet barely grappled cognitive 
dissonance around racial lynching translating into a strange, dislocated 
pathos. In Simone’s, recorded in 1965, there is articulate rage—stylized, 
shaped, and dramatized as distance alone can make possible. But, 
of course, the alertness to the raw, unprocessed, experiential texture of 
half-knowing and apprehension can itself be a defiantly ethical mimetic 
position in relation to the matter of life: a refusal of formal solace and its 
comprehensions.
Where, in this spectrum, do James’s precise tracings of disavowed, 
untold, and rearranged knowledges dwell? Whereas, in Morrison, the 
encounters lead to a possibility of redemption and understanding, no mat-
ter how uneasy, James’s more implicit reinvention of Shakespearean elisions 
preempts, as this essay shows, any transcendent or feel-good move to truth 
and reconciliation. How, then, does he manage—as I think he does—to 
write in the profound loneliness and vulnerability underlying such retell-
ings and evasions? What is the relation between high reticence as an 
aesthetic mode or a function of taste, as Aveek posits, and reticence as an 
experiential position, a function of human choice or, indeed, impotence? 
James and Iago and Shakespeare are all artificers; Emilia, Portia, Gertrude, 
and Helena are arguably both subject and agent, as are Maggie Verver and 
Milly Theale. How is the space between the art of suggestion and the lived 
moment of withholding knowledge negotiated by different media—drama 
or narrative? Shakespeare’s silences offer lacunae that embodied action on 
stage can fill in—but are they coterminous with the characters’ silences? 
What choices and risks does a director face in trying to make the “pensive 
text” speak?22
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NOTES
1 All references to Shakespeare’s plays, except Othello, are to the Arden 
Complete Works. References to Othello are to the Arden edition, ed. Honigmann.
2 Keats uses the phrase in a letter of April 21, 1819. See Atkins, On Keats’s 
Practice and Poetics of Responsibility, 9.
3 James, The Wings of the Dove, 477. All quotations are from this edition.
4 Auden, Collected Poems, 312.
5 James, The Turn of the Screw, lv. All quotations are from this edition.
6 Shakespeare, Sonnets, 405.
7 Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 82, 81.
8 Cinthio, trans., quoted in Honigmann’s Othello, 381. All quotations are 
from this edition.
9 James, The Golden Bowl, ed. Crick, 56. All quotations are from this edition.
10 Coleridge, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” lines 79–80, in Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, 55.
11 Yourcenar, Fires, 33.
12 James, The Liar, 270. All quotations are from this edition.
13 Preface to The Aspern Papers, in James, The Art of Criticism, 344.
14 James, James: A Life in Letters, 204–5.
15 McPhee, “On Omission,” 46.
16 See Michael Wood’s brilliantly provocative essay, “What Henry Knew,” 
13–26, unerringly alighting on Henry James as the gatekeeper to “the question of 
literature and knowledge” (13).
17 James, The Golden Bowl (1995 ed.), chapter 1, p. 12.
18 Morrison, Desdemona.
19 Hulme, Explorations in Shakespeare’s Language, 153–54; Salgado, ed., 
Othello, New Swan edition, 30.
20 Nuttall, A New Mimesis, 139.
21 Morrison, Desdemona, Sec. 8, 42–44.
22 Barthes, S/Z, 17.
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Chapter 5
Knowing Kin and Kind in 
The Winter’s Tale
Tanya Pollard
“I would most gladly know the issue of it.”1
EARLY IN THE WINTER’S Tale, Paulina presents Leontes with what she identifies as inarguable proof of his paternity, and accordingly of 
his wife’s fidelity. Hermione’s newborn infant, she explains, is “So like you, 
’tis the worse.” Turning to onlookers for corroboration, she continues, 
“Behold, my lords, / Although the print be little, the whole matter / And 
copy of the father” (2.3.98–100). The baby, according to Paulina, is easy 
to read, a miniature reprint of Leontes’s features. Leontes, however, draws 
the opposite conclusion: “This brat is none of mine. / It is the issue of 
Polixenes” (2.3.93–94). Any knowledge we can glean from the baby’s mat-
ter and copy, he suggests, will direct us towards a different original imprint.
Leontes’s error suggests a variation on a standard pattern. Throughout 
Shakespeare’s plays, characters routinely fail to recognize members of their 
family. Rosalind evades Duke Senior by wearing a cap; Sebastian is sty-
mied by Viola’s male apparel; Cymbeline has no idea that the young men 
who save his kingdom are his sons; and the Ephesian Antipholus shares a 
city with his long-lost mother for years without knowing that she is even 
alive, much less his neighbor. As Launcelot Gobbo observes after his father 
attributes his non-recognition to blindness, “Nay, indeed, if you had your 
eyes you might fail of the knowing me. It is a wise father that knows his 
own child” (Merchant of Venice 2.2.65–66). Among these many familial 
misrecognitions, however, Leontes’s response to Perdita stands out, not 
only because of the impressive number of failed familial recognitions that 
surround it, but also for its self-conscious alignment of kin with literary 
kind. As Aaron Kitch has argued, the play’s repeated use of the vocabu-
lary of print to illustrate paternity implicitly links the fear of illegitimate 
birth with concerns about unauthorized printing practices and uncertain 
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genres, such as its own mongrel tragicomedy.2 Throughout the play, its 
shape-shifting dramatic form proves as hard to identify as family mem-
bers, suggesting that the challenges of knowing kin and knowing literary 
kind create similar sorts of blind spots.
Failure to know kin precipitates the central crisis of The Winter’s 
Tale, when Leontes stakes his kingdom on misreading his family: his failure 
to recognize Perdita as his daughter rests on his similar failure to recognize 
Hermione as his faithful wife, which also raises questions over whether 
Mamilius is his son.3 Projecting his errors onto others, he accuses Camillo 
and others of blindness to Polixenes’s guilt and insists that Hermione has 
failed to distinguish him from his figurative brother: “You have mistook, 
my lady— / Polixenes for Leontes” (2.1.83–84). And, although the play 
suggests that these particular accusations are mistaken, Leontes’s pattern 
of familial misrecognition extends contagiously to others: Polixenes lacks 
knowledge of his son’s familial intentions, Florizel fails to recognize his 
disguised father through an extended and increasingly intimate conversa-
tion, and the shifting disguises of Autolycus defy recognition by Perdita’s 
Bohemian family. Even the play’s external family of readers and audiences 
find their illusion of privileged knowledge shattered—at least in their first 
encounter with the play—when Paulina reveals an apparent statue to be 
the still-living Hermione.
Fittingly, the play develops its preoccupations with knowing kin 
through the intermingling of two lexical families. The play is densely 
populated with forms of the word “know,” some conspicuous and some 
more easily missed. From the Old English cnawan and Old High German 
-knāen, “know” shares Indo-European roots both with Latin gnō-, gnōscere, 
the roots of cognition, recognition, ignore, and acquaint (from accognitus), 
and with the earlier Greek γνω-, γιγνώσκειν, the roots of prognosis and 
diagnosis.4 Direct forms of “know” (including knowledge, acknowledge, 
known, unknown, and knowing) occur ninety-four times in The Winter’s 
Tale, placing it at the upper end of Shakespeare’s most knowledge-fixated 
plays (exceeded only by All’s Well That Ends Well with 124, King Lear 
with 112, and Othello with 97).5 These words, rooted in English from its 
earliest Anglo-Saxon origins, also mingle in the play with later-arriving 
lexical cousins, including five instances of “ignorant,” three of “acquaint,” 
and one of “prognosticate”: all linguistic immigrants that entered English 
with the Norman invasion, and all of which appear in the play in relation 
to the problems of knowing family.
Alongside this preoccupation with the language of knowledge, the 
play similarly showcases the thematic ties between kin and kind, gene and 
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genre, with one hundred instances of words from these terms’ overlapping 
family trees. “Kin” and its suffixed cognate “kind” are Germanic words, 
rooted in Old English cyn(n) and its continental forebears.6 This word, 
in turn, is part of a larger lexical family rooted in the Aryan gen-, gon-, 
gn-, “to produce, engender, beget,” and accordingly shares lineage with 
Greek γένος, γόνος, and γίγνομαι, as well as the related Latin genus and 
gignĕre.7 These terms form the roots not only of genre but also of gen-
der, generation, genesis, genitals, genes, genetics, genealogy, and related 
familial vocabulary. Just as literary kinds represent a thinly veiled familial 
metaphor, then, genres have the same genealogical roots, and The Winter’s 
Tale actively explores their interwoven threads. Versions of the word kin 
(including kindred, kinsman, kind, kindness, and mankind), occur sev-
enteen times in the play, but its most extensive investment in this lexical 
family appears in its eighty-three uses of genealogical words—generation, 
gentry, and especially gentle.8 Versions of “gentle,” in particular, occur 
sixty-seven times in the play, becoming at times the object of an almost 
farcical obsession.9
Although these two linguistic bodies are not directly related, the 
roots of familial begetting in cin, kin, gen, and gn- suggest an uncanny 
proximity with the roots of knowledge in knāen, ken, γνω, gno, and gn. 
The close, if apparently superficial, resemblance between these two lexical 
families suggestively calls to mind the sense of “know” as “to be sexually 
intimate with; esp. to have sexual intercourse with.” Do knowing and 
engendering go hand in hand? Can we have one without the other? I 
suggest that, in The Winter’s Tale, blindness to family brings about both 
literal and literary barrenness, whereas acts of recognition, culminating in 
the final scene, restore the play to both literal and literary fertility.
Amid the dense linguistic underbrush of knowledge, kin, and 
kind, the play’s denizens have trouble seeing the forest for the trees. 
Critics of Leontes’s errors typically focus on his blindness to Hermione, 
but his responses to Perdita—his own progeny—offer an especially 
rich site for tracing the play’s reflections on the challenges of knowing 
kin. When Paulina makes her case that the child’s features recreate “the 
whole matter / And copy of the father,” Leontes threatens to destroy 
the evidence. After telling Paulina, “I’ll ha’ thee burnt” (2.3.114), he 
goes on to redirect the threat of fire towards the baby: “My child? Away 
with’t! Even thou, that hast / A heart so tender o’er it, take it hence / 
And see it instantly consumed with fire” (2.3.132–34). Otherwise, he 
explains, “The bastard brains with these my proper hands / Shall I dash 
out” (2.3.140–41).
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In turning to the epithet “bastard” to distance himself from his 
putative kin, Leontes seizes on a term that becomes a recurring touchpoint 
for him, and for the play. “Give her the bastard,” he instructs Antigonus 
when Paulina sets down the baby; “Thou dotard! thou art woman-tired, 
unroosted / By thy dame Partlet here. Take up the bastard, / Take’t up, 
I say” (2.3.74–77). Shortly after, he asks in dismay, “Shall I live on, to 
see this bastard kneel / And call me father?” (2.3.155–56). He goes on 
to taunt Antigonus for his eagerness “To save this bastard’s life,—for ’tis 
a bastard, / So sure as this beard’s grey” (2.3.161–62) and instructs him 
to “carry / This female bastard hence” (2.3.174–75). Not only does the 
apparent familial resemblance elude him, then, but he finds the opposite 
certainty blindingly clear. After harping on the term seven times in this 
one scene, he returns to it as his verdict at Hermione’s trial, where he con-
fidently pronounces, “You had a bastard by Polixenes” (3.2.81).
The word “bastard” appears ten times in The Winter’s Tale, more 
frequently than in any other Shakespeare play besides King John and 1 
Henry 6 (both of which use the term primarily in stage directions referring 
to characters titled bastard), although several other plays, such as Much 
Ado, Troilus and Cressida, and most famously King Lear, feature actual 
bastards. This frequency accords the play a privileged position in the 
period’s already extensive theatrical engagement with bastardy; as Alison 
Findlay and Michael Neill have pointed out, bastards are surprisingly 
prominent in the period’s plays and feature disproportionately in plays 
by Shakespeare.10 I suggest that the word’s pervasiveness in The Winter’s 
Tale, which lacks literal bastards, points not only to Leontes’s trouble with 
knowing kin, but also to the word’s unusually lonely lexical status. The 
word “bastard” is itself an orphan of sorts, the rare French word that lacks 
a classical Latin parent. A medieval invention putatively formed from fils 
de bast, “pack-saddle child,” the word apparently links the Old French bast 
(pack-saddle, used as a bed by muleteers in the inns) with the pejorative 
“-ard” suffix, though a link with bas, low, has also been speculated, in keep-
ing with connotations of base-born.11 The term’s primary meaning is “One 
begotten and born out of wedlock; an illegitimate or natural child,” but 
by Shakespeare’s time it also could mean “A mongrel, an animal of inferior 
breed” and, as an adjective, “Illegitimate, unrecognized, unauthorized.”12 
The word’s own lack of parental authorization, then, neatly mirrors its 
definitions.
At first glance, Leontes appears to be the character most intimately 
linked with the word “bastard.” He pronounces the word in eight of its ten 
appearances in the play, and his status as the source of paternal recognition 
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(or lack thereof ) gives him a privileged authority for defining legitimacy. 
Yet Perdita, the unauthorized apparent orphan, offers a more consistent 
link to each of the play’s instances of bastardy. She is the only character 
termed a bastard in the play, the second person beyond her father to use the 
word, and the addressee of its final instance, spoken by Polixenes in an echo 
of her usage. Although Perdita uses the term to denigrate a flower rather 
than a person, like Leontes she pronounces it in the context of a failed rec-
ognition between parent and child. Despite apparent oppositions between 
these two bastard-infused scenes of failed recognition—the first takes place 
in Sicilia, in the play’s so-called tragic half, and the second in Bohemia 
in the so-called comic half—their shared pairing of unacknowledged kin 
with the language of bastardy produces curious symmetries. Both scenes 
are fraught with generic precariousness, marking moments when a choice 
between knowing and not knowing kin creates consequences for the play’s 
generic identity.
Perdita’s apparent illegitimacy follows her to Bohemia, where her 
appearance prompts reflections on illicit procreation. “[S]ure some scape,” 
the shepherd reflects upon seeing her abandoned in a basket. “Though I 
am not bookish, yet I can read ‘waiting-gentlewoman’ in the scape. This 
has been some stair-work, some trunk-work, some behind-door-work. 
They were warmer that got this than the poor thing is here” (3.3.69–72). 
Despite his certainty about her misbegotten origins, however, he avoids 
the stigmatizing term bastard. By offering pity rather than distaste for the 
baby’s circumstances, he signals the familial kindness in which she will 
grow and flourish. It is sixteen years later when we see the language of 
bastardy resurface, when Perdita appears to be not only at risk of mon-
grelizing Bohemia’s royal bloodline, but also such a distraction to Prince 
Florizel that he fails to notice the emergence of his own father into his 
sightlines. Just as Perdita is both object and subject of the term bastard, 
she is similarly both the object of non-recognition and the cause of non-
recognition in others.
Polixenes seeks out the shepherd’s home to see his son, but, before 
interrogating Florizel, he first turns his attention to Perdita, the child 
previously misidentified as his bastard by his one-time best friend. In 
response to his questions about her garden’s winter flowers, she refers to 
the “carnations and streaked gillyvors, / Which some call nature’s bas-
tards,” pointing out, “of that kind / Our rustic garden’s barren, and I care 
not / To get slips of them” (4.4.82–85). In echoing her diction, Polixenes 
imitates and escalates her reproductive vocabulary. “You see, sweet maid,” 
he explains, 
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we marry 
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art
Which does mend nature—change it rather; but
The art itself is nature.
(4.4.92–97)
Polixenes’s analogy of botanical cultivation to category-crossing art has 
attracted considerable discussion of the play’s challenges to codified systems 
of literary genre; the play self-consciously marries the wild stock of comedy 
to the gentler scion of tragedy, in the process arriving at a hybrid or bas-
tard genre akin to Perdita’s gillyvors.13 According to this analogy, art offers 
both an opposition to nature—a word rooted in the Latin nascor, nasci, 
natus, to give birth—and an alternative form of reproduction. In the con-
text of his opposition to his son’s looming inter-class marriage, Polixenes’s 
recommendation that Perdita should embrace the plants’ prolific hybrid 
fertility—“make your garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them 
bastards” (4.4.98–99)—is of course saturated in irony. Perdita, for her part, 
insists that she will not countenance this generative mixing of kinds in her 
garden, although she is apparently willing to do so in her marriage.
If Perdita’s reluctance to breed bastard flowers suggests apprehen-
sions towards the social mixing she enters, Florizel for his part is eager to 
deny the claims of kin and kind. Challenged by his father on his intentions 
towards his mistress—“Let me hear / What you profess” (4.4.354–55)—
Florizel presses his unrecognized father into service. “Do,” he bids, “and be 
witness to ’t” (4.4.355). He will marry Perdita, he insists, despite his blood: 
were I crowned the most imperial monarch, 
Thereof most worthy, were I the fairest youth
That ever made eye swerve, had force and knowledge
More than was ever man’s, I would not prize them
Without her love; for her employ them all,
Commend them and condemn them to her service
Or to their own perdition.
 (4.4.358–64)
Florizel not only prizes Perdita over both kin and knowledge, but pun-
ningly relegates these realms—and everything else—to perdition if 
they fail to serve her. When she accepts his impromptu proposal, her 
adoptive father exhorts them to make their vows then and there. “And, 
friends unknown, you shall bear witness to ’t,” he addresses Polixenes and 
Camillo; “I give my daughter to him, and will make / Her portion equal 
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his” (4.4.370–72). Florizel assents eagerly: “But, come on, / Contract us 
fore these witnesses” (4.4.375–76). As one of the “friends unknown” who 
will “bear witness,” Polixenes raises the question of the absence of friends 
known, or rather parents. “Soft, swain, awhile, beseech you,” he addresses 
Florizel; “Have you a father?” (4.4.377–78). To his reply—“I have. But 
what of him?”—Polixenes asks, “Knows he of this?” and is told “He nei-
ther does nor shall” (4.4.379–81).
Florizel’s insistence that his father not know his most intimate life 
plans spurs outrage from his disguised parent. “Methinks a father / Is at 
the nuptial of his son a guest / That best becomes the table,” Polixenes 
insists. “Pray you once more,” he continues, 
Is not your father grown incapable
Of reasonable affairs? Is he not stupid 
With age and alt’ring rheums? Can he speak, hear,
Know man from man?
(4.4.382–87)
This quarrel hinges on questions of familial knowledge: who knows what, 
who is capable of knowing what, and who is deserving of knowing what. 
Polixenes invokes sensory numbing—the stupefied incapacity to speak, 
hear, or know—as the only possibility that would justify a man’s not mer-
iting knowledge of his son. In the absence of this stupefaction, he insists, 
“You offer him, if this be so, a wrong / Something unfilial” (4.4.393–94). 
Florizel grants this, but maintains that withholding this knowledge is justi-
fied. “But for some other reasons, my grave sir,” he explains, “Which ’tis not 
fit you know, I not acquaint / My father of this business.” A knowledge tug 
of war ensues: “Let him know’t”—“He shall not.” “Prithee let him.”—“No, 
he must not.” According to the shepherd, “he shall not need to grieve / 
At knowing of thy choice” (4.4.399–404). Knowing this choice, however, 
leads not only to grief but to fury. At Florizel’s “Come, come, he must not. 
/ Mark our contract,” Polixenes explodes. “Mark your divorce, young sir,” 
he retorts while uncovering himself: “Whom son I dare not call. Thou art 
too base / To be acknowledged. Thou a sceptre’s heir, / That thus affects a 
sheep-hook?” (4.4.404–8). In lowering his affections from a scepter to a 
sheep’s hook, Florizel loses the name of son, becoming too base for famil-
ial status. Denied the knowledge that is the privilege of blood, Polixenes 
in turn denies acknowledgment of filial status. “[W]e’ll bar thee from 
succession,” he continues; “Not hold thee of our blood, no, not our kin” 
(4.4.418). If Florizel, as it seems, is the king’s only heir, his disinheritance 
leaves Bohemia, like Sicilia, issueless. No knowledge, no kindness; no kin, 
no kingdom.
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Why is it so hard to know, or acknowledge, kin? Leontes’s non-
recognition of his daughter and Florizel’s non-recognition of his father 
are not the only moments of familial blindness in the play, but they offer 
paired fulcrum points for the play’s own generic instability. When Leontes 
denies his daughter, he seems also to deny the possibility of comic fertility 
for Sicilia, moving in the opposite direction from Benedick’s blithe subor-
dination of cuckoldry fears with the imperative that “The world must be 
peopled” (Much Ado 2.3.213–14). And, although Perdita’s flourishing in 
Bohemia’s lush gardens suggests a triumph over Leontes’s drive towards the 
tragic, the play’s second familial denial rewrites Bohemia in Sicilia’s image, 
challenging the possibility of generic recuperation. As the primary sites for 
the play’s odd invocations of bastards, moreover, these scenes raise ques-
tions about the relationship between bastards, recognition, kin, and genre. 
Do bastards baffle recognition? If they represent not the opposite of kin 
but an uneasy and unrecognized cousin to it, do they similarly undermine 
the straightforward classifications of literary kind? Do bastards mongrelize 
their plays, turning them into hybrid, half-breed, bastard genres?
If the base status of bastard represents the most extreme form of 
familial non-recognition, its opposite might be the lofty and acknowl-
edged status of gentility, the aristocratic realm to which Leontes and 
Polixenes attempt to deny their children access. Despite the prevailing 
current associations of “gentle” with refinement and delicacy, its usage in 
Shakespeare’s time continued to reflect its etymological origins, which 
refer explicitly to birth. The word comes from the Old French gentil, high-
born, noble, which in turn stemmed from Latin gentīlis, from genti-, gens, 
race, family. It shares parents, that is, with the words gender, genre, geneal-
ogy, as well as sharing grandparents with kin and kind.
Claims to gentility acquire a vexed status in The Winter’s Tale, in 
which Leontes’s suspicions of his wife’s pregnancy come to color all forms 
of birth. The word’s first instances appear in conjunction with Mamilius, 
whose birth Leontes also begins to question in the light of his later suspi-
cions. “You have an unspeakable comfort of your young prince Mamillius,” 
Archidamus tells Camillo in the exchange of courtly compliments that 
opens the play’s first scene; “it is a gentleman of the greatest promise that ever 
came into my note” (1.1.30–31). If Mamilius’s gentle status is an unspeak-
able comfort, it may also be simply unspeakable, or at least unknowable, as 
Leontes increasingly broods on his son’s adherence to familial resemblance. 
“How like, methought, I then was to this kernel,” he declares of Mamilius 
in the next scene: “This squash, this gentleman” (1.2.161–62). Just as 
Mamilius’s gentility hinges on his nascent status as kernel, squash, seed, 
and egg, the opposing “ungentle business” (3.3.33) of Perdita’s denial and 
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deportation hinges on her father’s non-recognition of her birth, and, when 
the play pauses to announce its passage through a generic rebirth, its chorus 
directs the language of gentility to those watching the play. Addressed as 
“Gentle spectators” (4.1.20), the audience is invited into the play’s extended 
acknowledged family.
The play concentrates its lexicon of gentility, however, in its last 
acts, with their dawning recognitions of kin. As the world of the court 
invades the pastoral realm of the shepherd’s home and fields, so too does its 
vocabulary. “Be merry, gentle,” the prince Florizel counsels the apparently 
ungentle shepherd’s daughter, and his disguised father similarly addresses 
her as “gentle maiden” (4.4.46, 85). When Polixenes and Camillo draw 
the shepherd into conversation, their social status attracts attention; the 
shepherd’s son tells Mopsa and Dorcas, “my father and the gentlemen are 
in sad talk” (4.4.296–97). Speaking of Florizel, Camillo tells Autolycus to 
“change garments with this gentleman” (4.4.619–20) and soon after urges 
“Nay, prithee, dispatch: the gentleman is half flayed already” (4.4.624–25). 
Autolycus himself, meanwhile, offers the clown and shepherd a liaison with 
nobility: asking them to take him to the king, he explains, “being some-
thing gently considered, I’ll bring you where he is aboard” (4.4.768–69).
This lexicon of gentility escalates and arguably explodes, however, 
back in the Sicilian court, which finds its members unexpectedly expanded 
not only by the belated recognition of Perdita, but also and especially 
by a new recognition of her extended kin. Even before the unveiling of 
Hermione’s statue, which simultaneously reveals kin and kind, genera-
tion and genre, the play unveils a similarly strange forging of new kinship 
bonds. Upon their miraculous adoption into the king’s family, the shep-
herd and his son learn not only that they have been socially elevated, but 
that their births have been accordingly rewritten. “Come, boy,” the shep-
herd tells his son; “I am past more children, but thy sons and daughters 
will be all gentlemen born” (5.2.113–14). Developing this point, his son 
accosts Autolycus with his failure to recognize his gentility. “You denied 
to fight with me this other day,” he complains, 
because I was no gentleman born. See you these clothes? Say you 
see them not, and think me still no gentleman born. You were best 
say these robes are not gentlemen born. Give me the lie, do, and try 
whether I am not now a gentleman born
(5.2.115–20)
Like the play, the shepherd’s son—along with his clothes—is born 
again, under newly gentle conditions. And under these conditions, he is 
newly recognized. “I know you are now, sir,” Autolycus acknowledges, 
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“a gentleman born” (5.2.121). “Ay,” the clown reiterates for emphasis, 
“and have been so any time these four hours.”
Through his belated new birth, the shepherd’s son’s also acquires a 
paradoxical new precedence over his father. When the shepherd echoes 
that he, too, has now been gentleman born—“And so have I, boy”—the son 
offers a correction of sorts, by way of clarification. “So you have,” he agrees,
but I was a gentleman born before my father, for the King’s son 
took me by the hand and called me brother; and then the two kings 
called my father brother; and then the Prince my brother and the 
Princess my sister called my father father; and so we wept; and there 
was the first gentleman-like tears that ever we shed
(5.2.123–29)
The new recognition of gentility not only rewrites birth but reverses its 
order, elevating first the adopted/illegitimate daughter, and then the legit-
imate son, before finally lifting the father. And, as the shepherd points out, 
their newborn gentle status has behavioral as well as social implications. 
When Autolycus asks to be forgiven for his previous failure to recognize 
their gentility, the shepherd seconds his urging. “Prithee, son, do,” he 
insists; “for we must be gentle now we are gentlemen” (5.2.136–37).
In keeping with his new gentility, the shepherd’s son accepts 
Autolycus’s apology and includes him in the Sicilian court’s expanded 
family outing to admire Hermione’s statue. “Hark,” he tells him; “the kings 
and the princes, our kindred, are going to see the Queen’s picture. Come, 
follow us” (5.2.156–57). This extended gentle family—“our kindred”—
will crucially form part of the larger audience to the play’s final revelations 
of kin and kind. As Perdita recognizes her mother, and Leontes recog-
nizes his wife, audiences can finally recognize the play’s evolving form as 
tragicomic, ending finally with the renewed fertility of comedy despite 
its seasons in the dark underworld of the tragic. Knowing kin proves 
prerequisite not only to continuing kingdoms, but to knowing—and 
acknowledging—the fertile, mongrel literary kind that the play embodies.
UNKNOWING KIND  133
Unknowing Kind: A Response to  
Tanya Pollard
Zachary Lesser
Tanya’s excellent essay on knowing, and not knowing, in The Winter’s 
Tale draws attention to the intertwined philological histories of words 
such as kin and kind, gens and gentle and genre, words that classify and 
create groupings based on family, race, class, and literary form. In the 
Renaissance, tragicomedy was the privileged dramatic form for thinking 
about such questions, and it insistently posed difficult questions about 
kinship. In his Compendio della poesia tragicomica (1601), the Ferrarese 
professor and poet Battista Guarini theorized this modern genre, sig-
nificantly unmentioned by Aristotle, through repeated comparisons to 
the kinds of mongrel or “bastard” mixture that Tanya traces through The 
Winter’s Tale. But he gives these mixed forms a positive valence: “Aren’t 
the horse and the donkey two distinct species? Of course. And yet from 
both springs a third species, the mule, which is neither one nor the other. 
The same can be said of the wolfdog [licisca] born of the wolf and the dog, 
which is neither wolf nor dog.”14
For Guarini, what is crucial about tragicomedy is that the two parts 
that make up the generic “third species,” comedy and tragedy, cannot be 
separated, just as the mule cannot be turned back into a horse and a don-
key. This is “the difference between a mixed being and a composite being. 
In the former, the parts lose their form, and form a third thing quite dif-
ferent,” whereas anything that is merely composed is simply a conjoining of 
the two in which each part can still be distinctly perceived. Again invoking 
the gendered and sexualized aspects of this mixing that Pollard highlights 
in The Winter’s Tale, Guarini writes: “The first can be compared to the 
fabled Hermaphrodite ... The second is like a man who hugs a woman, and 
thus after their embraces they each return to their own form.”15
Do Shakespeare’s late plays conform to Guarini’s fully theorized 
understanding of tragicomedy? To me, they seem closer to John Fletcher’s 
more humble remarks to the reader of The Faithful Shepherdess: “A tragie-
comedy is not so called in respect of mirth and killing but in respect it 
wants deaths, which is inough to make it no tragedie, yet brings some 
neere it, which is inough to make it no comedie: which must be a rep-
resentation of familiar people, with such kinde of trouble as no life be 
questiond, so that a God is as lawfull in this as in a tragedie, and meane 
people as in a comedie.” Fletcher knew Guarini’s treatise, and he likewise 
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stressed the mixed nature of tragicomedy against the merely composite 
nature of a play that simply alternates between scenes of “mirth and kill-
ing” or features characters “sometimes laughing together, and sometimes 
killing one another.”16 We do not know if Shakespeare read Guarini, but 
plays such as The Winter’s Tale, Pericles, and The Tempest—as well as The 
Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure earlier—are largely in accord 
with Fletcher’s simple definition of the genre, if not always with Guarini’s 
more classicized strictures. But Shakespeare does not quite conform even 
to Fletcher: poor Mamilius is brought near death, and then he actually 
dies.17 And to the extent that we can speak, as Pollard does, of the two 
“halves” of The Winter’s Tale—the tragic half in Sicilia and the comic half 
in Bohemia—then the play certainly fails Guarini’s test, looking more like 
the man and woman embracing than the fabled hermaphrodite.
We still have a blind spot for tragicomedy in Shakespeare’s work, I 
think. Since Edward Dowden popularized the term “romance” for these 
plays, we have, often grudgingly, used this categorization, which emerges 
out of a biographical framework that sees Shakespeare mellowing in old 
age after the harshness of his great tragic period. Dowden is an easy tar-
get for critique, although our own evaluations of Shakespeare’s plays often 
depend just as much, if in a more submerged way, on the chronology of 
their writing, with its inevitable link to biography.18 The “word which 
interprets Shakespeare’s latest plays,” for Dowden, is “reconciliation.”19 
Pollard’s essay draws our attention to the less resolved aspects of these 
plays—the failure to recognize kinship in gens and genre, the “mongrel 
literary kind that the play embodies.” What of our own mistaking of kind? 
What do we miss when we think of Shakespeare’s plays as somehow of a 
different kind than other Jacobean tragicomedies?
Part of what we miss, I think, is just the kind of promiscuous mix-
ture that, as Pollard shows, was at the heart of the genre of tragicomedy, 
and that (not coincidentally) provided Guarini with many of his key 
metaphors. The mixture here is of Shakespeare with his theatrical world, a 
world in which tragicomedy was the coming genre, in which playwrights 
such as George Wilkins and John Fletcher were establishing themselves on 
the scene (the latter with more success than the former), and in which col-
laborative playwriting was normal. Of the great collaborators Beaumont 
and Fletcher, Aubrey famously wrote that they “lived together ... lay 
together ... had one wench in the house between them, which they did so 
admire; the same cloathes and cloake, &c., between them.” Here too a gen-
dered and sexualized mixing stands in for the mixing of literary kind, the 
“wonderfull consimility of phansey” that Aubrey saw in the playwriting 
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couple.20 Rather than imagining a serene Shakespeare who, “whatever his 
trials and sorrows and errors might have been ... had come forth from them 
wise, large-hearted, calm-souled,” we might imagine him reenergized by 
new collaborations and new genres.21 Shakespeare the tragicomedian is a 
playwright who seeks out younger men to whom he can apprentice him-
self, seeing in Wilkins an up-and-comer with a good tale in Pericles, and 
learning from Fletcher, already emerging as the master of the genre, in The 
Two Noble Kinsmen. This is a Shakespeare who—at what would turn out 
to be the end of his career (whether or not he knew it at the time)—finds 
a rejuvenated creativity in mixed authorship, mixed forms, mixed genres.
The First Folio’s “Catalogue of the seuerall Comedies, Histories, 
and Tragedies contained in this Volume”—already an antiquated generic 
taxonomy—cannot (or refuses to) account for this creative mixing, dis-
persing The Winter’s Tale, The Tempest, Measure for Measure, and Merchant 
of Venice in the comedies and Cymbeline in the tragedies, and omitting 
entirely Pericles and Two Noble Kinsmen. The mixtures of genre and of col-
laborative authorship are a blind spot in Heminges and Condell’s vision 
of Shakespeare, a foundational unknowing of kin and kind that persists 
in often submerged ways in our own work. Did they simply not recognize 
these plays as tragicomedies, or Shakespeare as a tragicomedian, blinded as 
they may have been by the brilliant work in this genre of their current in-
house dramatist Fletcher? Did they already view Shakespeare as belonging 
to an earlier era of theater, one significantly different from the 1620s when 
tragicomedy as practiced by Fletcher and Massinger and others was well 
established on the English stage?22 Or did they instead think that the 
modern mixed genre was not sufficiently serious and elevated to justify 
inclusion in this monumental volume of their beloved (and best-selling) 
author? Whatever the reason for the exclusion of tragicomedy from the 
First Folio, it has helped to ensure that the recognition scene that Pollard 
sees at the end of The Winter’s Tale—not the recognition of kin that takes 
place onstage but the recognition by the audience of the play’s mixed 
genre—is one that we need to continually restage.
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Difficult Loves: A Response to  
Tanya Pollard
Aveek Sen
Tanya’s fine piece on “parental misrecognition” in The Winter’s Tale made 
me reread the play and its source text, Greene’s Pandosto, after a long time. 
But, more importantly, before going back to the books, I closed my eyes 
for a while and thought about my memory of the play across a “wide gap 
of time.” I remembered how moved I was every time I studied the play 
more than three decades ago, and what a high I got during my student 
years while watching it on stage, or even fragmentarily on television. In an 
obvious way, the statue scene—with its transcendent trickery—dominates 
those memories. But I also recalled another reaction—a very particular 
kind of disappointment—that I would feel, inevitably, at another much-
anticipated moment in the play. It was a romantic, almost Elian, sense of 
anticlimax when no theatrical realization quite matched up to the fleet-
ing yet bottomless complexity of what reading never failed to conjure up. 
This is when Florizel presents Leontes with Perdita in Act 5 as the girl 
Florizel loves but cannot marry, because she appears to be a shepherd’s 
daughter. Leontes, of course, does not yet know that Perdita is his daugh-
ter, although he knows, and recognizes, Florizel as Polixenes’s son because 
the young man so closely resembles his father. It is all happening in the 
presence of Paulina, in whose gaze the full range of the drama of this cog-
nitive error is being played out.
Even as Leontes finds Polixenes in Florizel’s every feature, thus 
legitimizing Florizel’s birth and rectifying his own earlier error of paren-
tal misrecognition, Shakespeare weaves into these moments a parallel 
story of potentially errant precognition in Leontes’s response to Perdita’s 
beauty. Paulina is quick to point out that the older man seems to be get-
ting improperly aroused by the sight of the girl. “Sir, my liege, / Your eye 
hath too much youth in’t,” Paulina tells Leontes, “Not a month / Fore your 
queen died, she was more worth such gazes / Than what you look on now” 
(5.1.224–27). Leontes is duly chastised by Paulina’s sharper-than-playful 
reprimand. “I thought of her / Even in these looks I made,” he admits to 
Paulina (5.1.227–28).
So many, too many, things are going on here, telescoped within a few 
seconds of playing—though not reading, remembering, and imagining— 
time. A kind of paternal blindness is getting unwittingly corrected into 
the fleeting risk of another, more terrible, filial mistaking. And for the 
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audience or reader who knows Greene’s Pandosto, the memory of how 
Greene’s narrative ends with incestuous lusting and suicide, “clos[ing] up 
the comedy with a tragical stratagem,” opens up a corridor of allusive time 
that is both literary-historical and psychosexually mischievous. Earlier, 
Leontes had described Paulina as the keeper of “the memory of Hermione” 
(5.1.59). So, even before bringing Hermione back for Leontes, Paulina 
skirts the edges of the perverse by presenting Perdita as a visual pre-echo 
of her mother, the effect of which on Leontes she firmly tries to, yet can-
not fully, regulate. Although Greene’s ending is invoked and averted, 
something unspeakable, but not entirely unspoken, has been planted in 
our imagination and in the play’s textual unconscious. So, later when we 
hear from the Third Gentleman about Leontes “worr[ying] his daughter 
with clipping her,” exclaiming “O thy mother, thy mother” in his unhinged 
joy-mixed-with-grief (5.2.57, 55), some primary innocence of feeling and 
action seems to have become irremediably complicated. Nothing can be 
quite as simple or “lawful as eating” any more (5.3.147).
This took me back to another strange, and easy to miss, father–
daughter moment in Othello—the tragedy that The Winter’s Tale revisits 
as tragicomedy. Desdemona’s father, Brabantio, has been roused from 
sleep and pulled out of bed by Iago to be told that “your daughter and 
the Moor are now making the beast with two backs” (1.1.114–15). And 
the outraged Brabantio declares, “This accident is not unlike my dream, / 
Belief of it oppresses me already / Light, I say, light!” (1.1.140–41).23 
What has Brabantio been dreaming of before he awakes to find it true? 
His language here takes me to Hermione’s words to Leontes during her 
trial: “You speak a language that I understand not. / My life stands in the 
level of your dreams, / Which I’ll lay down” (3.2.81–82) “Your actions 
are my dreams,” Leontes answers (3.2.82). A few lines later, Hermione 
puts herself again at the heart of a conjugal nightmare that plays itself out 
somewhere between sleep and waking: “if I shall be condemned, / Upon 
surmises, all proofs sleeping else / But what your jealousies awake, I tell 
you / ’Tis rigour and not law” (3.2.111–14).
At these moments, Shakespeare is opening up a space, at once ter-
rifyingly inward and helplessly public, that is, quite literally, dreamlike in 
its power to distort and determine forms of consciousness, expression, and 
action. It is a space of fantasy that is at once real in its oppressiveness, yet 
difficult to translate into the language of theatrical representation or neu-
tralize through the rational operations of justice. Hence, these moments 
happen more successfully in our imagination as we read the plays, but elude 
a satisfactory realization on stage, or feel overstated when described in 
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pieces of interpretive writing. We have to allow ourselves to be slightly sick 
in our heads and hearts to grasp what Shakespeare is saying, or not saying, 
about the murkiness of “natural” human relationships at such moments, 
making it impossible to keep ourselves apart, imaginatively and therefore 
morally, from the “sickness” of a Leontes, a Brabantio, or an Othello.
Shakespeare, like Leontes at the end of the play, was almost fifty 
when he wrote The Winter’s Tale. Thomas Mann—whose notebooks scru-
pulously record the amoral, desiring gaze he focused upon his own growing 
boys—gave himself a fiftieth-birthday present, in 1925, in the form of a 
story called “Disorder and Early Sorrow.” It is about the disconcertingly 
“conservative” and possessive tenderness that a forty-seven-year-old pro-
fessor of history finds himself feeling for his infant daughter, “his little 
Eve,” as she falls into a sort of infantile infatuation for her much older 
sibling’s male friend: “This [i.e., the professor’s love for his daughter] was 
love at first sight, love everlasting: a feeling unknown, unhoped for, unex-
pected—in so far as it could be a matter of conscious awareness.” “But he 
understood more,” Mann continues:
He knows ... that there is something not quite right about this 
feeling, so unaware, so undreamed of, so involuntary ... There is 
something ulterior about it, in the nature of it; that something is 
hostility, hostility against the history of today, which is still in the 
making and thus not history at all, on behalf of the genuine history 
that has already happened—that is to say, death. ... His devotion to 
this priceless little morsel of life and new growth has something to 
do with death, it clings to death as against life; and that is neither 
right nor beautiful—in a sense.24
Is not Shakespeare’s death-and-time-haunted family romance poised on 
the threshold of a similar consciousness? It is an emotion that Leontes 
could never articulate to himself in the way Mann’s professor of history 
would, and must therefore be left for us, today’s hapless historicists, to feel 
and try not to put in so many words in what we then go on to write about 
these beautiful plays, these difficult loves.
NOTES
1 The Winter’s Tale, 5.2.7. All references to Shakespeare’s plays, unless other-
wise stated, will be to the Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Evans.
2 See Kitch, “Bastards and Broadsides in The Winter’s Tale”; on this trope 
more broadly, see Brooks, Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England.
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3 On problems of knowledge in the play, see especially Cavell, Disowning 
Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare.
4 See the Oxford English Dictionary, online, “know,” viewed February 28, 
2017.
5 I base my word counts on MIT’s online Shakespeare.
6 Germanic cousins include Old Frisian kin, ken, kon, Old Saxon kunni, 
Middle Dutch kunne, konne, Dutch kunne, Old High German chunni, Middle 
High German künne, kunne, Old Norse kyn, Danish, Swedish kön, and Gothic 
kuni; see Oxford English Dictionary, online, “kin”.
7 The Oxford English Dictionary’s etymological entry for “kin” notes that, 
“In the Germanic word, as in Latin genus and Greek γένος, three main senses 
appear, (1) race or stock, (2) class or kind, (3) gender or sex; the last, found 
in Old English and early Middle English, but not later, is the only sense in 
modern Dutch, Danish, and Swedish.” English kin and kind, that is, have 
developed different aspects of this linguistic family than have some of their 
Germanic cousins.
8 This number includes references to gentlemen in speech prefixes and stage 
directions.
9 This is a Shakespearean record; runners-up include The Taming of the Shrew, 
with 55 instances of gentle, and Two Gentlemen of Verona, with 54.
10 See Findlay, Illegitimate Power, and Neill, “‘In Everything Illegitimate.’”
11 On the word’s development, see the Oxford English Dictionary, online, 
and McDougall, Royal Bastards, esp. 44–48. As McDougall discusses, the notion 
of bastards as base-born is complicated by the surprisingly extensive history of 
bastards who attained royalty, most notably William the Conqueror, regularly 
dubbed “bastardus.”
12 Later lexical developments have added to these meanings. Definitions in 
the Urban Dictionary include “child born out of wedlock” but focus primarily on 
the broader derogatory sense of “A person that is irritating or annoying” and heav-
ily feature “A person that has killed Kenny in South Park” (41; also see 2, 6, 20, 
25, 28, 37, and sample sentence: “You killed Kenny, You Bastard!!!,” 25).
13 See, for example, Wilson, “‘Nature and Art’ in Winter’s Tale.” On the play’s 
interweaving of botany, fertility, and female bodies, see Tigner, “The Winter’s 
Tale.”
14 I quote from the edition bound with (but bibliographically independent 
from) Guarini, Il Pastore Fido, sig. A4v: “non sono elleno due distinte spezie 
quella del Cauallo, & quella dell’animal indiscreto? Certo si: Et pure d’ambedue 
loro se ne fa la terza del Mulo, che non è ne l’uno, nè l’altro. Il medesimo si può 
dire della Licisca, di Lupo nata & di cane, che non è ne lupo, ne Cane.”
15 Guarini, Il Pastore Fido, sig. A3v: “la differenza dell’esser misto, all’esser 
composto. ... Il primo si può paragonare al fauoloso Ermafrodito. ... Il secondo 
è simile ad huomo, che s’abbracci con Donna, sì che dopò gli abbracciamenti, 
ciascuno torni nell’esser suo.”
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16 Fletcher, The Faithfull Shepheardesse, sig. ¶2v. Compare Guarini’s comment 
that tragicomedy takes from tragedy “il pericolo, non la morte” (Compendio, sig. 
A6v).
17 On Fletcher’s definition in relation to Shakespeare’s plays, see Zucker, “Late 
Shakespeare,” 352–70, 354–55.
18 See McMullan, Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing, esp. 54: “despite 
the various critiques that have been offered of it, Dowden’s basic understanding of 
the late plays has continued to underscore readings of those plays right up to the 
present”; on the importance of establishing the chronology of the works, see de 
Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim.
19 Dowden, Shakspere, 361.
20 Aubrey, Brief Lives, chiefly of Contemporaries, 1. 95–96; see Masten, Textual 
Intercourse.
21 Dowden, Shakspere, quoted in McMullan, Shakespeare and the Idea of Late 
Writing, 53.
22 For the idea of Shakespeare (and other turn-of-the-century dramatists) as 
embodying a “golden age” or earlier moment in theatrical history, see Farmer and 
Lesser, “Canons and Classics.”
23 Whereas all references to The Winter’s Tale, as in Tanya Pollard’s essay, are 
to the Riverside Shakespeare, all references to Othello are to the Arden edition, ed. 
Honigmann (2016), in line with other references to that play in this volume.
24 Mann, “Disorder and Early Sorrow,” 574–75.
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Chapter 6
The Epistemology of Violence in 
The Comedie of Errors
Stephen Spiess
E. Dro: Say what you wil sir, but I know what I know,
That you beat me at the Mart I haue your hand to show;
If ye skin were parchment, & ye blows you gaue were ink,
Your owne hand-writing would tell you what I thinke.1
LET US BEGIN IN language, bracketing, however momentarily, Shakespeare’s rich and allusive dialogue from its contexts in perfor-
mance. Indeed, when the Ephesian Dromio reunites with his master at the 
outset of Act III, he distinguishes the aural signifier from the imprinted 
sign, suggesting that this owner’s “hand-writing”—those incessant “blows” 
inked upon his “skin”—exceeds all speech, providing the truest register, 
the authentic record, of this slave’s reality at the “hand[s]” of a sadistic 
superior. It is not the first time that he construes their lingua franca in such 
terms: speaking with Adriana in an earlier exchange, Dromio cites violence 
as Antipholus’s preferred language, a mode of communication that both 
conveys and confuses “meaning”:
Adr: Say, is your tardie master now at hand?
E. Dro:  Nay, hee’s at too hands with mee, and that my two eares
can witnesse.
Adr: Say, didst thou speake with him? knowst thou his minde?
E. Dro:  I, I, he told his minde vpon mine eare,
Beshrew his hand, I scarce could vnderstand it.
Luc:  Spake hee so doubtfully, thou couldst not feele
his meaning.
E. Dro:  Nay, hee strooke so plainly, I could too well feele his
blowes; and withall so doubtfully, that I could scarce
vnderstand them. (TLN 319–30)
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As literal and metaphorical significations collide, this master’s “blowes” 
express/impress such potent meanings that his slave can barely “vnder-
stand them”: not only comprehend them, that is, but withstand or stand 
under their affective force. By the start of the third act, Ephesian Dromio 
apparently has given up trying to “know” his owner’s “minde,” and instead 
confirms his own reality, as felt and experienced, through a moving asser-
tion of what we might now call standpoint epistemology: “I know what I 
know ... the wrongs I suffer, and the blowes I beare” (TLN 629–35).2 How 
we interpret such knowledge claims—how we entertain, disown, and/or 
laugh at them—informs the play’s comedic and cultural work.3
Dromio of Ephesus’s dignified avowal, however subtle, proves 
especially poignant as a precursor to the scene’s famed lock-out exchange, 
arguably the play’s preeminent depiction of urban disorder.4 Here, elite 
masculine rage again emerges as a putatively humorous response to prob-
lems of signification. Barred entry to his house, Ephesian Antipholus 
first slanders and threatens his kitchen maid, then pledges to “break ope 
the gate” that impedes his progress (TLN 729).5 As scholars have long 
argued, this mise-en-scène conjoins spatial dynamics to sexual symbol-
ism: locked out of his house and his wife’s company, Antipholus fears 
that he has lost control of Adriana’s enclosed body.6 While Balthasar calls 
for “patience” and prudence (TLN 746–49), Antipholus immediately 
rejects such counsel, suggesting that his dwelling has become a brothel,7 
his wife a whore. He then threatens to destroy the former and, in a later 
scene, to disfigure the latter: “Dissembling harlot ... with these nailes, 
Ile plucke out these false eyes, / That would behold in me this shame-
ful sport” (TLN 1389–93). It is a visceral, horrifying charge, perhaps all 
the more unsettling to playgoers who know that the play’s manifold mis-
recognitions, doublings, substitutions, debts, and “blowes” are, of course, 
erroneous: not only mistaken, that is, but wandering—moving beyond the 
mark to encompass alternative bodies and unintended meanings.8 When 
Adriana adopts this hostile idiom moments later, castigating Dromio as a 
“prating pesant” and “slaue,” then pledging to “breake thy pate a-crosse” 
(TLN 354–57), audiences are reminded not only that the languages of 
Ephesian violence incorporate a range of speakers and addressees, but 
comprise a plethora of diverse marks, utterances, and actions including, 
but not limited to, the application of physical force.9 How such violence 
signifies, to whom, and in what contexts, is what interests me here. While 
scholars have long insisted that such aggressions not only are funny, but 
must be so, I adopt an alternative standpoint, one that reads the play’s 
aggressions not simply as a mark of dramatic farce, but also as a trace of, and 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF VIOLENCE  145
expected reply to, problems of signification and sexual knowing in the age 
of Shakespeare. Pursuing such an inquiry will take us from the houses of 
Ephesus and pages of scholarly criticism to the streets and brothels of early 
modern London and back again. What, I ask, are the relations of violence, 
signification, and (un)knowability in The Comedie of Errors? What is at 
stake in preserving or confronting the insignificance of the play’s manifold 
“blowes”? What does such violence render legible when allowed to signify 
as aggression or suffering? What might it suppress or conceal?
For some scholars, to begin in this manner signals my own erroneous 
misrecognitions, an absurd misreading of genre and performance history. 
The Comedie of Errors is, for Russ McDonald, “a superlative example of 
dramatic farce, a simple form of comedy designed chiefly to make an audi-
ence laugh.”10 Its “laughter,” Harold Bloom contends, “is always benign,”11 
and to “misread [the play’s] genre,” for John Creaser, “is to misread the 
work completely.”12 I thus risk appearing foolish—“analyz[ing ] delicate 
sentiments while the characters knock heads”13—or worse yet, puritanical, 
in pursuing this line of inquiry: “the principle vice” within a farcical uni-
verse, Creaser argues, “is to lack a robust sense of humor” and forget that 
these “simplified characters are scarcely touched by moral or even physical 
pain” (83, emphasis added). To know and understand this particular play, 
therefore, seems to require a willing suspension of horror, if not also an 
affective break between playgoers and players: one must not identify with 
the stricken Dromios, the threatened Adriana, or the beaten maids (TLN 
1643).14 One must look past the violence: see it as insignificant, meaning-
less, or, at best, as meaning something other than the type of felt, injurious 
“hand-writing” that Ephesian Dromio so vividly describes.
Such displacements extend to scholarly accounts that purport to 
take the play’s violence seriously. While Douglas Lanier reads The Comedie 
of Errors’s many “marks and rituals–faces, clothing, beatings, warts and 
moles, meals, rings and gold chains” as troubling contemporary ideolo-
gies of essentialist or authentic identity,15 his insights nevertheless conflate 
the material gift with the delivered blow, evacuating the corporeal conse-
quences of “breaking” into another’s body or domestic space (TLN 730)16: 
wounds or fractures emerge as simply one of many means through which 
various characters materialize their socioeconomic statuses and relations. 
Working in another hermeneutic tradition, Barbara Freedman insists that 
the play’s “aggressive impulses” are central to its “characteristic humor,” 
contending that “the key to farce ... is that we laugh at violence.”17 Yet 
Freedman’s psychoanalytic approach likewise displaces attention from the 
violence staged, locating its meanings in alternative bodies and identities. 
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The play’s manifold beatings, she argues, function as a type of screen fan-
tasy that cloaks the true object of aggression: Egeon, that wandering father 
whose primal transgression (failure to fulfill his marital debt) is denied in 
the drama’s manifest content and paid out in “random acts of punishment” 
bestowed upon other heads and bodies.18
This inexorable movement away from the play’s onstage aggressions 
permeates even performance studies, where scholars have long recognized, 
and productively troubled, the hostilities and coercions staged in other 
early modern comedies, most notably The Taming of the Shrew.19 But 
critics who foreground such “serious” concerns in The Comedie of Errors, 
according to Robert S. Miola, “ever run the risk of overreading and of wan-
dering far from the theatrical experience of this bright and lively play.”20 
Allowing certain meanings to signify in this play, we are told, not only 
threatens theatrical pleasure but incurs unnecessary interpretive labor: the 
over-reading scholar as comedic trope. At the same time, however, such 
prescriptions both assume a unified audience “experience” of, and response 
to, onstage confrontation,21 and elide the critical maneuvering necessary 
to bypass or explain away their unpredictable resonance(s). Thus, where 
McDonald insists that “meaning comes about in farce ... [through] what 
an audience sees and hears in the main action,”22 his farcical reading of 
the lock-out episode circumvents bodies and actions staged to secure 
meaning by way of the scene’s rhetorical structure: the episode “depends 
for its hilarity on the stichomythic exchanges between those outside ... 
and those inside” the enclosed house (86). Along with an antanaclasic 
exchange between Adriana and the Syracusan Dromio, such linguistic 
play, McDonald argues, supersedes embodied action as guarantor of its 
farcical tone. Why does language supplant the signifying body here? And 
in what ways? While privileging the dialogue’s formal structure, that is, 
McDonald concomitantly overlooks its content, including dialogue that, 
we shall see later in this essay, discloses alternative understandings of what 
such confrontations might signify or render visible.
My purpose here is not to dismiss some of the play’s most influential 
studies, but rather to consider how an epistemology of violence under-
stands The Comedie of Errors, including its significance within the scholarly 
tradition. As I have begun to suggest, such an epistemology (what is known 
or knowable about its violence, how this knowledge is produced, through 
what categories, and by whom it is accepted) is ineluctably linked to those 
material processes through which early modern meanings are made to sig-
nify (and not signify) in particular discursive contexts. Such processes, 
Valerie Traub reminds us, encompass our own hermeneutic practices and 
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decisions, as do assumptions regarding what can be known or discerned 
through that which appears insignificant, absent, or unknowable in early 
modern England.23 Farce and psychoanalysis, for example, offer particular-
ized signifying frameworks that structure what can or cannot be detected 
within, and known through, the mistaken blows of The Comedie of Errors. 
But violence, as Dromio of Ephesus reminds us, possesses many marks 
and connotations, dependent in part upon one’s own situated experiences 
and subjectivities. With what remains, therefore, I trace out one such 
experience, encoded within the lock-out exchange, that encourages con-
sideration of how violence connects to problems of sexual knowing on the 
streets and stages of early modern London. My intention here is neither to 
privilege the contextual above the theatrical, nor to elevate a materialist 
approach over other methodological investments; rather, I hope to suggest 
how thinking of humorous violence as a problem of, and as a response to 
problems of, signification and knowability might reframe what can be seen, 
heard, known about, and known through this early modern play. I thus ask 
not whether the play is funny, but what kind of cultural and epistemologi-
cal work is performed by violence that audiences are encouraged to see as 
ordinary, insignificant, and indeed laughable.
***
For all its apparent excesses, farce has long been associated with those most 
basic, recognizable, and even banal aspects of everyday life. Far from the 
exceptional or extraordinary worlds of Shakespearean tragedy, for exam-
ple, comedies such as Errors, according to Harry Levin, derive much of 
their energy from the productive proximity of the ordinary to the absurd. 
Revisiting Philip Sidney’s famous contention that comedy provides “an 
imitation of the common errors of our life,” Levin suggests that hilarity 
originates in our partial recognition of onstage error: our sense that “all this 
has happened before, and may happen again ... [for] patterns of behaviour 
are predictable.”24 We laugh, he intimates, because staged mishaps so closely 
parallel those confusions common to everyday life. If farce amplifies such 
uncanny play,25 its meanings nonetheless depend, potentially all the more 
so, on the representation of familiar routines and rituals: dining with one’s 
spouse, purchasing gifts, paying debts, fretting over misplaced affections 
or infidelities, speaking with family members, dealing with jealousies both 
petty and profound, serving one’s social superiors, and beating one’s subor-
dinates.26 Roman New Comedy, moreover, provided a basic urban and spa-
tial template for these anamorphic renderings of daily life, situating a range 
of familiar social types (senex amans, adulescens, virgo, matrona, meretrix) 
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within a typical municipal setting.27 Framed by an often rudimentary 
scaena (two or three doorways associated with purportedly distinct social 
spaces, such as a citizen’s house, priory, and brothel), city figures would 
navigate their identities and relations partly by way of their spatial practices 
or transgressions.28 Whether in Plautine Rome or on the Elizabethan stage, 
theatrical meanings thus depended partly on playgoers’ ability to recognize 
the presumed social and symbolic import—the “proper” significations—of 
such stock components, so as to fully appreciate their subsequent distor-
tions, misrecognitions, or resignifications. What might early moderns have 
seen or heard in the spaces, rituals, and misunderstandings of Shakespeare’s 
Ephesus? How did these scenes signify, to whom, and in relation to what 
problems of knowledge or knowability?
If we cannot account for all playgoing perspectives, we do know, at 
very least, how Dromio of Syracuse recognizes disorder at the gate. When 
his Ephesian counterparts, twin and master alike, threaten to “beat the 
doore down” of their newly inaccessible domicile,29 this substitute serv-
ant is charged by Adriana to identify “who ... keeps all this noise?” By way 
of response, he declares her “towne is troubled with vnruly boies” (TLN 
703–9). Misreading Ephesian Antipholus, that citizen, husband, and 
master of the house, as an “vnruly” adolescent, Syracusan Dromio’s short 
rejoinder provides a comedic frame for the confrontation in progress. But 
this response likewise encodes more troubling connotations, accessing a 
long-standing cultural practice fueled by precisely the spatial, sexual, and 
gendered anxieties on display in Antipholus’s confused fury.
Among the many ritual disorders of England’s festive calendar, per-
haps none proved as dangerous and potentially destructive as London’s 
so-called “apprentice misrule”: urban disturbances that “occurred,” 
according to Paul S. Seaver, “almost as regularly as the seasons.”30 Roger 
Manning, for example, posits “at least 96 insurrections, riots, and unlaw-
ful assemblies [occurring ] in London between 1517 and 1640,” with 
35 such “outbreaks of disorder” taking place in the final two decades of 
Elizabeth’s reign.31 Although the most notorious of these revolts took 
place in 1517 and 1617, such uprisings were especially prevalent in the 
early 1590s, including skirmishes significant enough to draw the Lord 
Mayor’s attention in 1590, 1592, 1593, and 1595.32 Social and gender 
historians have long debated the causes, aims, and demographics of these 
insurrections, but it is clear that such rioters, overwhelmingly male, pre-
dominantly vented their ire upon persons (aliens, foreigners, servingmen, 
pages, women, prostitutes, and actors) and spaces (brothels and theaters) 
that threatened social distinction.33
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These practices extended to university and college towns, includ-
ing Cambridge, where a small but, for our purposes, salient confrontation 
took place in 1594, sometime before the first known performance of The 
Comedie of Errors at Gray’s Inn, London, on December 28 of that year.34 
In that case, a group of young gentlemen—“a motley crew of students 
and marginal inhabitants of the town”—were accused of despoiling and 
flogging an unnamed woman, whom they had encountered at night, 
alone, and “hiding under a hedge.”35 Suspecting the woman was a pros-
titute, the men escorted her to Smoke Alley, a disreputable part of town, 
in an apparent effort to verify her illicit sexual status. Failing to secure 
any such confirmation, they then dragged her into a nearby field, debated 
her punishment, concluded that “shee should be whipt,” tore her clothes, 
flogged her with a belt, and besmirched her with dirt—perhaps even 
feces. Recounting this episode in her study of early modern masculin-
ity, Alexandra Shepard focuses on the men’s assumption of extra-juridical 
power: the manner in which they appropriated “the regulative stance of 
those in authority” and “mimicked [authorized] forms of judicial pun-
ishment designed to shame and humiliate disreputable women” (98). 
Although I concur with this reading, I am more interested here in the 
episode’s epistemological, rather than socio-symbolic, inflections: in the 
men’s (failed) attempt to ratify their counterpart’s sexual status prior to 
exacting “popular justice.” Why the detour to Smoke Alley? What, pre-
cisely, did the men hope to secure there? Would the episode have turned 
out differently, had they elicited that desired speech act—that evasive 
locution, which haunts the court record as an (absent) guarantor of 
the woman’s socio-sexual identity? Perhaps not, but in this remarkable 
account, one point appears indisputable: the men’s violent attack upon, 
and degradation of, this unknown woman is inextricably linked to their 
desire—and failure—to resolve her sexual status.
Such links between masculine violence and sexual unknowing 
proved all the more conspicuous by the turn of the seventeenth century, 
when London apprentices began ritualistically attacking the (supposedly 
unmarked) houses of prostitution they patronized.36 Traditionally occur-
ring on Shrove Tuesday, and thus directly preceding the onset of Lenten 
temperance, these “brothel house riots” often mixed symbolic renuncia-
tion with “ritualized yet very real violence,” as “windows were smashed, 
houses were invaded, and their occupants assaulted.”37 Civil authorities, 
who had long overlooked this “ancient administration of [popular] justice 
on Shrove Tuesday,” were thus forced to prosecute what traditionally had 
been accepted as licensed expressions of festive abuse.38
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Given their powerful spatial, gendered, sexual, and moral connota-
tions, these practices captured the imagination of a range of early modern 
writers, including Thomas Dekker,39 John Webster (with Dekker),40 Sir 
Thomas Overbury,41 Thomas Middleton,42 Ben Jonson,43 Shackerly 
Marmion,44 and Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher, who explicitly 
linked the destruction of “houses of iniquitie” to the “boies [of ] merry 
London.”45 John Taylor, for example, paints a frightening panorama of 
unruly violence in Iack-a-Lent, an early seventeenth-century pamphlet 
that describes “youths arm’d with cudgels, stones, hammers, rules, trowels, 
and hand-sawes,” who “put Play-houses to the sacke, and Bawdy-houses to 
the spoyle, in the quarrell breaking a thousand quarrels (of glasse I meane) 
making ambitious brickbats breake their neckes, tumbling from the tops 
of lofty chimnies, terribly vntyling houses, [and] ripping vp the bowels 
of feather-beds.”46 Although Taylor is perhaps best known as a satirist, 
his description largely parallels that offered by Edward Sherburne, who, 
in recounting the infamous 1617 riot—which included an attack on the 
newly assembled Cockpit playhouse (theaters were another favored target 
of the rioters)—noted:
The Prentizes on Shrove Tewsday last, to the number of 3. or 
4000 committed extreame insolencies; part of this number, taking 
their course for Wapping, did there pull downe to the grownd 4 
houses, spoiled all the good therein, defaced many others, & a 
Justice of the Peace coming to appease them, while he was reading 
a Proclamacion, had his head broken with a brick batt. Th’ other 
part, making for Drury Lane, where lately a newe playhouse is 
erected, they beset the house round, broke in, wounded divers of 
the players, brokes open their trunckes, & whatt apparell, bookes, 
or other things they found, they burnt & cut in peeces; & not 
content herewith, got on top of the house, & untiled it, & had not 
the Justices of the Peace & Sherife levied an aide, & hindred their 
purpose, they would have laid that house likewise weven with the 
grownd. In this skyrmishe one prentise was slaine, being shott 
through the head with a pistoll, & many other of their fellowes 
were sore hurt, & such of them as are taken his Majestie hath com-
maunded shal be executed for example sake.47
Whether instances of festive abuse, subcultural rites of passage, or, later in 
the century, concentrated expressions of political discontent,48 such riots 
were undeniably hazardous; as social historians have long acknowledged, 
the symbolic dimensions of any such ritual, even when framed within 
the temporal bounds of festivity, did not preclude “real and sometimes 
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irreparable damage.”49 Symbolic violence, furthermore, enacts a form of 
social discipline, even and perhaps especially when construed as frivolous 
or insignificant. As Keith Thomas notes, although licensed misrule offered 
“a safety-valve for the release of accumulated tensions,” it also operated as a 
mechanism for reasserting traditional hierarchies through focused expres-
sions of violence against particular subjects.50
Did such violence also serve to navigate, if not resolve, unset-
tling knowledge relations in the era? Following the suppression of legal 
prostitution in London by royal proclamation in 1546, such a ritual 
demarcation of illicit sexual identities and spaces encourages considera-
tion of how acts of physical, emotional, and symbolic violence emerge 
to mediate problems of sexual knowing.51 Whereas the conspicuous vis-
ibility of the Bankside brothels enabled a sense of social and geographic 
containment, however illusory, prior to suppression, the Henrician 
proclamation altered the material and linguistic signs by which London 
prostitution had been and could be known. Beforehand, “allowed stew-
houses had signs on their fronts, towards the Thames, not hanged out, 
but painted on the walls.” What happened when these signs were painted 
over and “this row of stews in Southwark was put down by the king’s com-
mandment”?52 As I argue elsewhere, without the clear signs and white 
walls of Southwark, all London buildings became potential sites of sexual 
commerce, including the Royal Exchange, Westminster, and St. Paul’s 
Cathedral.53 The violent marking of illicit spaces and personae, therefore, 
may have emerged as a mechanism for addressing, if not resolving, the 
epistemological quandaries of early modern whoredom: how does one 
know a whore is a whore? That one’s wife is not whore, nor their house 
a brothel? Thus, while London’s brothel house riots arguably post-date 
The Comedie of Errors,54 the play can be seen as participating in a larger 
history of (in)significant English violence, even anticipating how such 
riotous discontent would morph and evolve into the type of focused, 
domestic assaults that would come to characterize seventeenth-century 
apprentice misrule. As historical analogues, furthermore, the anxieties 
and practices mapped above assume heightened significance in the con-
texts of a Shakespearean play permeated by the languages of “harlotry,”55 
and one that derives much of its dramatic energ y from the incessant 
unsettling of conventional identities, boundaries, and spaces.
Ephesian Antipholus encounters precisely such a crisis of significa-
tion when he returns home to find another man in his stead. Calling for 
“an iron Crow” at the frenetic apex of the lock-out exchange (TLN 745), 
he presumably intends to use this crowbar to “break ope” his door, not 
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his wife—but the object of this warring blow remains unstated in the dia-
logue. Although the dynamics of the scene urge us to move on, to look 
past the unsettling possibilities at play here, we might benefit precisely 
by resisting that call. What kinds of knowing and unknowing, we must 
ask, are necessary for this scene to work? What kinds of knowledge did 
the various wives, servants, husbands, apprentices, and harlots in attend-
ance bring to such an exchange? What did they know about insignificant 
violence—domestic and theatrical, sexual and spatial—and how did the 
relations between such knowledges inform their affective responses to 
these staged confrontations? Playgoers have already heard Adriana declare 
that, should her husband “but heare I were licencious,” he would “spit at 
me, and spurne at me, / And hurle the name of husband in my face, / And 
teare the stain’d skin of my Harlot brow” (TLN 526–31, emphasis added). 
When he threatens to blind his wife, moreover, audiences are reminded 
that Antipholus of Ephesus certainly is capable of such brutality, however 
displaced onto other bodies or objects: revisiting their earlier lock-out, 
Ephesian Dromio recalls that his “bones” bore “witnesse” to, and “felt the 
vigor of,” his master’s subsequent “rage” (TLN 1364–65). If early moderns 
laughed here, what might such affective responses signify?56 What would 
they render knowable or unknowable? What kind of cultural work would 
they perform?
My intention here is not to resolve the epistemology of violence 
in The Comedie of Errors, but rather to offer a preliminary sketch that 
might prompt discussion of how such an epistemology operates within 
and beyond this particular early modern play. What, the play urges us to 
ask, are the relations of unknowing and humorous violence? What is our 
role, as present-day critics, in accounting for the cultural work of these 
(im)material blows? What might we learn by (mis)recognizing their the-
atrical significance? That audiences are encouraged to laugh at violence 
in The Comedie of Errors, indeed that we likely to do so, I want to suggest, 
is neither erroneous nor insignificant; rather, the sights and sounds and 
furies of humorous violence may prove all the more meaningful because 
they seem to insist, indeed to depend, upon their own meaninglessness.
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What Does the Slave Know? A Response to  
Stephen Spiess
Supriya Chaudhuri
At virtually any time in The Comedy of Errors, a slave is being beaten. 
Violence is a language, written on the victim’s body, and, through this 
urgent and moving set of reflections, Stephen prompts us to think again, 
and differently, about the play. “I know what I know,” says Ephesian 
Dromio: “That you beat me at the Mart I haue your hand to show; / If ye 
skin were parchment, & ye blows you gaue were ink, / Your owne hand-
writing would tell you what I thinke” (TLN 629–32).57 Despite Dromio’s 
“spelling out” of the metaphor of beating as writing, the assertion is full 
of difficulties, and I take my cue from Stephen in pausing for a moment 
to consider them. The slave’s knowledge of his master’s abusive violence is 
absolute, and implicitly subjective and inalienable: “I know what I know.” 
Philosophically, we might describe such knowledge as rooted in qualia, 
the phenomenal properties of pain. But Dromio is not willing to hold 
this knowledge as private and nonrepresentational. Rather, he sees it as 
expressed in visible inscriptions, readable by others. If the marks left on 
his body by Antipholus’s beatings had been a text bearing a distinctive 
signature, his master would have recognized his own hand, and—by an 
epistemological leap—learned what is in the slave’s mind, what he thinks. 
How could the master’s handwriting “tell” him this? Dromio stops short 
of saying that Antipholus would have shared the knowledge he claims for 
himself as the prerogative of the beaten slave, but he does assert that the 
author of the text grasps its meaning for the recipient. Does this follow? 
Only if—and this would be an argument rooted in the epistemology of 
violence—we claimed that to know what the slave thinks is no more than 
to know that he suffers. The abuser recognizes his hand by its inscription 
but also by its effect: what the abused body thinks is the pain it feels.
But, in another sense, Dromio knows “wrongly,” as the handwrit-
ing on his body is not that of his master Antipholus of Ephesus, but that 
of Antipholus of Syracuse. Does violence have a signature? Although 
Ephesian Dromio is regularly beaten (“I haue serued him from the houre 
of my Natiuitie to this instant, and haue nothing at his hands for my 
seruice but blowes”; 1311–13), he is hard put to understand the blows 
he has just received. For his master “strooke so plainly, I could too well 
feele his blowes; and withall so doubtfully, that I could scarce vnder-
stand them” (328–30; also meaning that he was nearly knocked over). 
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This failure of understanding afflicts Syracusan Dromio as well. When 
asked whether he knows why he is beaten, he responds “Nothing sir, but 
that I am beaten” (436). As Elaine Scarry argues, intense bodily pain has 
the power to obliterate all other feelings and sensations: it presents the 
here-and-now of existence in the body, requiring the minute-by-minute 
acknowledgment that “I am in pain now.” But this acknowledgment 
is not a statement or representation, as such pain involves, so Scarry 
argues, a “shattering” of language: it cannot be expressed except in inar-
ticulate cries.58 Even Wittgenstein, who is the author of a considerable 
excursus on pain, and whether we can experience the pain of others, says 
in the Blue Book: “The difference between the propositions ‘I have pain’ 
and ‘he has pain’ is not that of ‘L. W. has pain’ and ‘Smith has pain.’ 
Rather, it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying 
that someone moans.”59 What then do the Dromios know ? What kind 
of knowledge is proposed through the use of that subjunctive construc-
tion (“if/then”), with its jumps and elisions? If violence were writing, the 
author would be a reader: does it follow, then, that he could read not just 
the body but the mind of the slave? For the writing is his, not the slave’s: 
what does it tell him?
I found this problem so compelling that I could scarcely tear myself 
away from it. I recalled, too, that in “A Writing Lesson,” Lévi-Strauss had 
read writing as a form of violence, a tool of forced enslavement—an argu-
ment elegantly countered by Jacques Derrida, more or less to the effect that 
violence was already a kind of writing.60 But the point at issue here is surely 
not this metaphysical coincidence. Rather, as Stephen brilliantly urges, the 
point is an epistemological one. The question of what the slave knows is 
necessarily succeeded by: what do we know? In a play about error, we con-
stantly run the risk of knowing wrongly: specifically, of reading violence 
wrongly. The standard interpretation reads it as laughable, comic violence, 
its excess and unreason generically linked to farce, and specifically to the 
Plautine source. In fact the beaten slave is more a feature of the Amphitruo 
than of the Menaechmi: we might recall the wordplay on “verbero” (I 
beat) when Mercury threatens to beat Sosia, and Sosia takes the word as 
a substantive meaning “a whipped slave, a scoundrel.”61 If Mercury’s vio-
lence is commonly read as an instance of robust Plautine humor, so too, as 
Stephen documents, we are repeatedly told by editors and commentators 
that to identify with “the stricken Dromios, the threatened Adriana, or 
the beaten maids” would be to misread Errors completely, by missing its 
humor and “wandering far from the theatrical experience of this bright 
and lively play.”62
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Is the play’s violence then only a violence of the letter? Displaced 
onto language, violence becomes no more than a rhetorical effect, a gesture 
towards genre. Both Dromios, skilled punsters and quibblers, appear to be 
fully conscious of the extent to which language can absorb the physical 
energies of an exchange, often deflecting their masters from the physical 
realm to the verbal, from the application of the hand to the use of the 
tongue. Unfortunately, the reverse holds true as well, especially in a play 
where the main characters are prone to using their hands before they use 
their heads. There is desperation in Dromio of Syracuse’s efforts to jest his 
way out of trouble after having been beaten by his master for jesting out 
of turn: “Thinkst yu I iest? hold, take thou that, & that” (418). Dromio of 
Ephesus, beaten by the wrong Antipholus and threatened by his mistress 
at home, also bears witness to this usurpation of the tongue’s function by 
the hand: “so that my arrant due vnto my tongue, I thank him, I bare home 
vpon my shoulders” (348–50).
Stephen suggests that we are encouraged to laugh at these critical 
moments of miscommunication by the play’s own investment in the epis-
temic work done by violence in early modern England, from brothel house 
riots to everyday domestic abuse. Violence signifies by forcibly putting its 
signature on what cannot be known, but is simultaneously unauthorized 
and disowned. Still, it leaves its marks behind, as, however much we might 
try to dematerialize it, to convert it into language, it remains stubbornly 
material. This led me back to that initial problem of knowledge: who 
knows what the slave knows? The “readability” of texts turns out to be 
betrayed, not just by the prevalence of error, but by the fact that language 
does not do the work it promises. At the heart of The Comedy of Errors is a 
dense unknowability: violence inscribes its marks everywhere, but leads us 
astray, or misses its object. Laughter is an uncertain, “unsettling” reaction 
to the fact that the other cannot be understood.
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Narrating Violence: A Response to Stephen Spiess
Adam Zucker
It might be useful to see violence as an epistemological black hole: a pow-
erful point in space and time that organizes vast clouds of matter and 
energy around it. The closer you get to the black hole of violence, the more 
the fabric of your own experience shifts or is warped by it. Touching it 
might destroy you entirely. But, like the swirling arms of a galaxy, produc-
tive and sometimes beautiful reaches of time and space extend outward 
from a violent act. We do our best to ignore that distant, dark singular-
ity at the center of the Milky Way, and we can easily believe ourselves to 
be untouched or unaffected it. But rest assured: everything we currently 
know will vanish into a black hole, eventually. The beatings doled out in 
farce and life will capture us all. A great deal of believable comedy rests in 
the error of imagining otherwise.
The older critics Stephen (gently) takes to task in his essay for 
ignoring the darker ramifications of the beatings in The Comedy of 
Errors would disagree with me. Farce, they would claim (begging the 
question of the play’s genre), demands a kind of lighthearted accept-
ance of abusive acts. And, I confess, there are times that I see things 
their way, especially when it comes to the comedy of my contempo-
raries. I have laughed at South Park, Archer, and many, many other 
comic depictions of things that, if they were really happening , would 
be appalling. But I think Stephen is absolutely right in this case to draw 
our attention to the empty places of meaning that violence fills up, but 
never explains, in Shakespeare’s play. The beatings in The Comedy of 
Errors (both threatened and delivered) have always horrified me. They 
carry a pathetic excess or difficulty of signification along with them 
that can be hard to sort through, especially at our historical remove. As 
Stephen’s work on the resonance of apprentice attacks on brothels in 
Tudor and Stuart London demonstrates, one way to solve this problem 
is to tell our own stories about the kinds of violence we know occurred 
in Shakespeare’s home. Narrative—on stage, in criticism, in the class-
room—might help us decide how we ourselves want to make meaning 
out of an unknowable force.
With that in mind, I want to turn briefly to an easily accessible 
archive of violent narratives from Shakespeare’s London, the Middlesex 
Sessions records, which can be found either in print or online, where 
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they are keyword searchable.63 A cursory, fairly haphazard glance at one 
sliver of them reveals the ubiquity of criminalized and juridical violence: 
in a fortnight, between April 19 and May 3, 1613, the court handled 
actions pertaining to three stabbings, a shooting, two physical assaults 
upon constables, and, perhaps most pertinently for Stephen’s work (to 
say nothing of the Allwits in A Chaste Maid in Cheapside), the carting 
and whipping of William and Thomasine Barnewell, a husband and wife 
team accused of running a clandestine brothel out of their own home in 
the parish of St.-Giles-in-the-Fields.64
Fair enough. But, if beatings (major and minor), riots (small and 
large), and corporal punishments (fatal and non-) were clearly a part 
of ordinary life in the London of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, 
their emplacement in entertainment, that is, in ostensibly pleasurable 
texts and performances, shades into the difficult workings of ideology 
and human sociability. Telling stories, even funny stories, to one another 
about violent acts creates the cosmic lightshow around the hurt and 
anger of a lashing or a stabbing. Levin, McDonald, and others who rely 
on the genre of The Comedy of Errors as they make sense of its rough play 
do not want to peer past the glowing plasma, as, they believe, it is the 
entire point of the thing. But, to understand how violence works at the 
center of drama and history, we should, I think, ask ourselves questions 
about the interplay between its performance and its surrounding, defin-
ing narratives. What is the process through which fights or whippings 
turn into and color entertainment?
One way to work through this problem is to be as explicit as pos-
sible about what we are doing when we transform the bare-bones facts 
of historical violence into our own critical narratives. Stephen’s essay, 
for example, made me want to know more about the intimacies shaped 
by early modern sexual commerce and community policing, especially 
in the context of a play that works so hard to disrupt and recompose 
fraught familial bonds. The Comedy of Errors is a play about brothers 
who are not quite brothers beating each other up in ways that are not 
quite fraternal. Antipholus and Dromio (both the Ephesian and the 
Syracusan pairs) grew up together from infancy. Lacking their twins, 
they had each other. Their simmering frustrations and sudden outbursts 
will be familiar to anyone who grew up with a sibling close in age, though 
the distributions of power often shaped by birth order are transformed 
(both by Plautus and by Shakespeare) into the master–servant pairings 
of New Comic slavery.
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What does all this have to do with the whipping of bawds and 
whores and the destruction of whorehouses? Inspired by Stephen, I 
have used the term “intimacy,” above, to help clarify my own sense of the 
epistemological difficulties. It could serve as a keyword in a discussion 
of the propensity for violence to cause instructive problems of meaning 
for those who experience it. What, for example, would it feel like to be 
William and Thomasine Barnewell, who, the Sessions Records Calendar 
reports, were “to be openly whipped at a cart’s tail from the prison to 
their own house in the parish of St. Giles’ aforesaid, and there remain 
for some space to the end the inhabitants may take notice of them, and 
from thence to the prison again”?65 What would it feel like to be their 
neighbors, taking notice of the couple being whipped together in front 
of their house?
I have neither the space nor the imaginative capacity to answer 
those questions in useful ways, but I would love to read the work 
of someone who does. Critics of sloppy historicism have, for years 
now, complained about its tendency to move too quickly in an argu-
ment from the details of a local experience to the broadest conclusions 
about historical process. But the anecdotal narrative of the classic New 
Historicist might usefully be understood as formally analogous to the 
comic or farcical dramatic script. It works on us for a reason. What if 
we see the archive, as Ellen MacKay has recently suggested, as a perfor-
mance enacted by our encounter with it?66 Instead of asking whether or 
not the violence in The Comedy of Errors is meaningful in a serious way 
(it is!), what if we brought the fact of its creation to bear on the stories 
we still tell about violence?
NOTES
1 The Comedie of Errors, TLN 629–32. All citations drawn from Shakespeare, 
Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies, and refer to that 
edition’s through-line numbering (e.g., TLN 222). In using the Folio, I aim to 
supplement and, to a limited degree, illustrate and perform this essay’s governing 
argument regarding the epistemological and affective dimensions of early modern 
signification, both in that era and our own. Put differently, I hope that readers 
will consider their own affective responses to these potentially confusing, alienat-
ing, and/or estranging formulations, as well as to the desires—for stability, clarity, 
legibility, and “correction”—that such affects may foster. An exception has been 
made for the long and short “s,” which are translated in modern type. My thinking 
in this regard is especially indebted to Masten, Queer Philologies.
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point epistemology examines how one’s epistemic perspective (what one knows, 
how one knows it, what one accepts as knowledge, one’s access to knowledge, 
one’s ability to advance truth claims, etc.) relates to, and is informed by, one’s par-
ticular experience as a sexed, gendered, classed, and racialized subject. For a useful 
overview, see Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology.” See also Collins, 
Black Feminist Thought, 201–38.
3 On the interrelations of violence, epistemology, signification, and embodi-
ment in The Comedie of Errors, see also Akhimie, “Bruised with Adversity.” While 
our anaylses share much in common, Akhimie demonstrates how the play’s vari-
ous somatic “marks” can be read to illuminate the “physical and epistemological 
violence that racial ideology effects” (187), while I connect them to problems 
of sexual knowing and unknowing. These perpsectives, I submit, are not incom-
mensurate; rather, and in conjunction, they urge attention to the complex cul-
tural work performed by comedic violence, both in this particular play and early 
modern England more generally. Furthermore, both essays suggest that the expe-
riences, meanings, and (in)significances of early modern violence were informed 
by multiple axes of identity, including but not limited to those of race, class, age, 
gender, and sexual practice.
4 On the lock-out scene as apogee of the play’s subversive energies, see Levin, 
“Two Comedies of Errors,” 128–29; Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy, 
19–38.
5 Citing Nell/Luce as a “minion” and “baggage,” terms that suggest her subor-
dinate and potentially illicit sexual status, Ephesian Antipholus promises “You’ll 
crie for this,” e.g., for failing to let him inside (TLN 691–702).
6 Candido, “Dining Out in Ephesus”; Miola, Shakespeare and Classical 
Comedy, 29–30. On conceptual homologies between women’s chastity and 
domestic enclosure in early modern England, see Stallybrass, “Patriarchal 
Territories”; Parker, Literary Fat Ladies; Boose, “The Taming of the Shrew.” As 
Traub notes, although the “body enclosed” aptly “encapsulates the prescrip-
tive power of patriarchal doctrine” in early modern England, it nonetheless 
“fails to capture the ways that women asserted their desires and will—their 
agency—within such ideological constraints” (“Gender and Sexuality in 
Shakespeare,” 131).
7 Speaking with the Duke in the denouement, Ephesian Antipholus laments 
“This day (great Duke) she shut the doores vpon me, / While she with Harlots 
feasted in my house” (TLN 1680–83).
8 On error and errare in the play, see Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy, 
19–35.
9 On violence as a “pervasive means of wielding power, preserving order, 
controlling behavior, and resolving conflicts” that included, but was not 
restricted to, acts of physical aggression in the period, see especially Dolan, 
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and Bridling Scolds” and “The Taming of the Shrew”; and Detmer, “Civilizing 
Subordination.”
10 McDonald, “Fear of Farce,” 80.
11 Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 26. 
12 Creaser, “Forms of Confusion,” 93. See also Coleridge’s famous conten-
tion that “farces commence in a postulate, which must be granted” (Coleridge’s 
Shakespearean Criticism, 99). On The Comedie of Errors as a merger of the “seem-
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13 McDonald, “Fear of Farce,” 80.
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15 Lanier, “‘Stigmatical in Making,’” 306.
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17 Freedman, “Errors in Comedy,” 238, 236. See also Freedman, “Egeon’s 
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like Freedman’s, emphasize fragmentation and multiplicity rather than wholeness 
or mastery,” yet “contend[s] that we need to read this fragmentation and disjunc-
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rather than as a transhistorical lesson in the pitfalls of reading for mastery or a 
panhistorical experience of Lacanaian méconnaissance.”
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Streets,” 137; Walker, “Rereading Rape”; Orlin, “Women on the Threshold.”
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31 Manning, Village Revolts, 187.
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dents in this encounter reflects not only the capacious parameters of early modern 
“apprentice misrule,” but also, and following Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 
encourages further consideration of how lived experiences of (in)significant vio-
lence in one institutional and discursive context—the English grammar school—
may beget and inform related practices in other spatial, temporal, gendered, and 
epistemological contexts.
36 Although early modern writers incessantly link such disturbances to 
apprentice misrule, Griffiths (Youth and Authority) argues that such evidence may 
reflect an ideological consensus, rather than an established truth, that masks a far 
more diverse field of participants.
37 Lindley, “Riot Prevention,” 109–10. See also Griffiths, Youth and Authority, 
and Laroque, Shakespeare’s Festive World, 96–103.
38 Thomas, Rule and Misrule, 32–33.
39 Dekker, The Seuen deadly Sinnes of London: “they presently (like Prentises 
upon Shrove-tuesday) take the lawe into their owne hands, and doe what they list.” 
See also A Tragi-comedy: Called, Match mee in London (1631), where Bilbo, on 
Malevento’s behalf, promises to visit Gazetto and “beat downe the doore; and put 
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For a broader analysis of Shrove Tuesday allusions in another Dekker work, The 
Shoemaker’s Holiday, see Strazinsky, “The End(s) of Discord.”
40 Dekker and Webster, North-vvard Hoe (1607): Baud: “the prentises made 
a riot vpon my glasse-windowes the Shroue-tuesday following and I miscaried.”
41 Overbury, Sir Thomas Ouerburie His Wife (1616). See entries for A 
Roaring Boy (“Hee is a Superuisor to Brothels, & in them a more vnlawfull 
reformer of vice, then Prentises on Shroue-tuesday”) and A Maquerela, in 
plain English, a Bawd (“Nothing ... daunts her so much as the approach of 
Shroue-tuesday”).
42 Middleton, The Owles Almanacke (1618): “Shroue-tuesday falls on that 
day, on which the Prentices pluck’d downe the cock-pit, and on which they 
did alwaies vse to rifle Madam Leakes house at the vpper end of Shoreditch.” 
See also the first antimasque of Middleton’s The Inner-Temple Masque (1619), 
where Doctor Almanac calls “forth Shrovetuesday, one ‘a the silenc’st Bricke-
Layers,” and declares “Tis in your charge to pull downe Bawdyhouses, / To set 
your Tribe aworke, cause spoyle in Shorditch, / And make a Dangerous Leake 
there, deface Turnbul, / And tickle Codpiece Rowe, ruin the Cockpit, the / 
Poore Players ne’re thriud in’t, a ma Cōscience some Queane pist on vpon the 
first Bricke.”
43 Jonson refers to the Shrove Tuesday in several of his works, including 
Epicoene (1620), where Clerimont notes that Morose “would haue hang’d a 
Pewterers’ prentice once on a Shroue-tuesdayes Ryot, for being o’ that Trade, when 
the rest were quit.” See also Mrs. Otter’s exchange with her husband at the start 
of Act III: “Neuer a time, that the Courtiers, or Collegiates come to the Houfe, 
but you make it a Shrouetuesday!” During the antimasque in Time Vindicated to 
Himselfe (1623), Fame notes that “lawlesse prentices, on a Shrouetuesday ... com-
pell the Time to serue their riots: / From drunken Wakes, and strutting Beare-
baytings, That fauor only of their owne abuses,” while, in Bartholmew Fayre 
(1631), Lanthorn Leatherhead connects “the rising o’ the prentises” to the “pull-
ing downe the bawdy houses there, vpon Shroue-Tuesday.”
44 Marmion, Hollands Leagver (1632): Trim. “Good sir, let’s thinke on some 
reuenge, call vp / The Gentlemen prentises, and make a Shrouetuesday.”
45 Beaumont and Fletcher, The Knight of the Burning Peftle (1613): Raph: 
“Fare-well all you boies in merry London, / Nere shall we more vpon Shroue-
tuesday meete / And plucke downe houses of iniquitie.” On Beaumont as one of 
the play’s “parents,” see Masten, Textual Intercourse, 20–27.
46 Taylor, Iack a Lent (1620). See also Taylor’s A BAVVD (1635): “On former 
Shrove-Tuesdayes, when the unruly Rabble did falsely take upon them the name 
of London Prentices, then two or three thousand of those boot-haling pillag-
ing Rascalls, vvould march madly to the habitations of the most famous Bavvds, 
where they would robustiously venter [sic], breaking open Doores, battring downe 
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and Featherbeds, ravishing her mayds or stale virgins, spoyling all they stole not, 
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in nothing but Confusion and Errors: whereupon, it was ever afterwards called, 
The Night of Errors.” Reprinted in Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, 115–17. To 
my knowledge, there exists no record from the early modern period that connects 
audience laughter to specific scenes in the play.
57 I follow Spiess in citing The Norton Facsimile [of ] The First Folio of 
Shakespeare, ed. Hinman, and its through-line numbering (TLN).
58 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 4–5.
59 Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, 68.
60 Levi-Strauss, “A Writing Lesson,” 385–99. Derrida, “The Violence of the 
Letter,” 128–48.
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61 Plautus, Amphitruo, 1.1.180, 89.
62 Miola, “The Play and the Critics,” 13, cited in Spiess, this volume, 146.
63 See either Jeaffreson, www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series/middx-county- 
records (accessed June 16, 2015), or the more compressed Le Hardy, www.british-
history.ac.uk/middx-sessions/vol1 (accessed June 16, 2015). Citations are from 
the latter.
64 These records can be found in print in Le Hardy, Calendar To the Sessions 
Records, 87–116, or online at www.british-history.ac.uk/middx-sessions/vol1/
pp87–116
65 Le Hardy, Calendar To the Sessions Records, 116.
66 Mackay, “Feeling Unhistorical,” 40–53.
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Broken English: A Dialogue
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“To sleep, maybe to dream” and Other Encounters  
with a Trained Machine
Michael Witmore
Shakespeare’s plays and poems have been translated into numerous 
languages, including Klingon. In the middlebrow world of Star Trek, 
Shakespeare survives far into the future as an exemplar of high culture. 
A made-up language, sprung from the corner of a twentieth-century tel-
evision series, becomes yet another conduit for Shakespeare’s words—one 
fiction finding its future in another. Perhaps it is equally impressive that 
a machine can now “translate” Hamlet into and from any of more than 
one hundred languages. The popular online translation utility Google 
Translate will take any text—including lines from Shakespeare—and put 
them into any number of natural human languages. Now one can claim 
to find Shakespeare better in Finnish, even if there are more than enough 
Finns who can read Hamlet in the original.
Machine translation, which is what Google offers to millions of 
users a day, has come a long way in the last two years. In late 2016, the 
New York Times reported that Google Translate had made a sudden and 
unprecedented leap in ability.1 The jump was due to Google’s implemen-
tation of a neural network—a branch of artificial intelligence that trains 
a computer to recognize patterns without supplying the machine with a 
symbolic “map” of how those languages work (grammars, dictionaries). 
The Times story, which aimed to present artificial intelligence, or in this 
case “machine learning,” to a popular audience, describes how a native 
Japanese speaker achieved surprisingly good results when he fed his own 
Japanese translation of several sentences from Hemingway into the utility 
and found they could be serviceably translated back into English. Reading 
the article several months ago, I couldn’t help but wonder: Would it work 
on Shakespeare?
Whenever someone creates a new media form or communications 
technology, chances are someone will try it on Shakespeare. Although 
Klingon is not an option on Google Translate (yet), I was intrigued enough 
with the reports to try the utility out for myself. I pasted the “To be, or not 
to be” speech into the input window and indicated that I wanted to see it 
rendered in German. The machine returned the following:
Sein oder Nichtsein—das ist die Frage:
Ob es adliger in den Geist zu leiden
Die Schlingen und Pfeile des unverschämten Reichtums,
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Oder Waffen gegen ein Meer von Schwierigkeiten zu 
nehmen
Und indem ihr euch widersetzt, beendet sie. Zu 
sterben, zu schlafen—
Nicht mehr—und schlafen gehen wir zu Ende
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe—es ist eine Vollendung
Devoutly zu wünschen. Zu sterben, zu schlafen –
Zu schlafen, vielleicht zu träumen. Ay, es gibt die 
reiben,
Denn in diesem Schlaf des Todes können Träume 
kommen,
Wenn wir diese sterbliche Spule abgeschliffen haben,
Muß uns Pause geben.
My German is passable enough to know that the translation is very 
uneven. “Tausand natürlichen Schocks / Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe” is laugh-
ably bad. And what about “Devoutly”? The great Romantic philologist 
Schlegel added a crucial contrastive particle in his translation of the 
second clause, “das ist hier die Frage,” and this too is missing. Out of 
a perverse desire to see how these differences might be compounded, 
I fed this first effort back into the machine to have it rendered back 
into English:
To be or not to be—is the question:
Whether it is more noble to suffer in the mind
The snares and arrows of the insolent wealth,
Or take weapons against a sea of  difficulties
And by opposing you, she ends. To die, to sleep—
No more—and we go to sleep
The grief and the thousand natural shocks
This meat is inheritance—it is a consummation
Devoutly wish. To die, to sleep—
To sleep, maybe to dream. Ay, there is the rub,
For in this sleep of death dreams can come,
If we have abraded this mortal coil,
Must give us a break.
Weirdly echoing the now absent original, this double translation shows an 
algorithm struggling with everything from basic syntax to idiom. There is 
a big difference between “give us pause” and “give us a break.” One would 
have to look to Breton for something like “This meat is inheritance.” And 
what about the flatness of, “To sleep, maybe to dream.”
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An intriguing feature of the new machine learning techniques is 
that no one, not an English professor at Princeton nor a Stanford arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) researcher, can peer directly into the black box 
that produces the nifty results. Because neural networks simulate the 
accumulation of synaptic links occurring in our brains from childhood, 
an engineer from Google can only point to the gigabytes of “training” 
data that were used to train the network if he or she wants to explain 
the results. The so-called “hidden layers” in the system that translate 
stimuli into responses—here, virtual arrays of neurons that can be trained 
to “fire” in response to different inputs—are unavailable for inspec-
tion in any human-readable form. This is often the case with the work 
of algorithms: their results can be judged good or bad by a human. The 
mechanism itself, however, defies representation or narrative. All one can 
do is recite the recipe itself (the code) and the data on which the network 
or model was trained.
When we try to understand algorithms, it is easy to be disappointed 
with explanations of how they work. Critics of machine learning point out 
that there is a “something for nothing” quality to the way the new neu-
ral networks work. Boosted by faster processing and more training data, 
a trained network can intuit features that can be used to classify images, 
texts, sounds—anything that contains a pattern. Computer scientists 
debate the scientific and practical value of the new techniques, although 
the tide seems to be turning in the direction of “unintelligent” neural net-
works that train on lots of data when it comes to translation and speech/
image recognition. Machine learning techniques work well in situations 
where there is a lot of variety in the input, where a finite set of rules fails 
to map the things that need to be discriminated. Why create a dictionary 
of images, why simulate a natural grammar, if an algorithm can produce 
reasonable results without one?
Although the efficiencies are impressive, they are in some sense 
beside the point when it comes to our curiosity about how language 
works and the ways in which it can be used. We may want to use such net-
works to classify certain texts, showing for instance that Shakespeare is a 
more likely author of a given piece of writing than some other early mod-
ern author. But the techniques being tried now raise questions that go 
beyond those of how to reliably divide texts into recognizable classes. If 
machine learning works well for certain tasks such as translation—works 
without our knowing why—we glimpse some of what is behind our per-
sistent desire to understand the power of language and the distinct things 
that it can do. A literary critic may look at this situation and, ignoring the 
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questions of accuracy, say, “What I want is a representation of what the 
code does with the data, not a recipe for how it was done.”
All of this raises interesting questions about how we might be “fly-
ing blind” in the brave new world of machine learning and how, more 
specifically, some of the human behaviors that we associate with our 
greatest freedoms and creativity are predicted or modeled by a machine. 
Consider yet another Shakespearean example. Prior to the moment when 
Shakespeare wrote his “To be, or not to be” speech (around 1600), it is 
highly unlikely that anyone—given only that famous phrase—could accu-
rately predict what words would follow. Give a researcher a time machine, 
endless computing power, and a complete corpus of written and spoken 
English prior to Shakespeare’s Hamlet, and she would find this a chal-
lenge. The difficulty is that the training data are insufficient for such a 
predictive task. What comes next after “To be, or not to be?” Should it 
be the phrase “That is the question,” or “Ay, that’s the point,” which is the 
way the speech reads in the earlier quarto edition of Shakespeare’s play? To 
say what Shakespeare is going to do, you need to have a lot of examples of 
Shakespeare using words in a Shakespearean way. And, prior to Hamlet, 
there are not enough examples.
But consider now what kind of evidence or training data is avail-
able to the Google team and other researchers. As Shakespeare becomes 
the national poet of England, and as his phrases are repeated thousands, 
then millions, of times, it becomes almost impossible to hear “To be, or 
not to be?” and not find “That is the question” nearby.2 This particular 
sequence has been repeated, not only in English, but in the other lan-
guages into which Shakespeare has been translated. Translators, in fact, 
have been attracted to this speech as a crown jewel of Western introspec-
tion. Wilhelm Schlegel’s “Sein oder Nichtsein; das ist hier die Frage” 
is repeated many times as his translation of Hamlet enters the canon of 
German Shakespeare. An algorithm trained on the post-1600 corpus gets 
to train on better data, both in English and other natural languages. Who 
knows, perhaps Google Translate will at some point add Schlegel’s “hier” 
in “das ist hier die Frage,” even if it is blind to the contrastive emphasis of 
the additional word.
If you are training a translator with a neural network, the slow 
accumulation of such parallel instances is crucial, which is why it is not 
surprising that, when one feeds “To be, or not to be” into Google’s tool 
and double translates it back into English, the opening lines of Hamlet’s 
soliloquy are almost always right. Here are some examples of the results in 
several languages:
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English–Javanese–Javanese–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question > Dadi utawa 
ora dadi, sing pitakonan
Dadi utawa ora dadi, sing pitakonan > To be or not to 
be, that is the question
English–Arabic–Arabic–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question > 
 > To be or not to be, that is the 
question
English–Finnish–Finnish–English:
To be or not to be, that is the question > Ollako vai 
eikö olla, että on kysymys
Ollako vai eikö olla, että on kysymys > To be or not to 
be, that is the question
Now look at a few double translations of less famous parts of that 
speech:
English–German–German–English:
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune > Die 
Pfeile und Schleudern des wütenden Geschicks
Die Pfeile und Schleudern des wütenden Geschicks > 
The arrows and slings of furious fate
English–German–German–English:
The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to >
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe
Die Kummer und die tausend natürlichen Schocks
Dieses Fleisch ist Erbe >
The grief and the thousand natural shocks
This meat is inheritance
The initial translation task, starting with “To be, or not to be,” is less likely 
to be garbled. This is a very famous line (quoted frequently in the corpus) 
and is relatively straightforward syntactically, lacking figurative substitu-
tions. But the phrase “That flesh is heir to” is a very unusual formulation 
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which few machines can handle. I doubt even an inept human translator, 
supplied with a profusion of dictionaries, could come up with “This meat 
is inheritance.”
Google Translate stumbles on Shakespeare, who might be taken as 
an exemplar of poetic unpredictability. (How could a person this crea-
tive be predictable?) There is nevertheless something impressive about 
the results here. The Googlers have found an interesting way of formu-
lating the problem of predictability and, indirectly, the question of what 
makes different types of language (or language use) distinctive. The team 
first approached the problem by thinking about recognizing entities in 
images—things such as cats or faces. Quoc Le, a member of the team, 
asked, If I throw away a portion of an image and ask a machine to recon-
struct the original only from what is retained, how long will it take that 
system to learn what the best (most predictive) elements of images are that 
lead to good reconstructions?3 How, without being told in advance, can 
a machine select the features of an image that recur? As results of every 
reconstruction effort can be compared for similarity to the original image, 
which is retained, there is an inbuilt way of experimenting or cycling 
through random “subtractions” in order to learn which are most predic-
tive. This approach is representative of the so-called anti-symbolic school 
of AI: the machine is not looking to build a map of the things it encoun-
ters so that it can navigate the world as we navigate using the symbolic 
contents of our knowledge. It simply looks to predict what will happen 
based on what it has already “seen.”
One can think of this same process, which the Google team 
applied to images and languages, being applied to Shakespeare. Given 
the complete works of one of the most creative individuals ever to have 
used the language, what words, phrases, or sentences could be used to 
reconstruct the text if others went missing? A deep-learning algorithm 
begins to recognize a cat in millions of YouTube videos because it sees 
cats often. The evidence of thousands of images helps the machine guess 
which features—eyes, mouth, tail—and in what configuration tend to 
get repeated and, crucially, form together into a distinct and repeatable 
whole. So, if Shakespeare writes, “to sleep, perhaps to dream,” the full cor-
pus of English print might help the machine to guess, “Aye, there’s the 
rub,” even if it has no idea what those words mean.
These techniques are making their way into literary studies. Some 
of the same thinking that informed the translation and image recognition 
work at Google led to the creation of the “word embeddings” algorithm 
known as Word2Vec.4 Word2Vec grabs short sequences of words from 
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collections of texts and, using machine learning to train a model, maps 
how collocates (words that appear near each other) are distributed in the 
corpus. The technique builds on an idea made memorable by John Firth, 
who said that “you shall know a word’s meaning by the company it keeps.”5 
What is particularly interesting about Word2Vec is that a model trained 
with this algorithm seems to encode cultural bias or directionality. Every 
word is represented by a vector or string of properties that locates it in a 
finite number of dimensions. The vector can be described, geometrically, 
as an arrow leaving the origin in a three-dimensional space and pointing 
to a particular word. Other words sit nearby and can themselves be identi-
fied by their own respective vector arrows. The number of dimensions in 
which words are “arrayed” here tends to be much greater than three, which 
means that the model itself cannot be visualized directly. But there are 
ways of looking at neighborhoods of words that result, and, within these 
neighborhoods, there appear to be directionalities: some parts of the clus-
ter will “lean” male, others female. Animals might have associations with 
particular religions or geographies. There can be obvious moral or gen-
dered directionalities attaching to clusters of words associated with traits 
or behaviors.
One can sample millions of ten-word sequences of text in the full 
corpus of EEBO-TCP and create a model that captures dynamics that we 
would recognize as gender, social class, and geography. No one tells the 
algorithm to look for those things, but the “space” in which words get 
arranged in the model—a model no one can inspect—cannot help but 
register the biases and “predictabilities” that the historic use of our lan-
guage encodes. If you are talking about a “king,” you are also likely talking 
about a “male.” By a trick of something called “vector addition and sub-
traction,” you can traverse the direction from “male” to “female” and then 
backtrack (or subtract) the arrow you first traversed from “king,” and you 
will arrive at “female.” The names of literary characters, some with names 
often repeated in this corpus, will also acquire neighboring associations. 
If you use the word “Iago,” you are likely talking about someone who is 
“evil”: they are neighbors. And, if the word “evil” is often used around the 
word “subtle” in early modern English—as it is—Shakespeare’s formula-
tion, “subtle Iago,” may be more predictable than we might think hundreds 
of years later.
I do not want to dwell here on how machine learning finds predict-
ability in different domains. To the extent that anything has features that 
co-occur—semantic patterns in sentences or cat eyes in video frames—
there are ways a machine can learn to isolate and predict those features. 
BROKEN ENGLISH  177
When the techniques are applied to a training corpus of translations, a 
machine can recognize the language in which a text is written, even if it has 
never seen that text. Similarly, a machine can guess which cognate words, 
phrases, or sentences in a target language correspond to those found in the 
initial text. Set aside for the moment the fact that these “translations” are 
often infelicitous or plain wrong. They are significantly better than ran-
dom guesses, to the point where millions of human beings rely on Google 
Translate every day. The fact that this tool has become indispensable does 
not mean that literary language, or literary translation, is about to be 
sidelined. From the standpoint of a reader, I see no substitute for a good 
translation by someone who is also a compelling stylist in the target lan-
guage. If I want an English translation of Anna Karenina, I will still reach 
for that of Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky.6 But, if I am translat-
ing a Russian news source, I might be willing to start with a machine.
Machine learning may tell us very little about the complexities we 
prize in literary language of the sort we associate with Shakespeare. But 
what if we turn our attention to a more personal case? Suppose an algo-
rithm inspects every sentence I have written over the course of my adult 
life; it takes these “training data” and compares them with another corpus 
of sentences written by every other English speaker. All of my telegraphic 
text messages (“K, see you soon”) are included. So too are my notes to 
self (“Examine title page of F2 for Thursday”) and all of the sentences in 
the books I have written. On the basis of these labeled data, a machine 
might learn to guess correctly whether a new sample of text originates 
with me. Indeed, some future version of Google Translate might be able to 
take any sentence written by someone else and rewrite it in my own style, 
as if my style were another one of Google Translate’s “target languages.” 
What would my Hamlet look like? What would I want to know about any 
machine that could produce this result?
I would want to know, first and foremost, what a machine had to 
learn in order to sound like me. I would want to discover something about 
myself—via my style—that I could never intuit or predict, precisely because 
I cannot know all of the features that make my writing my own. I doubt 
that an algorithm could produce a satisfying Hamlet in my own voice, and 
I recoil at the idea of reading it. I doubt, too, if that translation would teach 
me what I want to know. For, if one opens up the black box of the algo-
rithm and inspects the training data, one would find only a recitation of 
every datum the algorithm encountered and the iterative re-weighting of 
the neurons that those encounters produced. There is a great difference 
between seeing what a machine did and saying what all of that means. 
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To get at the latter, I need a representation of the process—something 
more than a digest—that exemplifies the blindingly fast sequence of 
events that I do not yet understand. But here, precisely because I have 
entrusted the process to a machine whose operations defy symbolic rep-
resentation, I come up empty handed. Machine translation becomes 
practical when it avoids the symbolic representation of language, for 
example by abandoning the creation of a grammar or master set of 
dictionaries. Leave behind symbolic representation, and you get func-
tionality, perhaps even precision. But I am looking for something else. 
Would it not be easier to give a sample of my writing to a stranger and 
ask, What do you notice about this person’s writing?
The thought experiment points to an unintended effect of our 
desire to know what we are giving away of ourselves when we speak or 
use language. That desire is a desire to grasp what we know but cannot 
describe about our distinctive uses of language; the desire aims at the 
blind spot where a literary or linguistic self hides. Faced with a machine 
that has become the perfect mimic, we would find little to satisfy what you 
might call the humanistic drive. Correctly identifying a set of instances of 
this or that class of symbol use—personal style, genre, register, language—
only deepens our curiosity about what makes any such class distinctive. 
When I ask what makes a given language behavior recognizable, I want 
an answer that is itself symbolic, a description that references some pic-
ture of the world. The prize here is a map of the territory and the writer’s 
place within it. I might indeed learn “something new” from machine 
learning and the weird mirror it holds up to life. That mirror is not so 
much a reflection of “what I actually do” when speaking or writing, but 
a reflection of what I want from any description that makes those actions 
intelligible to me or others. Understanding that desire and the conditions 
under which it might be satisfied is itself a worthy task, even if machine 
translation remains an amusing goad to literary life.
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The Inheritance of Meat
Jonathan Hope
We are not looking at ourselves when we try to understand how we use 
language. We want to understand more of “what is really there” when 
someone uses language, and there are many sources of insight into that 
problem. The fact that sometimes a machine can help does not change the 
nature of the insight.
In the series of experiments above, Mike argues that just because 
machines can become good at picking out and so translating words from 
one language to another does not mean they understand what makes those 
words distinctive. When we look at the points at which machine transla-
tion breaks down—insolent wealth, or the inheritance of meat—maybe 
we become aware of what “distinctive” might mean in relation to language. 
It strikes me that the point, however, is that we are the ones who have to 
say that this or that set of features contributes to the distinctiveness of 
a text, and the fact that a machine helps does not invalidate the result. 
There are some things that, once seen, can then be described, and this rep-
resents an advance in knowledge—even an expression of what Mike calls 
the “humanistic drive.”
Consider the situations in which scholars try to identify the fea-
tures that make Shakespeare’s texts “distinctive.” This might be literary 
scholars seeking to describe his characteristic use of images or experi-
ments with genre, or it might be attribution scholars seeking “tells” 
which allow us to identify the author of a text. These are not really dif-
ferent activities, as they each posit a “distinctive” Shakespeare which can 
be isolated from a context: despite the hostility that has often existed 
between “traditional” and “attribution” literary studies, they are in fact 
both solidly Romantic in their attachment to the unique, identifiable 
author, using language in a way qualitatively different from “the rest.” 
Only Shakespeare would use metaphor this way, only Shakespeare uses 
these n-grams. Only Shakespeare.
Yet this focus on qualitative difference, instantiated as it is in school 
and university curricula where Shakespeare—only Shakespeare—is typi-
cally studied in isolation, and conferences and subject organizations where 
“Shakespeareans” meet to talk to other “Shakespeareans,” is not only a false 
representation of how literature works: it also misunderstands language. 
The inheritance of meat is the point where we see the system of language 
functioning: synonyms, polysemy, which makes alternates available on the 
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paradigmatic axis, but also context, the syntagmatic, which makes some 
of the choices impossible, or unlikely. Because the real, the interesting dis-
tinctiveness about Shakespeare is not qualitative: it is quantitative. He is 
distinct not by kind, but by degree.
In our work together, Mike and I collaborated with a computer 
scientist who used machine learning techniques to identify the words 
that best distinguish Shakespeare from his peer playwrights. The start-
ing question was not, “Which words make Shakespeare special?” It was, 
“Which words, if I find them present or absent from a text, give me the 
best indication that that text is by Shakespeare?” The results were interest-
ing. If a play is written by Shakespeare, it will, in comparison with those 
of any of his peers, contain relatively more of the words “say,” “speak,” 
“go,” and “did.” Conversely, a play by Shakespeare will use relatively fewer 
of the words “can,” “only,” “hope,” “may,” “sure,” “first,” “all,” “must,” “yes,” 
“yet.” A machine learning technique created a classifier for Shakespeare— 
essentially, a weighting of certain words (in abundance or deficit) that 
predicts whether or not Shakespeare wrote a particular text. We could ride 
“shotgun” alongside the algorithm to see how the many different scenarios 
or weightings it had to consider before arriving at this high-performing 
set of feature weights. Why would we want to, though? The point of the 
exercise is not that we can say what the algorithm means, but to justify 
its findings based on its known successes in other contexts. Once that is 
done, we can contextualize the results in whatever more or less humanistic 
way we want. There are two ways we can go with this: we can speculate 
on why Shakespeare is, relatively, more fond of imperatives that his peers; 
and/or we can think about the fact that the thing that is distinctive about 
Shakespeare is a set of relative shifts in the frequencies with which he uses 
a common set of words.
These are both interesting things to think about: maybe the first is 
the beginning of an explanation for why so many people (us included) are 
convinced that Shakespeare is “better” than any of his contemporaries—
and “better” by some considerable margin. Maybe the second thought, 
though, is more important in its implications: whatever the margins of 
“better,” Shakespeare is using the same language—because language is very 
exactly a shared system, not a set of unique practices found in one user. To 
take a slight tangent for a moment, the Romantic, qualitatively distinctive 
account of Shakespeare has delivered us into the hands of the “Shakespeare 
as word-coiner” myth, which takes first citations in the OED as evidence 
of first use and holds Shakespeare up as world-champion inventor of 
words. The deep desire here is for Shakespeare to be free of the system of 
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language—so free he creates his own words. Of course, this is to ignore the 
fact that word-coining obeys systemic laws of morphology, never mind 
the fact that almost all of the words claimed for Shakespeare can be found 
in writings earlier than his. Fundamentally, the attraction of this myth is 
the way it sets Shakespeare apart: qualitatively different from the drones 
who just use the words he mints. He produces value; we circulate it.
A Marxist critique of this “economy” of new words would point 
out that in fact Shakespeare simply “owns” the means of distribution. 
He is not a champion producer of words, but a very efficient circulator 
of them—taking the products of the system and boosting their visibility. 
Turning a profit. What we want to be a qualitative difference is in fact a 
quantitative one.
I have my own history with do. In my first book, The Authorship of 
Shakespeare’s Plays, I used this feature and others to identify Shakespeare 
as the author of certain portions of Pericles (and his contemporary John 
Wilkins as the author of others). Because Shakespeare learned English in 
the 1560s and 1570s, he favored a certain set of uses of do as an auxiliary 
verb. For example, he, relatively, is more likely to produce sentences such 
as “I do believe” or “I did say” than those born later in the century (or us 
today). In modern English, we no longer use this construction, preferring 
“I believe” or “I said.” When I see that a new machine learning classifier 
identifies a feature—“did”—as a predictor of Shakespeare, I can confirm 
from my own experience that this is an important insight. I had to dis-
cover Shakespeare’s distinctive use of this feature the hard way, counting 
all instances of auxiliary do in Shakespeare’s plays by hand. Based on that 
confidence, I am more receptive to the other findings: that Shakespeare 
favors words such as “say,” “speak,” and “go” in a similar way. And because 
I came to this historical difference through the theories of historical soci-
olinguistics, I was interested in it as a quantitative difference expressed 
across the linguistic system, rather than as a qualitative difference express-
ing Shakespeare’s distinctiveness.
With that fuller picture in place, I can begin to think about the dis-
tinctive scenarios in Shakespeare’s plays that may require a character to 
speak these words, or to leave out others. Why does Shakespeare fail, rela-
tive to others, to use the words “can,” “only,” “hope,” “may,” “sure,” “first,” 
“all,” “must,” “yes,” and “yet” as frequently? We can say that, at the level 
of the 500+ plays we have studied as representative of the early modern 
dramatic corpus, the differences we observe are “because” the text is by 
Shakespeare—and we can hypothesize that the systemic differences are 
produced by the context: Shakespeare’s place of birth, his gender, his age, 
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all features which affected the precise version of English he acquired as a 
child. But, of course, the systemic “explanation” does not explain every-
thing. It sets up the parameters within which Shakespeare works—and, 
yes, limits him in as much as it sets some things beyond his “natural” 
language and places other things inside it. We are all “prisoners” of the 
linguistic system, though most of the time we are unaware of the bounda-
ries, as it is a large prison, and the walls tend to be transparent. When we 
come up against something like the “the meat is inheritance,” we suddenly 
see that there is a wall where we had not previously thought of walking—
and the wall might tell us something about the structural principles of the 
enclosure itself.
NOTES
1 Lewis-Kraus, “The Great A.I. Awakening,” n.p.
2 On variants of “To be, or not to be” in early printed editions of Hamlet, see 
Shore, “Shakespeare’s Constructicon,” in reference to Peter Stallybrass.
3 Lewis-Kraus, “The Great A.I. Awakening,” n.p.
4 On word embedding models and the implementation of Word2Vec, see 
Schmidt, “Vector Space Models for the Digital Humanities.” For the origins of 
the technique, see Mikolov et al., “Distributed Representations of Words and 
Phrases and Their Compositionality.”
5 Firth, “A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory 1930–1955,” 11.
6 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina.
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Chapter 8
Conscience Doth Make Errors:  
The Blind Spot of Shakespearean  
Quotation
Zachary Lesser
ON THE WEBSITE “YAHOO! Answers,” people can post ques-tions about anything and receive answers from anyone. Some ques-
tions are about Shakespeare, and not surprisingly some are riddled with 
errors, such as the one from “Michaela” shown in Figure 8.1.
Here, both Michaela and “ConcernedCitizen” get quite a bit wrong.1 
Michaela claims that the quotation “is from Macbeth,” and Concerned 
Citizen agrees with her. At a deeper level, many scholars have insisted 
(although we may not agree with them) that “conscience” in this line does 
not have the familiar moral-religious meanings that ConcernedCitizen 
assumes it has, but rather means, in the words of E. K. Chambers, “the exer-
cise of conscious thought, speculation on the future.”2
But Michaela makes another mistake, one that is more interesting 
to me because it occupies a scholarly blind spot: she misquotes Hamlet’s 
Figure 8.1 A question and “best answer” from a Yahoo website.  
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110306135138 
AAf7vmH, accessed 11 January 2019.
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line, substituting doth for does. Perhaps you knew this immediately, per-
haps you did not. It is in the nature of blind spots, after all, that they are 
perspectival: if you drive my car, your blind spot will differ from mine, as 
your height, your angle of vision, and your positioning of the mirrors dif-
fer. I suspect, however, that many readers will not have spotted Michaela’s 
error, because great Shakespeareans have not always remembered the line 
any better than she has. We typically imagine quotation and misquotation 
as opposed poles, but in fact we misquote far more often than we real-
ize. And when we correct others’ misquotation, we often create further 
problems, as I hope to show here with an examination of two common 
(mis)quotations from Hamlet. Misquotation is a scholarly blind spot for 
another reason: once we have unmasked it as error, we tend to look no 
futher. In doing so, however, we fail to see what misquotation can show us; 
in our eagerness to demonstrate others’ errors and our own correctness, we 
often misrepresent the nature of Shakespearean textuality.
To return to Michaela: she is clearly a novice Shakespearean, but Figure 
8.2 shows Samuel Johnson, perhaps the most acute reader of Shakespeare of 
the eighteenth century, making the same error in his 1765 edition:
Figure 8.2 Samuel Johnson, ed., The Plays of William Shakespeare, 8 vols.  
(London: J. and R. Tonson et al., 1765), 7.209.
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And Figure 8.3 shows how the most influential early editor of 
Shakespeare, Edmond Malone, quoted the line in his landmark 1790 
edition. At least Malone did get the line right in his edition of the play 
itself, unlike Johnson. But his error in the apparatus here shows that, in a 
more offhand moment, when he was likely recalling the line from memory, 
Malone instinctively thought it read “doth” instead of “does.” When he 
was quoting rather than editing, we might say, Malone was misquoting.
Malone and Johnson are not alone. Laurence Olivier can be clearly 
heard saying doth in his 1948 film; so can Kenneth Branagh in 1996. 
Other legendary Shakespearean actors such as John Gielgud and Richard 
Burton have done the same, as have notable academics from John Crowe 
Ransom to Judith Butler.3 And more broadly, since 1800, the misquo-
tation rivals the correct quotation in appearances in the Google Books 
corpus, as shown in the graph in Figure 8.4, where the line that is initially 
higher represents the correct does, and the initially lower line the incor-
rect doth.4 Here we can see that, especially in the late nineteenth century 
Figure 8.3 Edmond Malone, ed., The Plays and Poems of William Shakspeare,  
10 vols. (London: J. Rivington and Sons et al., 1790), 10.669.
Figure 8.4 Graph of correct and incorrect quotation of the line,  
created through Google Books.
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and the first half of the twentieth, the line was being misquoted almost as 
often as it was being quoted correctly.
Another way to visualize the evidence is to graph the proportion of 
all quotations of the line that are erroneous (see Figure 8.5).5 We can now 
readily see that the error consistently composes about a third and often 
close to half of all the quotations of Hamlet’s line in Google Books.
It is difficult to perceive any trends here: the proportion remains 
relatively constant. On both graphs, the error seems to be diminishing 
(because of the ready availability of e-texts of Hamlet, making it easier to 
check?), but we cannot really tell yet; the apparent downward trend may 
soon be reversed, as has happened in the past. In the larger perspective, 
the most salient fact about the error is its persistence. It seems clear that 
this is one of the more frequently misquoted Shakespearean lines.6 Both 
graphs yield important information. The second shows that the error has 
been made consistently and frequently over the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, while the first helps us to isolate a particular period—the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when the error appears to have 
been significantly on the rise.
Why do so many people get this line wrong? The error crosses the 
divides between professional Shakespeareans and lay readers (and quoters); 
between the nineteenth century and the twentieth; between text and per-
formance, print and digital.7 One explanation has to do with the history 
of the third-person singular verb ending. In the early modern period, both 
Figure 8.5 Percentage of instances of the line in the Google Books  
corpus that are erroneous.
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the -s form (does, goes, says, etc.) and -th form (doth, goeth, sayeth, etc.) 
were available. According to Merja Kytö, “the -S ending remains very rare 
until 1590. In the 1590s, the -TH and -S endings co-occur in a number 
of texts, but after 1600 the regular ending tends to be -S.” By the end of 
the seventeenth century, “the receding variant form -TH was used only in 
biblical, liturgical, and other highly formal contexts.”8 The verbs have and 
do “tended to retain the -TH ending long after other verbs had adopted 
-S,” however, probably owing to their frequent use.9 Shakespeare himself 
used the -th ending more frequently than most of his contemporaries, 
especially in hath and doth, because of his age and because of the language 
patterns of his native Warwickshire. The difference is pronounced enough 
that, according to Cyrus Hoy, it is “the most effective linguistic evidence 
for distinguishing the work of Shakespeare and Fletcher” in their collabo-
rations; MacDonald P. Jackson agrees.10
What can we learn if we explore this misquotation rather than 
simply correct the error and look away? What we can see at work here, 
I think, is an unconscious desire for a Shakespeare who sounds appropri-
ately “Shakespearean.” Subsituting doth for does in this line makes Hamlet 
speak not only in a more “old-fashioned” manner, but also in a more for-
mal, elevated register. And it makes Shakespeare appear, in the paradoxical 
phrase used to describe “the warlike Harry,” more “like himself ” (Henry V, 
Pro. 5), as it forces him to use the -th form that he used with a frequency 
exceptional among contemporary dramatists—but not, in fact, in this par-
ticular line.
This desire for a “Shakespearean Shakespeare” can already be seen 
in Johnson’s 1765 edition, indicating that even by the middle of the eight-
eenth century doth had become somewhat antiquated.11 This archaic 
quality of doth, and its association with “biblical, liturgical, and other 
highly formal contexts”—and perhaps, in particular, with the King James 
Bible—seems likely to have driven the late nineteenth-century rise in the 
misquotation. In this period, a minor publishing industry developed in 
what we might call “Shakespearean piety,” books that packaged bits of 
Shakespearean verse alongside other uplifting and spiritual quotations to 
impart religious lessons. As the pastor of the Methodist Episcopal church 
in Kansas City, Missouri, wrote in “The Cowardice of a Guilty Conscience” 
(1910): “We have all had on our lips at one time or another those words 
of Hamlet in which he declares that ‘Conscience doth make cowards of 
us all.’”12 And the line does indeed appear in the works of numerous min-
isters: for instance, the fourth volume of The Homiletic Quarterly (1880), 
a crib book for preachers, treated conscience in its section on “Rough 
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Materials: or, Texts and Topics”; after giving the etymology of the word, 
it gave definitions from well-known theologians, relevant biblical pas-
sages, and a few literary quotations, including “Conscience doth make 
cowards of us all.”13 The Religious Tract Society’s Sunday at Home Family 
Magazine for Sabbath Reading offered “Proverb Lore” compiled by “the 
Rev. T. F. Thiselton Dyer, M.A.” among its poems, biblical extracts, and 
instructive stories; Dyer told readers, “How many are the advantages and 
blessings which belong to a good man,” but “How different is it with the 
person who has an evil conscience, for when that is so, ‘Conscience doth 
make cowards of us all.’”14
There is a clue here that we can trace in the large data set offered by 
Google Books. In each of these cases, the line is extracted beginning with 
Conscience rather than quoted in full. If we examine only those instances in 
the Google Books corpus in which Conscience is capitalized, the erroneous 
quotation outpaces the correct one for much of the period, again with a 
sharp rise in the late nineteenth century.15
As you will recall, in the early texts of Hamlet, the word conscience 
does not begin the line. Q2 has “Thus conscience dooes make cowards” 
(sig. G2v), and the Folio reads, “Thus Conscience does make Cowards 
of vs all” (sig. 2o5r). The Folio capitalization is part of its broader pro-
ject of capitalizing certain abstract nouns, according to emergent fashion 
in 1623. But the vast majority of quotations in the Google Books cor-
pus are not following Folio capitalization; they are undoubtedly quoting 
either from a contemporary edition of Hamlet, from memory, or from 
Figure 8.6 Graph of correct and incorrect quotation of the line, with initial  
capitalization, in Google Books.
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a compendium of memorable quotations. In other words, it is exceed-
ingly unlikely that the Folio typography is influencing the capitalization 
of these quotations, whether erroneous or correct.
What is influencing that capitalization, I think, is the extraction of 
only part of the line as a proverb to be compiled in collections of quo-
tations. In these commonplace compendia, as in the examples above, the 
initial Thus of Q2 and F’s line is omitted as part of the process of remov-
ing the line from its original context (where Thus refers to the preceding 
portion of Hamlet’s speech) for suitable reuse in new contexts. The capi-
talization of Conscience, in other words, is a marker of commonplacing 
and thus a marker of exactly what Malone was doing when he got the line 
wrong in his apparatus: quoting from memory and from a storehouse of 
proverbial wisdom and Shakespearean “beauties.” In the late nineteenth 
century, this commonplacing was part of the broader impulse to make 
Shakespeare teach religious and moral lessons, to make the national poet 
accord with the Bible. In recalling the line with doth instead of does, these 
writers align Shakespeare with the Bible not only spiritually, but also lin-
guistically, in the usage of the third-person singular verb ending.
As with the play as a whole, Q1 offers an intriguing counterpoint to 
this line.16 Although Q1 has generally been imagined as more antiquated 
than the modern philosophical version of the play embodied by Q2 and F, 
in this line the first quarto is decidedly more modern: “O this conscience 
makes cowardes of vs all” (sig. E1r).17 The line sounds more contemporary 
because it lacks the now-archaic “unregulated auxiliary ‘do’,” a construction 
that Jonathan Hope has shown is a favorite of Shakespeare’s.18 Modern 
usage prefers auxiliary do only in interrogatives (“Does conscience make 
cowards?”), emphatic statements (“Yes, conscience does make cowards”), 
and negatives (“No, conscience does not make cowards”). Linguists call 
these usages “regulated,” whereas non-standard forms are “unregulated”: 
the use of do in positive statements (“Conscience does make cowards”), 
and the lack of it in negatives (“Conscience makes not cowards”) or inter-
rogatives (“Makes conscience cowards?”). Already in the 1750s, Samuel 
Johnson disparaged “unregulated” auxiliary do in positive statements: “Do 
is sometimes used superfluously, as, I do love, I did love; simply for I love, 
or I loved; but this is considered as a vitious mode of speech.”19 Perhaps 
precisely because he considered unregulated auxiliary do as an outmoded 
and superfluous construction, Johnson unconsciously associated it with 
another archaic linguistic form, printing doth instead of does in this line.
By attending to this misquotation rather than dismissing it, we can 
see how it is informed both by the growing canonization of Shakespeare as 
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a writer of quasi-sacred texts and by the increasing sense that the language 
of those texts was archaic. Indeed, as the parallel with the King James Bible 
reveals, the two trends are intertwined. Furthermore, this misquotation 
draws our attention to Shakespeare’s texts in their multiplicity: it is not 
quite right to say that the “correct” reading is “Thus conscience does make 
cowards of us all.”20 Although it is true that, allowing for modernization of 
spelling, this is the reading in the Folio, Q2 omits “of us all,” and Q1 has 
another variation altogether. Editors have not always agreed on which ver-
sion of the line is the one that Shakespeare “actually” wrote. Correction in 
this case involves oversimplification of the textual situation.
To explore more fully the relationship between popular misquota-
tion, scholarly correction, textual variation, and Shakespearean editing, 
I want to look at another, better-known misquotation from Hamlet: 
“Methinks the lady doth protest too much.” Although this misquota-
tion seems no less widespread than Conscience doth make cowards, it does 
not, to my knowledge, appear in any scholarly editions of Shakespeare. 
Whereas Hamlet’s line about conscience clearly crosses the divide 
between professional and amateur Shakespearean, Gertrude’s line has 
been far more perceptible as a “popular” error. Perhaps for this reason, it 
has gained far more currency as a misquotation, one that people on the 
Internet take special pleasure in correcting. Gertrude’s “methinks” appears 
on Wikiquote’s “List of misquotations,” a page dedicated to “things that 
many people think are correct quotations but are actually incorrect,” and 
numerous other sites such as “Top 10 Shakespeare Misquotes.”21 The latter 
site informs us that, “This is probably one of the most commonly heard 
misquotes of Shakespeare” and gives us the “Actual Quote: ‘The lady 
doth protest too much, methinks’.” Wikiquote gives the same line as the 
“Correct quote.”
But in fact both “Top 10 Shakespeare Misquotes” and Wikiquote 
are miscorrecting : “The lady doth protest too much, methinks” is not 
“actual” or “correct” according to any of the three early texts of Hamlet. 
Q2 comes the closest with “The Lady doth protest too much mee thinks” 
(sig. H2v), but note that it treats me thinks as two words. Meanwhile, the 
Folio has “The Lady protests to much me thinkes” (sig. 2o6v), and Q1 
prints even more simply: “The Lady protests too much” (sig. F3v). The 
focus on misquotation creates a blind spot about the text itself.
The Folio and Q1 versions of this line again raise the question of the 
use of the unregulated auxiliary do. Both of these texts sound more modern 
than Q2 in omitting the auxiliary, and Q1 goes even further in modern-
izing by omitting “methinks.” This now-archaic form was still widely in 
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use in the early seventeenth century but may already have become some-
what obscure in its syntax, in which me functions as an indirect object of 
the impersonal (it) thinks in rough parallel with the still-current phrase 
“it seems to me.” The transformation of me thinks, as Q2 reads, to the sin-
gle word methinks, as we find in all modern editions and in the Internet 
versions of the “actual” and “correct” quotation, itself testifies to the archa-
icization of this syntactical form. As can be seen in the graphs from the 
EEBO-TCP Ngram Browser in Figures 8.7 and 8.8, the single-word form 
became more common in the latter half of the seventeenth century, as the 
two-word form began to fade from use.22
Although modern editions almost always favor the Q2 version of 
the line, with doth protest instead of protest, this was not always the case. 
In the early twentieth century, the New Bibliographers revolutionized 
the editing of Hamlet by arguing persuasively that the copy underlying 
Q2 was Shakespeare’s authorial manuscript, leading most subsequent edi-
tors to base their text on that edition. (The Oxford Shakespeare, edited 
by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, was a notable exception, as it broadly 
preferred Folio readings in its effort to reconstruct the texts of the plays as 
they were performed.) But most of the major eighteenth-century editors 
preferred the Folio reading, including Rowe, Pope, Theobald, Hanmer, 
Warburton, Johnson, and Capell. Malone’s emphasis in his 1790 edition 
on returning to the early quartos led him to print doth protest, and a num-
ber of nineteenth-century editors followed him, but by no means all.
Figure 8.7 Occurrence of methinks as a single word in the  
EEBO-TCP corpus.
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As late as 1877, the Variorum Hamlet edited by Horace Howard 
Furness printed the Folio version as its base text. The eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century rationale for choosing protests over doth protest was not 
merely a general preference for the Folio over Q2, however. The only com-
mentary note that Furness provides for this line is Hiram Corson’s remark: 
“The familiar ‘protests’ is better here than ‘doth protest.’”23 This comment 
epitomizes the kind of “eclectic” editing that the New Bibliographers 
would soon condemn as mere belletrism: the editor simply chooses the 
variant that seems “better” according to his personal aesthetic taste. The 
New Bibliographic movement led to the adoption of the principle of copy 
text, to the idea that individual choices of variants should be guided by 
a broader understanding of the nature of the copy underlying the multi-
ple editions of Shakespeare’s plays, and in this case to the choice of Q2’s 
doth protest as part of a larger preference for Q2 as closer to Shakespeare’s 
hand. But, as numerous critiques of the New Bibliography have pointed 
out, in practice there was still a great deal of aesthetic preference at work 
in twentieth-century editing. In his landmark New Bibliographic edition 
of Hamlet for the Arden Shakespeare, for example, Harold Jenkins repeat-
edly prefers “an obviously superior F reading,” even though he follows Q2 
as his copy text, because the word “is in Shakespeare’s finest manner, both 
inventive and exact.”24
If Corson argued for protests over doth protest because it was “bet-
ter” (more “familiar,” more direct and immediate), and if Jenkins chose 
Figure 8.8 Occurrence of me thinks as two words in the EEBO-TCP corpus.
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F’s “fretfull” rather than Q2’s “fearefull” porpentine because it was “obvi-
ously superior,” how different is this scholarly editorial practice from the 
misquotation of Gertrude as saying , “Methinks the lady doth protest 
too much,” or of Hamlet as saying, “Thus conscience doth make cowards 
of us all”?
This is not to say that there is in fact no difference between mis-
quotation and editorial emendation—far from it. Bibliographic analysis 
can indeed teach us a great deal about the printing and publication 
of Shakespeare’s plays, literary and stylometric analysis can illuminate 
Shakespeare’s (and other dramatists’) habits, and that knowledge can 
and should influence our attempts to reconstruct the texts of those plays 
from their extant witnesses. But this evidence is not generally as straight-
forward as we might wish. We could note, for instance, that Q2’s version 
of Gertrude’s line is a perfect iambic pentameter, whereas F’s “The Lady 
protests to much me thinkes” is half a foot short and metrically awkward. 
(Q1’s version appears not to be in verse.) By contrast, with Hamlet’s line 
about conscience, it is F’s version that is metrically perfect, whereas Q2 is 
a short line as it lacks “of us all,” and I find Q1’s “O this conscience makes 
cowardes of vs all” extremely hard to scan. In each case, the syntactically 
more “modern” version, without auxiliary do, makes the line metrically 
difficult and seems therefore somewhat less likely to be Shakespearean, 
but the two lines point to different texts, Q2 in one case and F in the 
other. Metrical analysis is thus not particularly helpful here, and larger 
stylometric studies, by their very nature, will not be able to resolve such 
fine-grained questions as which variant to choose in each of these cases. 
We could fall back on the New Bibliographic principle of choosing a 
copy-text based on a broader understanding of the nature of the texts and 
sticking with it in ambiguous cases, but most editors will want to choose 
F’s “Thus Conscience does make Cowards of vs all” alongside Q2’s “The 
Lady doth protest too much mee thinks.” If we resolve the problem by 
arguing that Q2 omits “of us all” owing to a compositor’s error (which I 
happen to think likely), are we actually answering the question here, or 
are we simply begging it? Shakespeare certainly wrote plenty of metrically 
short lines for dramatic emphasis, after all, and one could argue that “Thus 
conscience dooes make cowards” is one of them, that it is more “familiar” 
and hence “better,” as Corson would say, just like F’s metrically deficient 
“The Lady protests to much me thinkes.”
In these two cases, we see a similar pattern. The misquotation 
(whether “popular” or “scholarly”) favors the “old-fashioned” form, pre-
ferring a Shakespeare who sounds quaintly archaic, like the mock-Tudor 
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houses that can be seen throughout Stratford-upon-Avon. Pushing 
“methinks” to the initial position emphasizes that distinctly early modern 
word, adding to the “Shakespeareanism” of the line; the choice of “doth 
protest” over “protests” or “conscience doth” over “conscience does” 
works along the same lines. Meanwhile, in each case, the correction over-
corrects and misrepresents the textual variation around each line. And, if 
both of these misquotations reveal an unconscious expectation for how 
Shakespeare “should” sound—a desire for an “old-timey” Shakespeare 
that is easy enough to ridicule—editors and critics have probably been 
too complacent about our own investments in, and dependence on, 
similar expectations that Shakespeare must have sounded “like himself.” 
Recent work in stylometrics has shown that individual authors have dis-
tinctive stylistic “signatures,” certainly, but these typically operate below 
the level of conscious thought, in deeply engrained sytactical habits 
rather than in particular vocabulary or turns of phrase. In other words, 
Shakespeare probably had no idea what he sounded like, on this level, 
and we are probably less able to hear that distinctive style than we think. 
If we approach editorial decisions with the idea that Shakespeare should 
sound “like himself,” we need to do so with an awareness of our blind spot 
around (mis)quotation, or we may run into the same kinds of error as 
Samuel Johnson, Edmond Malone, and Michaela.
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On Not Knowing Shakespeare: A Response  
to Zachary Lesser
Tanya Pollard
“Brush up your Shakespeare,” Cole Porter promises us, “and they’ll all 
kow-tow.”25 Mysteriously, and disappointingly, this does not always 
prove true in practice, but many of us continue to identify Shakespearean 
knowledge with at least some degree of authority. It is both disconcert-
ing and intriguing, then, to learn from Zack’s wonderful and wide-rang-
ing research not only that most of us could do with more brushing up, 
but that even those steeped in an awful lot of Shakespeare have recurring 
blind spots.
The impressively persistent tradition of quoting “Conscience doth 
make cowards of us all” highlights the power of authoritative misreadings to 
perpetuate themselves. When a phrase is endorsed by the likes of Johnson, 
Malone, Olivier, Gielgud, and Branagh, it takes on a familiarity that many 
will accept unquestioningly, despite its departure from Shakespeare’s 
original texts. As Zack shows, though, the recurring persistence of “doth” 
suggests investments beyond the simple tendency to repeat the words of 
apparent experts. Even for readers and audiences oblivious to scholarship 
on Shakespeare’s habitual linguistic patterns, the plays themselves can 
instill an instinctive preference for the characteristic “doth.” The word’s 
regular Shakespearean appearances prompt, as Zack points out, “an uncon-
scious desire for a Shakespeare who sounds appropriately ‘Shakespearean.’” 
If Shakespeare’s authority rests in significant part on his plays’ perceived 
status as archaic, quasi-sacred texts, there are cultural stakes in maintaining 
a Shakespeare who uses “doth” as an auxiliary verb, and maybe even a cer-
tain felt virtue in correcting him when he fails to do so consistently.
Patterns of misquotation, though, raise questions and problems 
beyond wanting Shakespeare to sound “like himself.” As Zack also points 
out, other recurring misquotations, such as “The lady doth protest too 
much, methinks,” respond at least in part to textual indeterminacy. If 
three “original” Shakespeare texts offer three different versions of this line, 
how do we decide what Shakespeare sounds like? The problems of locat-
ing Shakespearean authority—and with it, of establishing Shakespearean 
knowledge—multiply with recent arguments for expanding the canon of 
Shakespeare’s collaboratively written plays. If plays that we have under-
stood as Shakespeare’s turn out to include contributions from others—and, 
by the same token, if plays that we have attributed to others turn out to 
198  TANYA POLLARD
include contributions from Shakespeare—we find other, larger chal-
lenges to identifying a consistent Shakespearean voice. When we explore 
Shakespeare’s habits of imitating and quoting other writers, moreover, as 
well as the ways that others were moved to imitate and quote him, the pos-
sibility of distilling stylistic purity recedes even further from our grasp.
Recognizing Shakespeare’s responsiveness to his immediate the-
atrical milieu similarly raises the specter of more expansive and indirect 
forms of extratextual influence. If the improvisations of Shakespeare’s 
clowns and/or the distinctive forms of charisma associated with his better-
known actors made their way into Shakespeare’s lines, either directly or 
through permeating his imagination, do the resulting inflections represent 
Shakespeare, or someone else? And, if attending to these likely direct and 
indirect debts suggests that Shakespeare’s plays have always been at some 
level collectively constructed, are modern alterations—by editors, direc-
tors, actors, and/or the memory-challenged among us—intrinsically less 
valid than those that might have taken place more than 400 years ago?
As Zack points out, it is not intellectually useful to lump together 
different approaches to reworking Shakespeare: misquotations reflect very 
different kinds of principle from those involved in editorial or directorial 
decisions, and some Shakespeares are demonstrably more authentic than 
others. The persistence of blind spots that recur across these categories, 
though, underscores the degree to which we all rely on our instincts about 
what is authentically Shakespearean. Probing these instincts, similarly, 
reminds us that, however well informed they may be, they are all bounded 
by the limits of what we know, and what we can know, about a writer 
whose words reach us filtered through the distorting media of time, vari-
ant texts, and uncountable losses. In “On Not Knowing Greek,” Virginia 
Woolf—whose Greek was very good—wrote that “it is vain and foolish to 
talk of knowing Greek,” but that the idea persists regardless. “All the more 
strange, then,” she observed, “is it that we should wish to know Greek, try 
to know Greek, feel for ever drawn back to Greek, and be for ever making 
up some notion of the meaning of Greek, though from what incongru-
ous odds and ends, with what slight resemblance to the real meaning of 
Greek, who shall say?”26 Happily, we are on firmer territory in knowing 
Shakespeare than antiquity—we have the benefits of more linguistic and 
chronological proximity and a sturdier paper trail—but the difference is 
of degree rather than kind. Zack’s essay, like Woolf ’s, reminds us to be cau-
tious about assuming our familiarity with the foreign country that is the 
literary past, and prods us in particular to keep an eye on what we can 
learn from our own blind spots.
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The Food of Points: A Response to  
Zachary Lesser
Adam Zucker
Given this collection’s interest in discussing unknown or unknowable sub-
jects in Shakespeare studies, I may as well begin this response with a quick 
story about my long-standing friendship with Zack, which began during 
our first year as undergraduates. He and I shared serious and probably 
predictable academic interests and advisors at the time, but, more impor-
tantly for this story, we also both loved pinball. We would spend hours 
crammed into the small game room of our university’s student center, too 
clueless at age nineteen to realize that the plexiglass window that put our 
pinball obsession on display day after day to the many other students walk-
ing past might damage our chances at winning the kinds of game that were 
being played out in the hall and elsewhere on campus. On this particular 
day, I was killing it, again, on the Star Trek machine, while Zack waited 
patiently for my turn to end and his to begin. The machine chittered and 
blooped in its song of a billion warp-speed points, and Zack, already pro-
ficient in the ways of Shakespeare, was ready with a quotation. “If music be 
the food of points,” he said, “Play on.”
I had no idea what he was talking about, and I told him so. I was 
impressed when he told me it was the first line of Twelfth Night, not least of 
all because Shakespeare seemed to be weirdly tuned in to pinball aesthet-
ics of the early 1990s. For all time, indeed. It was not until I read the play 
several months later that I learned that Zack had misquoted the line. For 
a measurable chunk of my undergraduate career, I thought Shakespeare’s 
music was the food of points.
I am writing this twenty-five years later, but I am still learning about 
misquoting Shakespeare from Zack. And, although the situation in the 
game room differs greatly from the scenario he has shown us in his essay 
here, the central premises of both are similar. Given the right authorities, 
the difference between “wrong” Shakespeare and “right” Shakespeare is 
very difficult to discern. And perhaps more to the point, the text we see 
before us in our minds when we imagine a “correct” Shakespearean script 
can be shaped by influencing authorities we will never entirely recognize, 
even as we pronounce some of the most famous lines in the plays.
Those authorities are not always pinball-playing friends with a bet-
ter grip on the canon than oneself. I freely confess that “Thus conscience 
doth make cowards of us all” sounded absolutely right to me before I read 
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this essay. More strangely, even now that I know it is wrong, it still sounds 
entirely right to me. The authority of presumptively archaic Shakespearean 
style, an authority that has overwhelmed the memories of Malone, Olivier, 
and Branagh among others, plays a role in my own mind-edited text of 
Hamlet. There is no single work of criticism or scholarship that has made 
me feel this way. Some internal instinct, an instinct upon which I rely too, 
too frequently to respond to questions posed by text, is completely misin-
forming me. I have never noticed its presence before.
The blind spot of knowledge explored by Zack, then, might best be 
understood as a space of unanalyzed influence not just on “Shakespeare,” 
but on the performance of the Shakespearean text in editorial scholarship, 
on stage, and in classrooms. The force of this influence can move along 
many different vectors laid out by the histories of textual performers them-
selves. Was Shakespeare, for a hypothetical speaker, teacher, or editor, a 
naturalized, ever-present companion in educational contexts, as he often 
is or has been in the UK? Was Shakespeare a facet of an occupying power 
building school curricula or bringing its foreign culture to bear in a colo-
nial administration, as he once was in India and throughout the British 
Empire? Was Shakespeare, as he was for me, a compelling poet who gave 
an independent voice to the son of an aspiring, heavily-accented immi-
grant? These kinds of frame for the feeling of the Shakespearean could 
be multiplied many, many times over, each one of them potentially nudg-
ing text into different configurations. The pathways that lead Shakespeare 
to “sound like himself,” as Zack puts it, sometimes turn back in on them-
selves, and they sometimes span the globe.
I am not sure we can ever perfectly identify the forces that lead 
groups of knowledgeable people to make the same mistake over and over 
again. The panoramic perspective I have hinted at above would encompass 
an infinity of unseen forces, and, although Zack’s survey of nineteenth-
century moralizing Shakespeare quotation collections gives us one 
potential method for locating cultural momentum, the blind spot here is 
perhaps too protean to be clarified entirely. But we can always be aware of 
the diversity of formal or structural authorities underpinning any given 
Shakespearean line. Editorial glosses and emendations, to name the most 
obvious, are influential simply because we have gotten very used to grant-
ing the editor her in-text power. The sound of an actor’s voice in a canonical 
performance will easily make us believe in an extra “doth” or two. And 
even here, in a collection of essays and responses, the form of print and 
scholarly affiliation can make incorrect things seem to be authentic. Take 
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this short essay, for example. I confess, here at its conclusion: Zack never 
said that thing to me in the game room at university. We did play quite a 
bit of pinball, but I made up the entire story simply to make a point about 
the formal contexts for authority. Did the framing of this book and the 
trust you have been trained to place in it make the Zuckerian anecdote 
ring true? Did you suspect from the outset (maybe because you have met 
me) that it was complete bunk?
We should always try to discern the force of authority in textual 
matters and otherwise. When we lose track of it entirely, it doth make 
cowards of us all.
NOTES
1 https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110306135138AAf7vmH.
2 Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Chambers, 183. As I show in Hamlet After 
Q1: An Uncanny History of the Shakespearean Text, ch. 4, Chambers was the first 
major editor to gloss the word in this way, but it soon became dominant; but per-
haps ConcernedCitizen is right?
3 Gielgud in an audio recording of three of Hamlet’s soliloquies: www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=BCyjXJ9oogg (no longer available); Burton in the 
famous 1964 Broadway simulcast in theaters, directed by Gielgud: www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lsrOXAY1arg. See also Christopher Plummer in a version for the 
BBC: www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ay2I7py3Og. Among recent productions, 
Mel Gibson, Ethan Hawke, and David Tennant all speak the line correctly with 
does. See Ransom’s “Communications: On Shakespeare’s Language” and the title 
of Butler’s “Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All.”
4 For ease, I have removed the labels on the Y-axis, which run from 0.0% to 
0.00000240% of the GB corpus. The graph is case-insensitive and so will capture 
any form of the text string.
5 To do this, we graph instances of “conscience doth make cowards” as a per-
centage of instances of either “conscience doth make cowards” or “conscience does 
make cowards,” with the formula conscience doth make cowards / (conscience doth 
make cowards + conscience does make cowards). Unfortunately, Google Ngrams 
cannot combine formulae like this one with case-insensitive searching. The graph 
for Conscience with a capital C in each case results in a somewhat higher error rate. 
Owing to OCR problems, however, the actual results include numerous examples 
of the lower-case conscience as well. Running the search with “Thus conscience” 
at the start—to capture the entire line as it appears in most modern editions—
results in a somewhat lower error rate, perhaps because the line is being quoted in 
full and more attentively. But nonetheless, the misquotation generally makes up 
between 20% and 30% of all instances.
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6 There is an important discrepancy between the two graphs. The first shows 
that, in the late nineteenth century, conscience doth was rising significantly relative 
to conscience does, but the second does not show a concomitant rise in the percent-
age of all quotations of the line that are erroneous. This is mathematically impos-
sible and probably points to a problem with the use of OCR in Google Books. 
As noted above, the second graph is necessarily case-sensitive, whereas the first 
was case-insensitive; the discrepancy between the two ways of visualizing the data 
likely derives from difficulties with the OCR recognition of the phrase when it 
is variously capitalized. There is clearly a problem with case-sensitivity in Google 
Ngrams and Google Books, one that is currently impossible to diagnose clearly, 
let alone correct. To make matters more complex, apparently Google Books and 
Google Ngrams have different ways of handling case-sensitivity in searches and 
may return slightly different results. At the large scale of the arguments in this 
paper, however, this should not matter much.
7 An odd digital example: typing Schlegel’s German translation of the line 
(“So macht Gewissen Feige aus uns allen”) into Google Translate yields a retrans-
lation into English as “Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all.” As the algo-
rithms underlying Google Translate do not use the archaic doth, this line must 
have been coded as a unit into Translate by a human, probably using the “Suggest 
an edit” function.
8 Kytö, “Third-Person Present Singular Verb Inflection in Early British and 
American English,” 115.
9 Kytö, “Third-Person Present,” 121.
10 Hoy, “The Shares of Fletcher and his Collaborators,” 74; see Jackson, 
“Looking for Shakespeare in Double Falsehood,” 140.
11 Lucy Munro traces the related process of self-consciously archaizing lan-
guage in Archaic Style in English Literature, 1590–1674.
12 Banks, “The Cowardice of a Guilty Conscience,” 302.
13 The Homiletic Quarterly 4, 556.
14 The Sunday at Home Family Magazine for Sabbath Reading 1487, 683.
15 The differences here seem stark enough that they are unlikely to be 
accounted for by OCR problems with capitalization.
16 On the ways in which the discovery of Q1 in 1823 has influenced our 
understanding of the play and of Shakespeare more broadly, see my Hamlet After 
Q1.
17 On constructions of Q1 as antiquated, “barbaric,” and retrograde, see 
Hamlet After Q1.
18 See Hope, The Authorship of Shakespeare’s Plays, and Munro’s analysis of 
Fletcher’s use of archaic style in The Faithful Shepherdess (Munro, Archaic Style, 
175–77).
19 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, via Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online, image 46, accessed July 27, 2016.
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20 The only scholar I have found who (briefly) draws attention to this misquo-
tation is Callagahan, Hamlet, 32. Callaghan smartly locates the misquotation in 
the context of the three texts of the play.
21 https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/List_of_misquotations; http://listverse.
com/2008/09/15/top-10-shakespeare-misquotes
22 EEBO N-gram Browser, developed by Anupam Basu, http://earlyprint.
wustl.edu/eebotcpngrambrowser.html, accessed July 21, 2016. I use the regular-
ized spelling function.
23 Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Furness, 254.
24 Shakespeare, Hamlet, edited by Jenkins, 59–60.
25 Cole Porter, “Brush up your Shakespeare,” Kiss Me Kate (1948).
26 Woolf, “On Not Knowing Greek,” 23.
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